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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to carry forward the theo¬
retical and practical work of the ANISA Model by:

(1) elaborating on

the ANISA Theory of Development as it pertains to pre-numerical think¬
ing by contrasting it with the theoretical perspectives of Jean Piaget
and his colleagues; and

(2) developing the outline and supportive

materials for a training program that will enable parents and teachers
to facilitate pre-numerical thinking in young children.
The first objective was addressed through a presentation of the
ANISA Model which included a discussion of it's Philosophy, the Theory
of Development, the Theory of Curriculum and the Theory of Pedagogy.
A similar presentation of the Piagetian Theory was made.

Chapter Three

was devoted to a presentation of Piaget’s views on the development of
number.

A review of major research findings with regard to the develop

mental sequence of number, the conservation of number, relational
terminology and conservation, the structure of language, age and the
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attainment of conservation, and length, density and number research.
Chapter Four is devoted to an analysis of ANISA's concept of
learning to learn or learning competence and Piaget's concept of
equilibration from which are derived the major causal or regulatory
mechanisms of development as they apply to the period of the develop¬
ment of number and logic.

Through this analysis, it was concluded

that the ANISA concept of learning competence and Piaget's notion of
equilibration describe in the development of the child a similar
mechanism.

That mechanism basically involves gaining conscious control

over the processes of differentiation, integration and generalization
through equilibratory mechanisms of conflict between schemes.

Internal

conflict between schemes leads the child first to trial and error
solutions,

compromise judgments and retroactive corrections of apparent

discrepancies between the perceptual field and logical operations.

In

the last stage of the development of number, the child is able to con¬
sciously utilize aspects of the operation of number through the trans¬
formational rule structure of reversibility,
tion.

identity and compensa¬

The developmental sequence of number is then described in

ANISA terminology.
theory and research.

This developmental sequence is based upon Piagetian
The result of this analysis was to determine the

learning to learn of number.
The second major objective of the dissertation was that of practi¬
cal implications for an ANISA parent-teacher training program, as
derived from the theoretical synthesis of Piagetian number and ANISA's
learning to learn.

A two-part training program was suggested.

v

The

fi^st part utilizes a modularized "audio-tutorial" technique for training parents and teachers in various aspects of number development.
The modules suggested were:

The fundamental properties of number, the

conservation of number, classification, seriation, and the diagnosis
of the developmental level of competence.
mental properties of nunber,

The first unit, the funda¬

is then developed in some detail which

includes objectives, materials, a booklet for parents and teachers,
and a sample discussion of the fundamental properties of number.

The

second part of the training program places the parents and teachers
in an actual teaching situation with children.

This is conducted

under the guidance of ANISA trainers, and involves actual implementa¬
tion of number experiences with children.

vi
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INTRODUCTION

The number and variety of available models, philosophies and
theories of educational practice have increased dramatically in recent
times.

Many, having been founded upon sound pedagogical and theoreti¬

cal principles, have proved to be effective in at least some measurable
categories.

A wide variety of these programs have been implemented at

the pre-school level.
In a recent study, Bissell divided existing pre-school programs
into four categories based upon their objectives, strategies, and the
extent of their structure.

The four categories were:

permissive-enrichment programs;
(3)

(1) the

(2) the structured-cognitive programs;

the structured-informational programs; and

(4)

the structured-

environment programs.'*"
In the permissive-enrichment category were programs such as Bank
Street, Weikert’s traditional or "Unit" Programs and many Head Start
Centers.

According to Bissell, these programs are "essentially adapta¬

tions of adjustment-centered pre-schools .

.

.

the teaching strategies

2
(of which)

are typically child-centered and permissive."

According

to Weikert, they are characterized by "watching and waiting for the

1Joan Bissell, "The Cognitive Effects of Pre-School Programs for
Disadvantaged Children," in Revisiting Early Childhood Education:
Readings, ed. Joe L. Frost (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.,
1973), p.

224.

2Ibid. , p.

225.

2

child’s needs to emerge and to determine the timing of different
3

activities.

Among programs of the second type, the structured-cognitive pro¬
grams, were, for example, the Karnes Ameliorative program, the
Ypsilanti:

Perry-Piagetian Cognitive program.

In general, these pro¬

grams foster "aptitudes and attitudes directly related to the learning
processes

.

.

.

and they have fostered the development of language,

conceptual, perceptual and attentional processes through a strategy of
teacher-directed activities."^
Among programs of the third type, the structured-informational
programs, were versions of the Bereiter-Engelmann model.

These pro¬

grams have a general goal of teaching specific information through an
extremely structured program which is wholly teacher-directed.
The best examples of structured-environment programs are the
traditional Montessori program and Nimnicht and Meiers "New Nursery
School" program.

In the Montessori program, the children direct their

own activities within a carefully prepared self-instructive environment.
"These programs have learning-process goals and a moderate degree of
structure."-’

Specifically,

the Montessori programs "have as their

3Joan Bissell, "The Cognitive Effects of Pre-School Programs for
Disadvantaged Children" (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1973),
p. 225, quoting D. Weikert, "Pre-School Programs:
Preliminary Findings,"
in Journal of Special Education, I, 1967, pp. 163-181.
^Bissell,

"The Cognitive Effects of Pre-School Programs for

Disadvantaged Children," pp.
5Ibid., pp.

227-228.

226-227.
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objectives the

fostering of growth in ordering and classifying skills,

arithmetic concepts, attentional and sensory faculties and motor
coordination.
Bissell reported significant differences among the programs in
results of tests in cognitive areas as measured by the Stanford-Binet
Intelligence Scale,

the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, the Illinois

Test of Psycholinguistic Abilities, and the Metropolitan Readiness
Test.

"Tests for significant differences among groups indicated that

the performance of children in the Ameliorative (structured-cognitive)
and the Bereiter-Engelmann (structured-informational) programs were
significantly better than that of children in the two traditional pro¬
grams (permissive-enrichment)

and the Montessori programs."^

Remember¬

ing that the programs were divided or classified according to their
objectives,

strategies, and the extent of structure,

it was found that

for "disadvantaged children" the structural approach to cognitive
growth was most effective.
Citing such analyses as Bissell's is to recognize a need for the
educational profession to establish itself on a scientific basis, on
test-proven results.
tive growth,

Although Bissell's analysis concerned only cogni¬

there is a need to show how the above pre-school programs

have been able to establish scientifically-provable effective results
across the entire spectrum of human potentiality.

6Ibid., pp.
^Ibid., p.

227-228.
237.

The programs have
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tended to be piecemeal to a greater or lesser degree when the "whole"
human being is considered.

In recognition of the strengths of prior

educational efforts and in view of the need to establish a comprehen¬
sive approach,

the ANISA model was developed.

This dissertation is associated with the development of the
ANISA model which has evolved over the past thirteen years through
the efforts of Dr. Daniel C. Jordan and his colleagues.
ent time,

At the pres¬

this model would not fit easily into any one of Bissell's

four types of programs, as it transcends each in some fundamental
ways, and is at variance with several of them.

An important charac¬

teristic of the ANISA model is its aspiration to deal developmentally
with the child in a comprehensive manner;

that is, ANISA eventually

aspires to succeed at producing measurable effects along a comprehen¬
sive spectrum of potentialities as the child develops rather than in a
limited number of cognitive and affective categories.

Balanced and

comprehensive development is one of the keys to the release of human
potential.
Another important difference is that ANISA is more than a pre¬
school program.

It includes parent-training, with concern for the

quality of prenatal development, emphasizing that nutrition is the key
to the actualization of biological potential
biological potential).

(or achievement of man’s

It is a teacher-training program, and above all,

because its philosophy is based on the nature of man and not on a
particular methodology,

it can take from all existing successful,

scientifically effective methods or programs and tailor them into a

5

comprehensive program designed to release man's potential across his
entire spectrum of abilities.
The breadth of ANISA's philosophy and educational goals provides
a theoretical umbrella under which the development of specific educa¬
tional objectives, strategies and structures can proceed in logical
consistency with all other specific aspects of the model.
example,

As an

this dissertation relates to a specific area of cognitive

growth which will be developed under the general theoretical umbrella
and which at a later time will be integrated into the entire compre¬
hensive ANISA model.

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this dissertation is to carry forward the theo¬
retical and practical work of the ANISA model by:
(1) elaborating on The ANISA Theory of Development as
it pertains to pre-numerical thinking by contrast¬
ing it with the theoretical perspectives of Jean
Piaget and his colleagues; and,
(2) developing the outline and supportive materials for
a training program that will enable parents and
teachers to facilitate pre-numerical thinking in
young children.

6

The ANISA Theory of Development and the Need for Elaboration

The ANISA model is divided into four major aspects:

a Philosophy,

a Theory of Development, a Theory of Curriculum and a Theory of
Pedagogy.

The Theory of Development is derived from the Philosophy

and in turn provides a broad and logically consistent foudation upon
which rests its application to both Curriculum and Pedagogy.

Chapter

One contains a discussion of all four related categories of the model.
Elaboration of aspects of the Theory of Development and their
consequent application to Curriculum and Pedagogy follow Chapter Three.
Chapter Two is a presentation of Piaget's Theory of Development.

From

Piagetian theory the specific aspect of cognitive growth which is to
be applied to the ANISA Theory of Development, namely, pre-numerical
thinking and the development of logico-mathematical thought
Piagetian phrases),

is derived.

(to the

A detailed analysis of the development

of logico-mathematical thought as it applies to the general issues of
the developmental processes, creativity,

learning, environments and

the nature of interaction with the environments, provide areas of
concern for the elaboration of the ANISA Theory of Development.

This

analysis will be aided by attempting to find the conjunction between
the ANISA Theory of Development with that of Jean Piaget and his theory
of the development of knowledge.

In addition, the extensive body of

research associated with Piagetian theory will be of importance.
Justification for the thesis that the elaboration of the ANISA
Theory of Development can occur through an analysis of Piagetian theory

7

and research as they relate to number thinking is enhanced when one
considers that:

(1) ANISA as a comprehensive model must rely upon the

strength of the individual aspects of the program;
aspects must,

(2) the individual

in turn, be integrated into the entire model;

(3) ANISA

views mathematics as one of the fundamental symbol systems, the mastery
of which is important to the actualization of psychological potential¬
ity;

(4)

Piagetian operations established in early childhood have been

shown to correlate with the "math readiness" of the child when formal
education is realized, as in elementary school;
the foundation of mathematical abilities;

(6)

(5) number thinking is

in spite of the funda¬

mental nature of mathematical abilities established in the pre-school
period,

little longitudinal research has been directed toward strengthen¬

ing its inclusion in curricula.
It was reported recently (Suydam, Marilyn and Weaver, Fred, 1975)
that many surveys have been conducted assessing the mathematical
knowledge acquired by children prior to their entry into school (five
or six years old).

Cited, for example, were:

(1930); Brownwe11 (1941); Ilg and Ames

Buchingham and MacLatchy

(1951); Bjouerud (1960); Rickard

(1967); Heimgartner (1968); Rea and Reys (1970).

"Unfortunately, the

generalization that can be made from such studies are limited for
several reasons:
(1) Usually groups were relatively small, and readily
available groups, rather than groups representative
of the total population, were used.
(2)

Few surveys have been replicated; most were con¬
ducted at only one point in time, as well as in only
one locality.
As with most surveys, the question

8

arises whether the findings would be accurate for
other children in other places.
(3) The methods of collecting information varied.
Some used individual interviews; others used test
groups.
Some used one question to affirm a par¬
ticular aspect; others asked many.
Also the depth
of the questions varied from those requiring
single-worded responses to those requiring manipu¬
lation of objects or, rarely, reasons for answers."8
Later analysis will show that the foundation of mathematical think¬
ing is established in this pre-school period.

Most curriculum efforts

whose thrust concerns mathematical development have been at the ele¬
mentary school level, which occurs after the foundation is established.
Research cited by the above authors corroborate the importance of
Piagetian operations (which are established prior to formal math train¬
ing) with respect to "math readiness" and success in formal training
[Almy, Chittendon, and Miller (1966); Robinson (1968); Steffe (1967);
LeBlanc (1968); Dodwell

(1961); and Wheatley (1968)].

These results,

combined with the strength of the theoretical constructs of ANISA and
Piaget, would suggest not only the justification of, but even the
necessity of including "number thinking" as one aspect of ANISA’s
comprehensive program as it applies to pre-school aged children.

Teacher and Parent Training

In order for this theoretical material to be useful in a

8Marilyn Suydam and Fred Weaver, "Research on Learning Mathema¬
tics," Mathematics Learning in Early Childhood, in Thirty-Seventh
Yearbook of The National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, ed.
Joseph N. Payne (Reston ."Virginia :
The National Council of Teachers of
Mathematics,

1975), pp*

48-49.
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pedagogical sense,

it must eventually be incorporated into a complete

training program.

An outline of the type of training program, its

organization, the materials, etc.,

implied by the complex and detailed

manner in which development proceeds can be developed within the scope
of this dissertation.

Since one of ANISA's goals is to lay a scien¬

tific foundation for the training of teachers, such a training program
can be of great assistance to the implementation of the ANISA model.
The training program will be organized around the developmental
sequence and hierarchy of relationships found within the development
of number thinking.

Its purpose will be to assist the adult learner,

in this case the parent and teacher, to experience the development of
this complex concept in a manner similar to the child's development.
The adult will then understand the processes which enable the child to
develop at an optimum rate towards a full understanding of number, and
the adult will be able to function as an effective guide to the child's
interaction with the environment.
It is important to state that the ANISA model deals with the
education of the whole child, cognitive development being but one
aspect of that whole, and that number is but one aspect of cognitive
development, albeit an important one.

This training program for

parents and teachers must then at some point be incorporated into a
training program which integrates all aspects of development.

10

CHAPTER

I

THE AMISA MODEL

ANISA:

A General Definition

ANISA means 'tree of life' and symbolically represents neverending growth and fruition in the context of protection and
shelter, and signifies the blending of the useable and fruit¬
ful past with a new sense of the future.
... It has cul¬
minated (thirteen years of research) in the formulation of a
philosophical base, from which we derived a theory of develop¬
ment, a theory of curriculum and a theory of teaching—all in
the service of one overarching goal:
the creation of a com¬
prehensive educational system that would be unique in its
power to release human potential.^

ANISA:

A Comprehensive Educational Model

The rationale, justification and historical perspective for the
development of a comprehensive educational model has been documented by
Daniel C. Jordan, Director; Donald T.

Streets, Assistant Director; and

ANISA staff members and will therefore not be attempted here.
to this discussion, however,

Germane

is ANISA's foundation upon a refreshing

view of man and his potentialities, on the bold assertion that man is
the apex of creation and is capable of actualizing his unlimited poten¬
tialities.
For practical purposes, human potential has been divided into two
basic categories:

biological and psychological.

The ANISA Theory of

^Daniel C. Jordan and Donald T. Streets, "The ANISA Model:
A Mew
Basis for Educational Planning," Young Children, Vol. XXVIII, No. 5
(June 1973), p.

290.
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Development fixes nutrition as the key factor in the actualization of
the former and learning as the key factor in the actualization of the
latter.

Psychological potentialities are broken down into five

categories:

the psycho-motor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and

volitional areas.

The actualization 'of potentiality is not viewed as

a description of an end state but rather as indications of man's
ability to continually move beyond himself,

to transcend his present

state by establishing goals, objectives and ideals (anticipated future
states)

and to organize the use of energy around these ideals.

The

capacity to create ideals and respond to them as "lures" makes action
purposive and establishes man as a spiritual being, rather than a
material being whose behavior is mechanistically determined.

The con¬

cept of the spiritual nature of man is philosophically related to the
Whiteheadian notions of immanence and transcendence.
to the "indwellingness" of the past

Immanence refers

(memory) as it is brought to bear

on the present, and transcendence is a state of preparation or anticipa¬
tion of the future.

The conscious control over creating new states of

being in all five areas of potentiality is described as learning
competence.

Stated in another way,

conscious control over the process

of learning is viewed as the key to the release of human potential;

it

is the ability to "learn how to learn" or the ability to consciously
modify and control learning behavior.
This view of the unfoldment of potentiality leads to a definition
of man which is based upon purposive activity.

12

A Definition of Man

The chief feature which distinguishes man as an organism
from man as mechanism is creativity guided by purpose and
expressed by the two fundamental capacities of man, namely,
his ability to know and his ability to love.2
The power made evident through Creativity enables man to structure
the past,

the present and the future in a form that enables him to move

continually beyond himself.

As man's capacities gradually unfold or

become actualized, new foundations for creative advance are built.

The

importance of this principle can be seen when it is examined in the
light of the one or two billion year process through which man has
evolved.

Man's position among all other living organisms which have

evolved is one of preeminence.

Although his preeminence is not of a

physical nature, all of his physical adaptations possessed are well
suited to serve the real elements of his preeminence, his capacity to
know and to love.

The expression of these characteristics has allowed

man to become the dominant creature on earth.

Dobzhansky observes, "It

happens, however, that by all sensible criteria of progress man is
superior to all other creatures.

.

.

The conclusive evidence of man's

superior position is that he, and he alone, has evolved the genotype
which enables him to develop and maintain culture."

ANISA views all

of the elements of culture to be expressions of the two basic capacities
of the individual, which are,

2Ibid. , p.

in broad definition, his ability to know

292.

^Theodosius Dobzhansky, Evolution, Genetics, and Man (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,

1955), p.

373.
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and to love.

Agriculture,

science and technology are expressions of

the capacity to know, whereas idealism,

altruism, emotions, affectively

and social unity are examples of the capacity to love.
Man by nature is conscious of his existence, his powers and his
potentials.

The function of education as conceived by ANISA, therefore,

is to assist man to assume conscious control over these powers and
therefore over his destiny,

a destiny which is dependent upon trans¬

lating the latent potentialities into actuality at an optimum rate.
Whitehead's philosophy of the organism has been drawn upon heavily
in developing ANISA's philosophy.

It provides "a new vision that can

integrate the massive knowledge about child development in a way that
illumines the nature of man and accounts for the phenomenon of purpose
and its role in continual actualization of human potentialities."
The capacity for consciousness itself is inherent in the
nature of man, but its quality is dependent upon the experi¬
ence of the organism, the accumulation of its past stored
as memory (a form of immanence) and the contrast of that
past with the experience of the immediate present in prepa¬
ration or anticipation of the future (a form of transcen¬
dence) .
These qualities of immanence and transcendence—
prerequisites of consciousness and self-awareness—define
man's essential being in spiritual rather than material
terms, a central proposition of the philosophical basis of
the model.^
The word "spiritual" as it relates to man's being—expressing the
qualities of immanence and transcendence—is used to suggest an onto¬
logical principle in man's becoming which is "evidenced by man's
ability to structure the unknown and to form ideals which express

^Jordan and Streets,

"The ANISA Model," p.

292.

14

subjective aim or intention which in turn guides the process of
becoming—perpetual self-transcendence."5
Conscious control over the processes of becoming and as a result
control over what one develops into as an ontological principle is not
suggested by current models of biological evolution, nor does conscious
control reflect back on vitalistic accounts of evolution.

Although

there is not as yet a single universally accepted theory of biological
evolution, Darwin's natural selection and Lamark's environmental influ¬
ence model have provided a foundation for modern interpretations such
as Waddington's and Piaget’s.

Theirs is the recognition that life is

an organization which directs and places limits on the nature of the
interaction which can occur between the environment and the organism.* **
The control and influence exercised by the structure or organization
itself advanced by the ANISA theory is very closely allied to
Waddington's and Piaget's, although Piaget mainly explains development
in terms of autoregulatory and equilibration mechanisms which normally
depend upon the conscious activity, whereas ANISA places greater
emphasis on the determining aspect of conscious control;

i.e., develop¬

ment is fundamentally determined by purposive activity and hence cannot
be automatic or autoregulatory in nature.

For ANISA the advent of

immanence and transcendence is unique to man; however, man is not solely

5Ibid., p.

292.

**For a more complete discussion of mechanisms of evolution, see
p.

in Chapter II.
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accounted for through them as these developmental principles do not
operate to exclude all levels of evolutionary mechanisms for all must
be incorporated if the origin and development of man's potential is to
be fully explained.

The Process of Becoming

ANISA recognizes and explains becoming through three interrelated
processes:

growth, development and maturation.

Maturation refers to

the genetically determined aspect of the development of the physical
organism,

such as the nervous system which requires a timetable of some

fifteen years to reach full maturity.
increase in size.
development.

Growth refers simply to an

Hence, our concern is centered on what is meant by

"The theory broadly defines development as the process of

translating potentiality (biological and psychological)

into actuality;

makes that process synonymous with creativity as the fundamental and
inherent dynamic characteristic of the organism; establishes inter¬
action with the environment as the general means by which the process
is sustained.

Learning—The Key Factor in the
Release of Man's Potential

The Key factor in the process of translating psychological poten¬
tialities into actuality is learning.

7Ibid., p.

293.

It is fundamental because it
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implies gaining conscious control over the process of becoming.

The

conscious control is manifest when one is "in charge of the process of
knowing how to learn."

Knowing how to learn is what is meant by learn¬

ing competence.
From a general perspective,. the strength of this thesis is tied
to the idea that creativity is the fundamental and dynamic characteris¬
tic of the organism.

As a dynamic,

it is related in a larger sense to

motivation, a force which is thought to be behind all learning.

The

most powerful form is intrinsic motivation which in ANISA terms "comes
from a subjective confirmation that competence is being gained."8 9
a child's relationship with his parents,
confirming one,

When

teacher and environment is a

i.e., when from the environment affirmative support and

protection are received,

then progress is made at an optimum rate.

In

this "feedback" system, Robert White (1959) has suggested a term for
this sense of competence, this motive force behind all action and learn¬
ing,

this sense of well being when growth is occurring.

He calls it

"effectance"—qualified by Jordan as "a psychogenic motive which arises
Q

out of the structure of consciousness."

The term psychogenic in this

case means structured in the consciousness as opposed to viscerogenic
(motives such as thirst, hunger, or sex) or neurogenic (motives of
sensation and reflexes).
The unity of all existence represented in man is dynamic;
it is experienced as a consciousness in which stored

8Ibid., p.

296.

9Ibid., p.

296.
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accumulations of past experiences are brought to bear upon
immediate circumstances in anticipation of the future_an
a^iCuPati°n felt in the iiranediate present as purpose fused
with hope and aspiration.
Man is thus a conscious creature
capable of creating his future out of his past by virtue of
decisions he makes in the immediate present.
The quality of
those decisions determines the rate by which his potentiali¬
ties are translated into actuality.
It is that process of
translating potentiality into actuality which the philosophy
underlying the ANISA model illumines.
Learning, very broadly
defined, is the essential dynamic of that process and gaining
conscious control over the process is what is meant by learn¬
ing competence.
Now that intrinsic motivation has been related to an inherent
dynamic, creativity,

and this has been given the name "effectance" and

has been described as the force behind the process of becoming, more
can be specifically said about the conscious control of this activity
or process through learning.

The Process of Differentiation, Integration,
Generalization and Learning Competence

Competence depends on gaining conscious control over the processes
of learning.

Competence or conscious control is itself something which

must be learned.

It is learning how to learn.

It is gained when the

environment of the child established by his parents and by an educa¬
tional system such as ANISA helps "students to develop an inner accep¬
tance of responsibility for developing their own infinitude of poten¬
tialities through the acknowledgement and cultivation of a sense of

■^Daniel C. Jordan and Raymond P. Shepard, "The Philosophy of the
ANISA Model," World Order, Vol.

7, No.

1, Fall 1972, p.

295.
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purpose as it relates to aspirations and ideals."11
Another requirement of learning competence is the capacity to
utilize the fundamental processes or mechanisms of learning.
the processes of differentiation,

These are

integration and generalization.

Jordan has defined learning competence and its processes as "the
ability to differentiate experience, whether internal or external,
separate elements,

to integrate them in a new way,

into

thereby providing

new information, new feelings, new skills and new perceptions which may
or may not become expressed immediately in some form of overt behavior,
and to generalize the integration."

12

The efficacy and power of this concept of learning competence can
be best understood and judged after an explanation of five related
aspects of ANISA theory.

They are:

(1) A specific analysis of the relevance of the processes
of differentiation, integration and generalization to
general learning theories.
(2) An analysis of the five areas of human potentiality
as outlined by ANISA (Psycho-motor, Perceptual,
Cognitive, Affective and Volitional) with respect to
differentiation,

integration and generalization acting

as common denominators of all types of learning
reflected in different categories of potentiality.

^-Jordan and Streets, "The ANISA Model," p.
l2Ibid. , p.

297.

295.
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(3) The definition of the environments (Physical, Human,
Unknown and the Self) which provide sites of inter¬
action of experience specified in the definition of
learning competence and their integration with the
processes of differentiation, integration and
generalization.
(4) The achievement of competence as it relates to stages
of development and the various forms which differen¬
tiation,

integration and generalization take in each

respective stage.
(5) A description of behavior expressed as actualized
potentialities which provides criteria for judging
learning competence.

1.
The Processes of Differentiation, Integration and Generalization
as Common Denominators of a Variety of Learning Theories
In 1971, Jordan researched a wide variety of learning theories
specifically for the purpose of finding common denominators of learning.
These included "Gayne's eight types of learning, Walter's brain wave
theory, Tolman's sign learning, Lewin's field theory, Snygg and Comb's
perception theory, Bandura's modeling theory, Moxrcer's two-factor
learning theory, various mediational theories, Piaget s theory, the
TOTE theory of Miller, Primbam and Galantar, Skinner's work on condi¬
tioning, and Harlow's theory of learning sets."13

Jordan concluded

13Daniel C. Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human
Potential," unpublished manuscript. Xerox, December 1971.
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from this study that the processes of differentiation, integration and
generalization applied as general or common denominators across all of
these theories.

The following is the definition of learning competence

derived from that study.
Learning competence, then refers to a capacity to abstract
(differentiate) or select from what is stored in one's
memory about the process of learning experienced earlier
that is relevant to a present learning task and apply it
appropriately to the task.
To do this 'appropriately' will
involve some kind of association (integration) of the dif¬
ferentiated or abstracted aspects of previous learning
processes with the requirements of a present task.-^
Generalization was not included at that time, although it is
obvious that any integration gains in utility if it can be generalized
to wider fields of application, and the ability to generalize thus
increases the competence of the human being as a learner.
An analysis of some aspects of the relationship between ANISA's
learning competence model (differentiation,
tion) and Piaget's model

integration and generaliza¬

(assimilation, accommodation and equilibration)

as they relate to number development will be made later in this work.

2.

Categories of Potentiality
One of the most important elements of ANISA theory is the recogni¬

tion of the breadth of human development accompanied by attempts to
specify the developmental processes fundamental to different types of
potentiality.

These developmental processes are incorporated into what

is hoped will be a comprehensive approach to curriculum and human

14 Ibid., p.

56.
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development.

Five major types of potentiality have been identified,

the first three of which most school systems deal with in some fashion
(although not from an ANISA perspective):
cognitive;

psycho-motor, perceptual and

the remaining two are affective and volitional.

It is

important to recognize both the usefulness and the limits of these
definitions, as on the one hand they seem to specify the type of educa¬
tional experiences needed while on the other hand they may lead to frag¬
mented conceptions of the human being;

in reality there is no fragmenta¬

tion as the areas of potential overlap.
Learning is the key to the release of each one of these areas of
potentiality, hence it is now appropriate to explore the application of
learning competence to each area and to suggest how the differentiation,
integration and generalization might differ.
Psycho-motor potentialities:

"Competence in this area refers to

a capacity to coordinate, control and direct the movement and position
of the voluntary muscles.Various motor activities must be differ¬
entiated,

integrated and generalized in order that all of the general

motor activities become established as part of the motor base of the
child.

Some of the processes recognized are balance and posture, loco¬

motion, manipulation receipt and propulsion.

Since much of this

activity occurs at the beginning of a child’s life, and since develop¬
ment is continuous and progressive, much that is established in the
psycho-motor base forms the foundation for the other areas of

■^Jordan and Streets, "The ANISA Model," p.

298.
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potentiality:

perceptual, cognitive, affective and volitional poten¬

tialities.
Perceptual potentialities:

"Perceptual competence refers to the

capacity to differentiate sensory information and integrate that infor¬
mation into generalizable patterns which constitute interpretations of
reality that enable the organism to make meaningful decisions and to
act.

,,16

with:

Some of the processes recognized to this date are associated
vision, audition, olfaction (smell), taste, the cutaneous senses

(touch, cold, hot)

and the vestibular senses (equilibrium).

When com¬

bined, these processes establish a structure analogous to the motor
base, namely the perceptual base.

This base not only has functions

related to perception itself, but with internal structuring and organi¬
zation incoming stimuli are interpreted "in terms of past experience,
present needs, and aspirations or intuitions which concern the
future."'*'7

Differentiation, integration and generalization act as a

set of processes governed by the perceptual base leading to further
structuring of perceptual knowledge.

Changes in the perceptual base

assist to keep the perceptual world of reality in concert with changes
in the cognitive or affective worlds of reality.
Cognitive Potentialities:

Cognitive competence evolves through

successive stages of development and has its origin in the psycho—motor
and perceptual bases.

■^Ibid. , p.

299.

17Ibid. , p.

299.

Cognitive competence, which is most closely
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related to the "knowing" end of the bi-polar axis of man's poten¬
tiality,

the ability to know and to love, represents one of the main

avenues through which man moves beyond himself in the creative advance
into novelty; although cognition has its origins in a psycho-motor and
perceptual base

(physical reality)

of abstract knowledge.

it moves beyond them into the world

This advance represents a large portion of what

is described as consciousness and it accounts for much of man's adap¬
tive control over his environment.

In knowledge is the construction of

man's reality which is by nature unlimited in possibilities.
Some of the basic thinking processes which have been identified
involve operations such as:

analysis,

syntheses, classification, seria-

tion, number relations, deductive and inductive inference, interpola¬
tion, extrapolation, analogy,

conservation and transitive relations.

Many of these operations are interrelated with other operations.

All

are gradually structured through interaction with man's environments
over time.

All involve the abilities to transform, displace, connect,

and combine the abstractions or differentiations of thought.

Thought

begins with differentiations which are integrated or combined in some
fashion according to the rules of the structure or operation dealing
with the abstraction, and is completed when the integration is
generalized to new situations.
Affective Potentialities:

Affective competence "refers to the

ability to organize one's emotions and feelings that energize the
system and support in a positive manner the release of further
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potentiality."

18

Affective competence refers to the ability to love,

the second aspect of the bi-polor axis, referred to earlier.

"The

organization of emotional life depends on being able to differentiate
emotions,

integrate them in reference to objects, events or ideals and

to generalize them in ways that provide basic stability in life."19
Volitional Potentialities:

Volitional competence "is the capacity

to form ultimate aims, differentiate them into operable goals and
integrate them into a perpetual flow of intentional behavior directed
toward the achievement of those goals.'
the core of conscious control;
over his destiny.

is central to man achieving control

Moreover it is essential to the process of translating

potentiality into actuality.
"concrescence"

i.e.,

Volitional competence is at

(1929).

Alfred North Whitehead terms this process

"Concrescence not only includes everything

normally conveyed by the word development but also encompasses man's
unique ability to go beyond himself—the ability to accumulate the past,
bring it to bear on the present while structuring the future, thereby
moving perpetually beyond any present state of being.
means of that

'moving beyond'

advance into novelty.'"
Volition,

Learning is the

which Whitehead calls the 'creative

21

so often overlooked in today's educational world,

18Ibid., P-

300.

19Ibid., P-

300.

20Ibid., P-

300-301

21Ibid. , P-

295.

is at
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the very heart of the construction "learning competence."

It charac¬

terizes the ontological principle spoken of earlier, namely, that learn¬
ing competence depends on a conscious activity which is directed by
intention, will, aim and purpose.

The role of volition in learning is

applied to the very processes of learning competence when Jordan and
Streets state:

"The processes of differentiation,

generalization are neither random or haphazard.

integration, and

In most instances,

they are directed by intention or subjective aim, which determines what
becomes abstracted and how the abstracted or differentiated elements
are then integrated and generalized."

3.
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The Classification of Man's Environments
The classification of man’s environments is important to learning

competence from two perspectives.
(differentiation,

First, learning is an active process

integration and generalization) which occurs when the

learner interacts with the environment.

This can be summarized by the

following simple diagram:

Potentiality-^ Actuality
Experience

22Ibid. , p.

(encounters and interactions
with the environment which
sustains biological matura¬
tion and learning)23

297.

23Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human Potential
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Second, the content of curriculum is information about the world
organized around these environments.

These environments are:

The physical environment:
includes everything except
human beings.
It can be broken down into three
sub-categories; mineral, vegetable and animal.
The
curriculum content expressed in this environment is
exemplified by the following examples:
mathematics,
natural sciences, natural history, and technology.
The human environment:
includes all human beings and is
characterized by such curriculum content as language,
communications (reading, writing and speaking),
social sciences, human relations, ethics, and other
unspecified aspects of culture.
The unknown environment:
includes all that we know that
we do not know; i.e., man has the ability to
describe what he does not know.
Curriculum content
areas are art, aesthetics, philosophy, literature,
religion, etc.
The Self:
represents a combination of the physical,
humar. and the unknown environments.
"The self is
a special case of the human environment, special
because for a particular person it becomes the most
constant aspect of his total environment.
It can
never be abandoned or left behind.
Though con¬
stantly present, it is also changing.
Whitehead
reminds us that process and a Self require each
othe1'; in separation all meaning evaporates and
neither can be understood.
The forms of process
derive their character from the individuals involved
and the environments in which they exist; the charac¬
ters of the individuals can only be understood in
terms of the process in which they are implicated.
... As the self interacts with the environment,
its potentialities (expressed through the processes)
are actualized—that is, they become powers."24

24Michae]

F. Kalinowski and Daniel C. Jordan, "Being and Becoming

The ANISA Theory of Development," World Order, Vol.

7, Ho.

A, p.

21;

Donald T. Streets and Daniel C. Jordan, "Guiding the Process of
Becoming:
The ANISA Theories of Curriculum and Teaching, World Order,
Vol.

7, No.

A, p.

33.
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The characterization of the environments with which the learner
interacts is important when attempting to describe the nature of the
learning,

hence, the nature of the differentiation,

generalization which occurs.

integration and

This is especially important when consid¬

ered by the teacher who is responsible for organizing the type of
environment, which by its organization may encourage a type of dif¬
ferentiation,

integration, or generalization.

As "differentiation,

integration, and generalization comprise the

common denominator of all types of learning reflected in the different
categories of potentialities ..." (psycho-motor, perceptual, etc.)
and as "the child develops through an interaction with his total
environment"

25

ferentiation,

(physical, human, etc.), then the processes of dif¬
integration and generalization must mediate the inter¬

action with the environments.
For example,

as the child interacts with the physical environment

various cognitive potentials may be exercised and developed.

Streets

and Jordan26 describe an example of the way in which the physical
environment can be arranged to facilitate differentiation, integration
and generalization in pursuit of the development of the cognitive
process of inductive inference.

The specific content is Archimedes'

principle of bouyancy which states that a floating body sinks until it

25Street and Jordan, "Guiding the Process of Becoming," pp.
34.
26 Ibid., p.

37.

30,
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displaces its own weight in water.
table and a bottle cap.

Materials suggested are a water

Initially the empty cap floats; however, as

the child adds water drop by drop (adding weight to the cap), it
gradually sinks lower and lower.

If three or four caps are used

simultaneously, each with a different amount of water in the cap,
a comparison (or differentiation)
ferent weights.

can be made as to the effect of dif¬

This comparison is extended

(integrated) when all four

caps are considered simultaneously, at which time an inference regard¬
ing both the effect of weight in the specific instance and in the
generalized condition to other similar objects placed in the water
table can be made.
The classification and definition of each environment allows
prescription of the type of interaction which is appropriate in an
ANISA classroom where the types of experiences reinforce the content
to be developed as well as the processes of differentiation, integra¬
tion and generalization.
The processes of differentiation,

integration and generalization

remain fundamental across all forms of interaction which are incorpo¬
rated in the ANISA curriculum.

However, the type of interaction and

content varies depending upon the environment interacted with.
To apply the basic principle underlying the achievement of
learning competence look for the possibilities of express¬
ing differentiation and integration in any given situation,
and make the alterations in the situation needed to provide
such opportunities; then make certain the child can take
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advantage of those opportunities appropriate to his develop¬
mental level.27
Mention of developmental level brings us to a consideration of the
relationship between stages and learning competence.

4.

Stages of Development and Learning Competence
Development from an ANISA perspective is viewed as an orderly

process to which there is a rhythm which is characterized by pattern
and timing.
Pattern.
In development, pattern is reflected in sequence.
Because development is an orderly process and because we
conceive it to be any change which has a continuous direc¬
tion and which culminates in a phase that is qualitatively
new, we define a developmental sequence as the order of
those changes in an organism that yield relatively perma¬
nent but novel increments not only in its structure but in
its modes of functioning as well. °
The increments of change are assumed by some theorists to occur in
a universally invariant pattern which gives rise to the notion of stage,
as each stage is fundamentally different from the preceding stage and is
viewed as a prerequisite to its successor.

Philosophical justification

for adopting a stage-related-sequence of development is found in
ANISA's reliance upon Alfred N. Whitehead and Michael Polyani.

Polyani

"refers to the hierarchical structure of creation, rising from inani¬
mate to the living and on to the subsequent layers of each biotic level,
as the process of emergence which has culminated in the reality of man.

27Jordan,
p.

"Learning Competence and the Release of Human Potential,

59.
2®Kalinowski and Jordan,

"Being and Becoming,

p.

22.

30

"In Whitehead's terms,

the already realized data when fused with sub¬

jective aim or purpose, enables one to transcend that

'boundary'

attain a higher level of organizational complexity."29

and

Whitehead has

identified here subjective aim or purpose as the causal factor which
enables passage from one stage to another.

In addition, because Jordan

found differentiation and integration to be common to all of the learn¬
ing theories referred to earlier, one can hypothesize that they are
three substages which characterize the orderly progression through a
stage.

The three substages are:

and (3)

generalization.

(1) differentiation,

(2)

integration,

Recalling that learning competence is motivated by Whitehead's
subjective aim or purpose,

the above stages can be related to the

gradual unfoldment and development of intentioned behavior.

"The

orderly process of development is guided by conscious or unconscious
intention or subjective aim, which determines what becomes abstracted,
and how the abstracted or differentiated elements are integrated and
generalized. "3<9
The second major aspect of rhythm is timing.

As pattern or a

theory of stages applies universally to all children, the concept of
timing is meant to apply to the individual child who develops at his
own individual rate.

The development or unfoldment of potentiality, a

process to which an educational model must be sensitive, occurs within

29Ibid. , pp.
30Ibid., p.

23-24.
23.
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the individual child.
The concept of timing has also been extended to the hypothesized
presence of sensitive periods within development.

"A sensitive period

is a limited period during which an organism is particularly amenable
to certain experiences that will usually bring about significant and
lasting changes in tissue growth, physiological functioning, and/or
psychological functioning."31

in a broad educational sense the concept

of a sensitive period adds to the general concept of stage when optimum
growth factors are sought.

This becomes even more important when some

sensitive periods are thought to be critical periods.

"If the suscepti¬

bility to a particular developmental modifier is limited only to the
sensitive period and if the presence or absence of that modifier
during the sensitive period results in permanent damage or change, the
sensitive period should be designated a critical period."

32

Both the concept of the sensitive period and the more limited
critical period are hypothetical constructs at this time, as little
psychological research has been conducted which would support them.
From an educational perspective,
explored,

they are valuable hypotheses to be

for if they do exist they are obviously of great importance

to the release of all of man's potential.
It should be noted that the notion of stages in development is
not central to the ANISA Theory of Development.

31Ibid., p.

24.

32Ibid., p.

24.

Stage has been explored
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by ANISA staff members as an adjunct to the central theory and the
general conclusion has been that stage in no way contradicts but, in
fact, may lend some of the needed specificity to general concepts such
as learning competence.

At this time, however, no recognized pattern

to development has been found which cuts across all of the domains of
man s potentials,

although patterns have been recognized in each of the

domains separately.

A close and natural connection has been noted

between the psycho—motor base and perceptual base as precursors to
cognitive development, and thus a notion of stage has begun to emerge.
Further, one attempt to generalize stage has been made in the article
by Kalinowski and Jordan (1973).
It is my intent to show later in this work that a necessary con¬
nection must be made between Piagetian notion of stage and the achieve¬
ment of learning competence, as they relate to number development.

As

learning competence relates to the processes of learning through dif¬
ferentiation,

integration and generalization and as Piaget recognizes

that the manner or process by which man relates to his environment
changes in its fundamental character through a series of invariantly
ordered stages in the cognitive domain, then the processes of dif¬
ferentiation,

integration and generalization must fundamentally change

form and evolve through each stage.

5.

A Description of Behavior Expressed as Actualized Potentiali¬

ties Which Provides Criteria for Judging Learning Competence
Criteria for judging learning competence must fundamentally and
broadly be based upon behavior evidence of the conscious control over
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the processes of learning; namely, differentiation,
generalization.

integration and

Diagnostic instruments need to be designed to analyze

the child’s ability in a learning situation, i.e., his ability to first
differentiate aspects of experience arising out of the environment
interacted with,

then integrate them as required in many cognitive

inference schemes or schemes where some sort of coordination between
the attributes is required, as in conservation exercises, and finally
to generalize what has been learned to new situations.
On a more specific level,

learning competence becomes manifest

as each of the five areas of potentiality becomes actualized.

Compe¬

tence in the psycho-motor domain, for example, would be described by a
wide variety or behaviors which manifest the ability to control,
coordinate and direct the movement and position of the voluntary muscles.
Specific examples among the wide variety of psycho-motor compe¬
tencies involve balance, posture,
sorts.

locomotion and manipulations of many

In the cognitive domain, competency would manifest itself in

many of the traditional areas included in curriculum,
math,

reading,

etc.

specific abilities.

such as language,

In each of these broad cognitive areas are many
In mathematics and in number relations, for

example, are found such abilities as classification, of which there
are many types such as simple classifications or hierarchical classifi¬
cations that are eventually extended to include the quantitative
properties of number.

The volitional domain is generally characterized

by the ability to differentiate purpose into operable goals and inte¬
grate them into a perpetual flow of intentional behavior directed

towards the achievement of goals.

Some of the processes which relate

to the development of volition and therefore to possible areas of
diagnostic analysis are "attention, goal-setting, self-arousal,
perseverance, effecting closure and fantasizing a state of goal attain¬
ment."33
Higher order competencies comprise the most complex levels of
evidence of learning competence as they represent a fusion of all five
areas of potentiality, each one contributing in various proportions to
any specific higher-order competency,
values.

in combination with attitudes and

The higher-order competencies are technological, moral, and

spiritual, and personal effectance which is a combination of the other
three.

Higher-order competencies develop with respect to each of the

environments described previously.

For example, technological compe¬

tence results from an interaction with the physical environment.

Each

one of the five areas of human potential is developed in various degrees
in this interaction with the physical environment.
are actualized,

they are structured.

called attitudes and values.
corresponding value base.

As potentialities

These resultant structures are

Each higher-order competency rests on its

Thus,

technological competence rests on

material values; moral competence rests on social values; and philo¬
sophical competence rests on religious values.
One of the important contributions of the ANISA model deals with
moral competence.

Individual moral competence is recognized by ANISA

33Streets and Jordan, "Guiding the Process of Becoming," p.

33.
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as a crucial expression of societal responsibility.

One aspect of this

competency delineated by ANISA is the recognition of the unity of man¬
kind which is a fusion of information about mankind with social atti¬
tudes and values.

This aspect and many others necessary to the well¬

being of specific societies and mankind in general comprise moral
competence.
Personal effectance is the "highest" of the higher-order compe¬
tencies because it represents an integration of technological compe¬
tence, moral competence and philosophical competence.

Personal

effectance is fundamental to expression of creativity in the human
being, is fundamental to a person's sense of well being about himself
and hence governs mastery of dealing with the environments and "thus
the capacity for self-transcendence and continuing development.

,,34

The ANISA Theory of Curriculum and Teaching

The ANISA theories of Curriculum and Pedagogy are logical deriva¬
tives of the Theory of Development presented in previous pages.

In

support of its logical relation to the Theory of Development, specific
criteria have been established and met by the theories.

Prior to the

practical implementation of the model which has occurred in subsequent
years, Jordan (1971) established five criteria which provided guidelines
for the development of a Theory of Learning which would guide the Theory
of Curriculum:

34Jordan and Streets, "The ANISA Model," p. 302.
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(1) They (components of a Theory of Learning) should
provide the basis for understanding all types and
processes of human learning (i.e., they should be
as comprehensive as possible).
(2) They should shed light on what kinds of environ¬
ments, forces, factors, or experiences stimulate
learning.
(3) They should account for things in the environment
or within the individual which inhibit or block
learning.
(4) They should enable us to make fairly reliable pre¬
dictions about outcomes.
(5) They should enable us to generate a variety of
hypotheses about learning competence which can
be tested out so that we can begin to identify
the really critical factors in the teaching¬
learning process.35
Most of the criteria presented here have been discussed in pre¬
vious sections and will be reviewed here as they apply to the Theory
of Curriculum.

Foshay and Beilin have also briefly outlined a few

additional criteria which have been accepted by Jordan and colleagues
with respect to the Theory of Curriculum.
When a comprehensive curriculum theory is built, it will
have to take into account not only the learning methods
and teaching methods (strategies of instruction and the
like), but also the knowledge to be learned, the nature of
the student who will learn it, and the nature of the
societal responsibility shared by teacher and student.
For if education is a moral affair before it is a techni¬
cal affair, then the grounds for moral behavior have to be
incorporated in one's theory of educational action.

Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human Potential,"

pp. 8-9.
36"Curriculum" in Robert L. Ebel, et al., eds.. Encyclopedia of
Educational Research, Fourth Edition, N. 2 quoted in Donald T. Streets
and Daniel C. Jordan, "Guiding the Process of Becoming," World Order,
Vol.

7, No. 4, 1973, p. 29.
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"Curriculum, as we define it, is comprised of two interrelated
sets of goals and what children do, usually with the help of peers and
adults, to achieve those goals."

One set of goals relates to the infor¬

mation or content of curriculum, the other to the process goals.

The

organization of the content goals rests on the "classification of
environments (physical, human, unknown and the Self), and includes
three basic symbol systems (mathematics, language and art) used to con¬
vey information."

The organization of the "process goals rests upon

the classification of the potentialities of the human organism (psycho¬
motor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and volitional) and the means
by which those potentialities become actualized.

The Environments and the Content of Curriculum

Classification of the environments provides a conceptual framework
in which to organize all of those elements which we inherit from our
cultures, which are the content of curriculum.

The content curriculum

organized around the physical environment includes mathematics, natural
sciences, natural history and technology.

The content curriculum

organized around the human environment includes language and communica¬
tion (reading, writing and speaking), social sciences, human relations,
and ethics.

The content curriculum organized around the unknown

environment includes art, aesthetics, philosophy, and religion.

The

"curriculum of the Self" is an accumulation of all of the above as they

37Streets and Jordan, "Guiding the Process of Becoming," p. 30.
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relate to the Self.

The information relating to the Self is "organized

around the categories of potentialities and includes body-awareness,
Perception,

self-concept, self-esteem,

self-determination, physi¬

cal health, the social self and the ideal-self."38
The three symbol systems or systems of representation mediate both
the assimilation of the content curriculum and the mastery of the
process of curriculum.

They are mathematics for the physical environ¬

ment, language for the human environment and art for the environment of
the unknown.

Since these symbol systems are relatively recent additions

to ANISA theory,

the exact relationship with respect to representational

knowing in the empiricist tradition

(S-R psychology) or with respect to

the nature of knowing and representation from Piagetian perspective has
not been fully explored;

i.e.,

the exact functional relationship of a

symbol system to develop or the process of becoming has not been fully
determined.
In the empiricist

(S-R)

tradition,

internalized representation of

the overt sign or symbol is a sufficient explanation of knowledge.

The

causal factor of the development of knowledge is the stimulus or the
external sign which causes the internal sign.

Knowledge, therefore,

has as its adequate source the external reality, sign or symbol, such as
language.

In ANISA terms, knowledge has its origin in learning,

processes of differentiation,

integration and generalization.

in the

Although

the role of the processes has not yet been as clearly defined in ANISA

38lbid., pp.

33-34.
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theory as they have in Piagetian theory, where the functional signifi¬
cance of the internal system or structure is transformational in
character,

i.e., knowledge is not copied but is transformed through

assimilation and accommodation mechanisms, it is clear that both ANISA
and Piaget rely upon the intervention of processes as causal agents to
development.

The Five Categories of Potentiality
and the Process of Curriculum

The process goals relate to the actualization of potentiality in
the five categories of potentiality.

Learning has been identified as

the key to the release of potential in each one of the five categories.
More specifically, the process of learning is defined as the ability to
know how to learn or learning competence.

Through knowing how to learn

or the conscious control of the processes of learning, the child attains
mastery over the fundamental factor in the release of his potential.
According to Harlow, this capacity of "learning to learn transforms
the organism from a creature that adapts to a changing environment by
trial and error to one that adapts by seeming hypothesis and insight."

39

Each one of the categories of potential has been explored from a
perspective of the function of the processes of differentiation, inte¬
gration and generalization.

What remains to be discussed is the fusion

39"The Fermation of Learning Sets," N. 59, quoted in Daniel C.
Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human Potential,
unpublished manuscript, 1971, p.

54.
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o f the content and process in curriculum.
One important aspect of this fusion of content and process relates
to the formation of attitudes and values which "collectively constitute
character and personality."^0

As the child develops through an inter¬

action with his environment, his potentialities become actualized, that
is they become structured.

As they become structured, the environment

of the Self is gradually built, which has already been described as the
fusion of all cf the other environments.

One important aspect of the

Self is the character and personality, partly made up of values and
attitudes, which are structured through interaction with the various
environments.
For example, as a child interacts with the physical environ¬
ment, potentialities (psycho-motor, perceptual, cognitive,
affective and volitional) are collectively released (process)
and blended with selected information (content) about that
environment to form material attitudes and values on which
technological competence rests. . . .
Interaction with the human environment, in similar fashion,
translates those same basic potentialities into structured
powers which collectively and interrelatedly combine with
information about mankind to form social attitudes and
values on which a person's moral competence rests.
As one attempts to interact with the ultimate unknowns and
to structure them, he forms ideals.
This kind of inter¬
action leads to the formation of religious attitudes and
values on which spiritual competence rests. . . .
As the Self interacts with its own self within the context
of the other environments, all the other values become
integrated.
This integration constitutes the structural
and functional reality of personal identity—the funda¬
mental expression of creativity inherent in all human

40

Streets and Jordan, "Guiding the Process of Becoming," p.

34.
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beings.
Personal effectance is determined by the quality
of this integrated structuring.
If the quality is good,
the person will be both confident and competent to deal with
the environment; and his capacity for transformation and
continual development will be insured.
In other words, per¬
sonal effectance is 'self-competence'—a combination of tech¬
nological competence, psychological competence, moral compe¬
tence, and spiritual competence.^1
An analysis of the foregoing with respect to the initial criteria
for a comprehensive curriculum theory cited at the beginning of this
section reveals that most, if not all, of the criteria have been
addressed, such as learning processes, types of learning, the environ¬
ment,

forces,

factors and experiences which stimulate or block learning

and the nature of culture and societal responsibility.

This was accom¬

plished through the content and process issues of curriculum which com¬
prise two aspects of a unified curriculum theory.

The concept of per¬

sonal effectance which includes motive factors, and the union of tech¬
nological, psychological, moral and spiritual competencies directly
addresses the need to clarify societal responsibility and makes educa¬
tion a moral affair as well as a technical affair.

ANISA's Theory of Pedagogy

The ANISA Theory of Teaching flows directly from the Theory of
Development and Curriculum.
According to the theory of development, development is sus¬
tained by the organism's interaction with the environment.
Thus it follows that teaching will take its definition from
this premise.
Teaching, therefore, means arranging environ¬
ments and guiding interactions with them to achieve the goals

41 Ibid., pp.

34-35.
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specified by the theory of curriculum.
The theory of
pedagogy classifies arrangements and interactions in terms
of these goals.
Since the main goal is the development or
achievement of learning competence, and since learning
competence means the ability to differentiate, integrate,
and generalize aspects of experience, environmental arrange¬
ments and interactions with them can be classified in terms
of the particular aspect of learning competence they facili¬
tate.^2
The teacher then has the role of arranging environments and guiding
interactions of the child in order that learning competence is achieved
by the individual.

The teacher in this frame of reference must then

deal with the individual child as each child is at a different level of
development and has unique strengths and deficiencies.

Therefore, the

teacher must not only be skilled at guiding interactions with the
environment but mast also assume a diagnostic and prescriptive role with
respect to each child.

As various levels of competency are achieved by

the child and "as the child grows and develops, he will come to take a
more active role in diagnosing his own needs and prescribing the arrange¬
ment of his own environments and his own interactions with them.

He
/

'X

then becomes a teacher of his own Self—an independent learner."

Implementation and Evaluation of the ANISA Model

As stated in the introduction, ANISA has been under development as
an educational model for the past thirteen years.
years it has been implemented in three sites,

A2Ibid., p.

36.

A3Ibid., p.

37.

Over the past several

in Maine,

in Kansas, and
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in Connecticut.

(Implementation began at the kindergarten level in

1973 and was extended to include the first and second grades of several
classrooms in September 1974.)

Two studies of the effectiveness of the

ANISA Model have been conducted at the Connecticut site which is in the
Suffield Public School System.^
The conclusions reached, although they were very encouraging as
to the effectiveness of the model, were limited due to the shortness of
time that it was implemented in the first and second grades.

ANISA was

evaluated by Pjissell with respect to "the adequacy of ANISA per se—its
strengths as an educational theory,

its potential for generating contin¬

uously dynamic learning environments,

for meeting needs of parents,

teachers and staff, etc.,"4"1 and with respect to the "achievement of
Suffield’s educational goals.
Three fundamental aspects of the ANISA theory were analyzed.
were:

"its assumptions, its definitions or

potential for empirical verification."^

They

’data language,' and its

The underlying assumptions

44The first of the studies was coordinated by Ronald Hambleton and
assistants, and is titled "Final Report, 1973-74:
An Evaluation Study
of Selected Outcomes of the ANISA Program, Suffield, Connecticut"
(University of Massachusetts, Laboratory of Psychometric and Evaluative
Research, 1974).
The second study was conducted by Joan S. Bissell,
Sharon L. Hazelkorn and Cynthia Longfellow, and is titled "An Evaluation
of ANISA in Suffield:
1974-75," (Harvard Graduate School of Education,
Laboratory of Human Development, February 1975), mimeographed.
^Bissell, Hazelkorn and Longfellow, "An Evaluation of ANISA in
Suffield:

1974-75," p.

46Ibid., p.

11.1.

47Ibid. , p.

1.3,

1.1.

1.4.

and its definitions have been presented in detail prior to this, hence
they will not be repeated here.
and empirical verfication,

As for the generation of hypotheses

some of these were "predicted relationships

between the children participating in well-implemented ANISA class¬
room and improved competencies in the cognitive, perceptual, psycho¬
motor, affective and volitional domains, and predicted efforts on
teachers and aides participating in ANISA; e.g., the model makes the
teacher look at children individually and constantly—not only when
they do something unusual or outstanding, and a host of other hypothe¬
ses generated by Ronald Hambleton, et al.,

1974."48

Their analysis of the ANISA theory concludes:
ANISA possesses all of the elements traditionally found in
a scientific or educational theory.
It has a number of
explicit assumptions, most of which provide an extremely
idealistic basis for educational planning.
It has a compre¬
hensive and straightforward set of definitions of key educa¬
tional concepts.
These definitions are broad enough to be
used in a wide range of educational settings.
Finally,
ANISA specifies numerous testable hypotheses concerning
relationships between experiences in the model and student
growth.
It is because each of these fundamental elements
of an adequate theory is found in ANISA that it can provide
the basis for Suffield’s educational planning and practice.
Because of the abstract and general nature of the theory,
specific applications in classroom situations will have to
be derived by Suffield staff as the model is implemented.
What is perhaps most important is the fact that ANISA pro¬
vides a highly flexible theoretical umbrella which can be
modified as necessary during the process of implementa-

48Ibid. , p.

1.7.

49Ibid., p.

1.8.
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The second part of an analysis was measuring the effectiveness of
ANISA with respect to Suffield’s goals.

The goals were clearly

established and extensive tests were performed with respect to each one.
An example of one of Suffield's goals concerned the teacher's ability
to act as a facilitator of learning, and the student's capacity to
achieve at his highest level of ability.

The conclusions suggested

there was a high degree of success evident in spite of the shortness of
time that the model has been implemented in Suffield, and in spite of
the fact that in especially the first and second grade classrooms there
was a need for more ANISA materials.

The closing third of the report

made recommendations for such materials.

In addition, various diagnos¬

tic tools were suggested and an extensive and helpful ANISA implementa¬
tion checklist was included.
As the model theorizes about the importance of the child's develop¬
ment of personal effectance, that sense of self-competence which comes
about through the feedback from an affirmative and supportive environ¬
ment,

so also will the model develop at an optimum rate and achieve an

effectance of its own through research efforts such as were conducted
by Bissell, Hazelkom and Longfellow.
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CHAPTER

PIAGET:

II

A THEORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE

Introduction

Jean Piaget has formulated a theory which addresses the issues of
the origin, nature,
and knowledge.

structure and development of man's intelligence

Such concerns fall within the domain of epistemology,

which is that branch of science, philosophy, and psychology which
investigates the nature of knowledge.

Further, Piaget is a genetic

epistemologist, not only addressing the question of "What is knowl¬
edge?", but also what are the "conditions" and "laws" which govern its
genesis.
ates,

To this point, Barbel Inhelder, one of Piaget's close associ¬

states:

"The development of knowledge seems to be the result of

a process of elaboration that is based essentially on the activity of
the child."'''
This chapter will address Piaget's theory of "What is knowledge?",
"How is it organized?", and "What are the processes of elaboration?"
Under these headings, Piaget's three forms of knowledge

(the

innate, figurative and logico-mathematical) will be derived from three
types of cognitive activity:
behavior.

the innate, perceptive, and acquired

The three forms of knowledge will be integrated with the

1Barbel Inhelder, "Some Aspects of Piaget's Genetic Approach to
Cognition," in Piaget and Knowledge:
Theoretical Foundations, Hans G.
Furth (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 23.
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notions of the schemata, the scheme, and the operation, which are
respectively related to the reflexive scheme, sensori-motor schemes,
and the preoperative, concrete operative and formal operational struc¬
tures of thinking.
of the manner

These structures comprise characteristic patterns

in which thinking develops.

Further,

this development

occurs in an invariant sequence which is hierarchically arranged.
Within this context is the Piagetian notion of stage.
most crucial

Last, and of

importance to the ANISA Theory of Development,

cussion of Piaget’s notions of the processes of elaboration.

is a dis¬
This will

include a discussion of the relationship between biology and knowledge
from which is derived the model of the functioning of cognitive struc¬
tures; namely,

the equilibration model.

Under this will be discussed

accommodation and assimilation, homeorhesis (after Waddington) and
homeostasis

(after the biological model),

development and learning,

the relationship between

the mechanisms which control and influence

transition from one level of thinking to the next, such as the inter¬
active conflict which develops between parallel structures.

What Is Knowledge?

Piaget states:

"The fundamental hypothesis of genetic episte¬

mology is that there is a parallelism between the progress made in the
logical and rational organization of knowledge and the corresponding

2
formative psychological processes."

Hence, we begin by stating that

2Jean Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, translator Eleanor Duckworth
(New York:
The Norton Library, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1971),
p.

13.
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knowledge is not a "simple copy of reality, because it always includes
a process of assimilation to previous structures."^

A discussion of

What is knowledge?" is not one of static knowledge structures but is
possible only after the processes of formation and function are intro¬
duced.
According to Piaget, knowledge has its origin in three types of
cognitive activity or functions,
the "innate."* * * 4 5

the most simple and fundamental being

The very young child's instinctive or reflexive actions

(such as characterize the innate), for example,

the grasping reflex,

are gradually structured through the ordering and patterning of the
basic reflexes into reflexive schemata which give rise to sensori¬
motor schemes.

This Piaget classifies as "innate" knowledge.

The facts reveal (particularly in the course of the first
year's development in the human being) the existence of
remarkably stable agencies between the forming of basic
habits and the dawning of sensori-motor intelligence.
These stable agencies are restricted in scope in man; however,
they constitute the beginning of "knowledge structured by hereditary
programming.Hereditary programming implies that man has accumu¬
lated in the genome, as a result of adaptations to the external

^Jean Piaget, Biology and Knowledge:
An Essay on the Relations
Between Organic Regulations and Cognitive Processes, translator
Beatrix Walsh (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, Second
Edition,

1974), p.

4.

4Ibid., p.

2.

5Ibid., p.

3.

^Ibid., p.

226.
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environment

(the equilibratory response), certain patterns of behavior,

such as the before-mentioned grasping reflex or "as may be the case
with certain perceptual structures

(seeing colors and two’or three

dimensions in space)."7
The second type of cognitive function is "perception."8

This

activity is characteristically more oriented toward sensory data or
perceptions of the environment.

Resulting from this function is

sensori-motor intelligence which is gradually structured or patterned
through perceptions of the environment and is referred to as figura¬
tive knowledge

(the recognition of images).9

The figurative aspect in an imitation of states taken as
momentary and static.
In the cognitive area the figurative
functions are, above all, perception, imitation and mental
imagery, which is in fact interiorized imitation.10
It is obvious that with respect to innate functions, much of what
happens both in immediate behavior, and in development, is under the
control of internal mechanisms, whereas the figurative aspect of
"knowledge gained by physical experience

.

.

. experience of external

objects or of whatever appertains to them, abstractions being made of
objects as such"^
environment.

involves the learner in an interaction with the

This type of interaction results in a static knowledge

7Ibid. , p.

226.

8Ibid., p.

2.

9Ibid. , p.

3.

10Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, p.
"^Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, p.

14.
226.
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which is unlike knowledge which results from the third cognitive func¬
tion; namely,

"acquired behavior."12

Piaget differentiates two forms of acquired behavior:
mathematical

(which is primarily endogenetic in origin;

the logico-

i.e., its

activity, origin and organization are largely internal) and that of the
empirical apprenticeship and experimental behavior
upon physical and external experience).13

(knowledge based

Logico-mathematical knowl¬

edge and operative knowing are used synonymously in this section.
a strict sense,

In

logico-mathematical knowledge is operational, although

in a wider sense aspects of logical and mathematical knowledge are evi¬
dent during the pre-logical and pre-numerical period.1^
The differentiation of acquired forms of behavior becomes impor¬
tant for Piaget when he considers the role of learning versus develop¬
ment.

Learning is mainly provoked and involves the external environ¬

ment, whereas the development of knowledge of the logico-mathematical
type is largely the result of an internal process.13

This differentia¬

tion is also important when Piaget considers the mental "operation" and
distinguishes it from all other forms of mental activity.

12Ibid. , p.

2.

13Ibid. , p.

2.

■^Jean Piaget,
Science Teaching,

2

"Development and Learning," Journal of Research in
(1964), p.

184.

15A specific definition of the operation, and operative knowing,
is developed later in this chapter.
A discussion of the pre-logical
and the pre—numerical period is to be found in the introduction to the
next chapter.
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The acquired behavior function gives rise to the third major cate¬
gory of knowledge, the logico-mathematical.

Logico-mathematical knowl¬

edge represents the highest form of thought and, according to Piaget,
develops through internal

(endogenetic) processes.

To summarize, the three cognitive functions give rise to three
distinct forms of knowledge:
mathematical.

the innate,

the figurative and the logico-

A practical example cited by Inhelder and Piaget will

serve to introduce important distinctions between each of the forms of
knowledge.

In the example, reflexive schemata (innate) are used and

extended to elementary forms of classification (grouping) and seriation (finding ordered differences)
figurative

(perceptual)

schemes, at the sensori-motor or

level of intelligent behavior.

These are then

easily distinguishable from the "operative" or logico-mathematical
forms of classificatory or seriation schema.
Between the ages of six to eight and eighteen to twenty-four
months, which is well before the acquisition of language, we
find a number of behavior patterns which are suggestive of
both classification and seriation.
A child may be given a
familiar object:
immediately he recognizes its possible
uses; the object is assimilated to the habitual schemata of
rocking, shaking, striking, throwing to the ground, etc.
If
the object is completely new to him, he may apply a number of
familiar schemata in succession, as if he is trying to under¬
stand the nature of the strange object by determining whether
it is for rocking, or for rattling, or rubbing, etc.
We have
here a sort of practical classification (Cf. J. Piaget, The
Origin of Intelligence in the Child, 1952, pp. 235-252),
somewhat reminiscent of the latter definition by use.
But
this rudimentary classification is realized only in the course
of successive trials and does not give rise to a number of
simultaneous collections.
However, even these later are
foreshadowed very early when the children pile a number of
similar objects together or when they construct a complex
object.
These two kinds of behaviors may be regarded as
pre-verbal precursors of the graphic collections.
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As for seriations, some approximation to these can be found
in various constructions.
One such example is a tower made
of nesting boxes.
To begin with, children may choose the
boxes at random but in time they manage to arrange them
approximately in order of decreasing volume.
. . . Neverthe¬
less, these elementary organizations are still far removed
from the corresponding operational structures.
A sensori¬
motor schema is the functional equivalent of a concept inas¬
much as it results in intelligibility and generalization,
lrom a structural point of view the two are by no means
identical.
It is characteristic of the sensori-motor schema
that its various possible applications cannot be realized
simultaneously, so that 'extension' and 'intension' cannot
be coordinated by reference to one another.16
In this example,

the first two forms of knowledge to develop

involve the child's use of elementary psycho-motor actions (innate) to
discover possible practical uses for the unknown object in a perceptual
figurative sense.

This form of behavior is easily distinguishable from

classification behavior at the logico-roathematical level, where through
the operative schemes the child is able to coordinate qualities of the
object in an intensive sense
environment)

(qualities within the immediate set or

and in an extensive sense (qualities of the object out¬

side the immediate set or environment).
Innate knowledge is, therefore, a result of the patterning of a
reflexive action,

such as shaking the object.

The sensori-motor knowl¬

edge or figurative knowledge results from the experimental use of the
reflexive schema to determine the practical use of the object by
combining rocking,

shaking, looking, listening and/or throwing, etc.,

16Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The Early Growth of Logic in
The Child;
Classification and Seriation, translators E. A. Lunzer
and D. Papert; Introduction, Lunzer (New York:
The Norton Library,
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 13-14.
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to determine "what is it like."

The logico-mathematical or operative

knowledge occurs at a much later stage as it characteristically does
not appertain to states or objects (the physical experience) but to
transformation of one state to another;
or transform states and objects.

i.e., actions which coordinate

The type of thinking involves the

Piagetian notion of the operation.

An operation is, above all, an

action which transforms or coordinates an object or group of objects
in some manner.

For example, number operations do not deal with the

actual qualities of the objects but with a set of rules of transforma¬
tion whereby the differentiated qualities of the objects are trans¬
formed into a quantitative property.
example of classification,

Or, as from the previous

the qualities of the object are compared

and coordinated with the qualities of other objects and an entirely
new classification is determined for the object based on a set of
rules of transformation.

For example,

the object is a toy because it

can be played with and not because it is soft and wooly like another
toy.
Examining these three categories of knowledge from another per¬
spective serves to bring out two more features:
relationship, and

(2)

(1)

their inter¬

the method or mechanisms of development.

Piaget,

in his work Biology and Knowledge, develops the theme that all knowl¬
edge, even innate knowledge, has been acquired by the organism in
response to the environment.

He distinguishes two broad categories on

the basis of the time that it takes to acquire the knowledge:

innate

or long-term acquisition, which develops over generations, and acquired
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behavior, which is learned and develops during the life of the
organism.

He further distinguishes in the latter category knowledge

of an endogenetic nature (a preponderant share of activity and organi¬
zation that is internal as in the case of logico-mathematical struc¬
tures) and exogenetic (or the emperical apprenticeship and experimental
behavior; knowledge based on physical or external experience).17

Each

is recognized as being at a different stage or degree of organization.
Use of the root word "genetic" implies that there is a mechanism
(equilibration) which is common to both types of knowledge acquisition.
A chart on the following page diagrams this.

The vertical arrows

indicate that logico-mathematical knowledge is constantly being fused
with data from the other two sources.

Piaget,

in hypothesizing about

the development of the higher forms of acquired behavior through the
equilibration model,

states:

If all types of knowledge, innate or acquired, necessarily
presuppose a certain permanent functioning, which gives rise
to assimilatory schemata and their coordinations, then the
hereditary forms of cognitive behavior, which predominate
among animals (reflexes, instincts, and so on) as the field
of adaptation or equilibrium is limited, will divide up in
two complementary ways as soon as this field is extended by
means of representation or thought.
First, it will tend
toward externalization or pheno-type accommodation to
environment, in other words, to learning, to experiment and
to physical knowledge of the first category; then it will
tend toward internalization or formal structuration through
consciousness or, to put it more exactly, through reflec¬
tive abstraction based on the internal conditions of each
functioning (that is, on those general forms of organiza¬
tion which extend beyond cognitive assimilation and back

17Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, pp.

3-4.
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into the common mechanisms, hence, to those processes which
lie at the heart of any living organization).
The processes referred to here will be explored in a later section,
however,

some important assumptions of Piaget's theory have been intro¬

duced and others implied.
Briefly,
struction;

for Piaget intellectual growth is developmental in con¬

i.e., development includes the notion of a series of stages

of growth which occur in an invariant sequence.

These stages are

hierarchically organized, each a logical outgrowth or consequence of
the preceding stage.

Implied within each stage are both horizontal and

vertical relationships among the constructs of intelligence.

Each of

the three forms of knowledge has its own construction or structure,
however,

it is important to note that in a vertical fashion the three

aspects of knowledge are hierarchically integrated, resulting in the
building of successively more complex total structures of knowledge.
The logico-mathematical aspect is the last to develop, and by imple¬
mentation has its origin in the innate and figurative aspects.
The proposed manner or mechanism by which knowledge develops is
most closely associated with a biological model.

Piaget sees the

epistemic child as an adaptive and coordinating organism,
interaction with his environment.

Further,

in constant

since for Piaget knowledge

is never a simple copy of reality but exists because of an action per¬
formed by the knower,

the process of interaction is fundamentally

transformational in character.

18 Ibid., p.

267.

This is because that which is
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experienced as reality always exists with respect to what is already
inside the knowtr's structures.

This fundamental relationship serves

to shape or limit what the child chooses to make meaningful at each
stage of development.

The process of integration into previously

existent structures is referred to as assimilation.

The process of

adaptation completes itself as the child's knowing structures are
changed or accommodated as a reaction to what has been integrated or
assimilated.

The process is one of a dynamic state of equilibrium

where interaction with the environment creates new knowledge, a new
state of development,

therefore a new state of adaptation.

The relationship between figurative knowledge and logicomathematical

(operative) knowledge provides an interesting example of

a new state of adaptation or development, emphasizing the "internaliza¬
tion or formal structuration" Piaget referred to earlier.
hierarchy of thought processes

This

(use of types of knowledge) has lead

Piaget to emphasize two of the aspects of knowledge in thinking, and
the development of logical structures.

A summary of the two aspects

of thought is presented in Figure II on the following page.
An example drawn from the manner in which the child deals with
the conservation of substance in the physical world provides reason
for establishing essential differences between figurative and logicomathematical or operative thinking.

Remembering that Piaget's central

thesis is that knowledge is not a simple copy of reality but actions
performed on that object, research has demonstrated that the young
child's first abstractions of an object are static and are taken into
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consideration one at a time, such that a clay object which has dimen¬
sions of length, width, and depth is judged by one dimension only.
For the child who is not yet reasoning in an operative sense (i.e.,
able to transform or compensate change in one dimension with change in
another),

the size of the object may be determined by its perceived

length alone.

When the object is reshaped such that it becomes

shorter than it was originally, then he judges there to be less
material.

The child neglects to account for the material's increase

along other dimensions (compensation).

Piaget cites a similar example

involving number, where the child, by counting ten objects in a
straight line,

first from the right and then from the left, rearranges

them in a circle and other shapes, each time discovering that number
is independent of shape and that the order of addition does not matter
(the property of commutativity).
In each example,

19

the operative aspect of thinking is a transforma¬

tion or an action of thought upon the abstracted perception.

Piaget

refers to this type of action or thought as reflective abstraction and
defines it as a "process of reconstruction with new combinations, which
allows for any operational structure at any previous stage or level to
be integrated into a richer structure at a higher level.

20

Further,

Piaget differentiates three levels of the abstraction process:
of taking cognizance of the existance of one of these actions or

19Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, p.
^Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, p.

17.
320.

"First,
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operations (as in the perception of correspondence between sets of
objects); second,

the action noted has to be

'reflected'

(in the

practical sense of the term) by being projected into another plane—
for example,
action .

.

the plane of thought as opposed to that of practical
third,

it has to be integrated into a new structure,

which means that a new structure has to be set up, but this is only
possible if two conditions are fulfilled:

(a) the new structure must

first of all be a reconstruction of the preceding one if it is not to
lack coherence and congruity;

it will thus be a product of the pre¬

ceding one on a plane chosen by it;

(b)

it must also, however, widen

the scope of the preceding one, making it general by combining it with
elements proper to the new plane of thought; otherwise there will be
nothing new about it."

21

These three levels of reflective abstraction

will be used to explain progress in the development of the operations
of number.
The next major questions to be dealt with, namely,

"What is the

structure of knowledge and how is it organized?" will now be addressed
as they have been only suggested in generality to this point.
suance of this,

In pur¬

it has been established that the roots of logical and

mathematical thought lie within coordination of actions, and as these
actions are coordinated,

the fundamental structure is established in

what Piaget terms the "operation."

Further, mental operations

eventually constitute "structures" which are totalities of thought.

21

Ibid., p.

320.
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Before proceeding with the discussion of the operation, it is
timely to reflect on Piaget's fundamental hypothesis of genetic
epistemology,

that of the parallel between the progress made in the

(logical and rational) organization of knowledge and the corresponding
psychological processes.

So far, a basic pattern of organization has

emerged to include the notion of three forms of knowledge which, as
development proceeds, become transformed from the most basic to the
most complex by means of reflective abstraction which is fundamentally
a process of equilibration.

By means of reflective abstraction,

knowledge is reflected to new planes of meaning or intelligent
behavior.

These new planes are characterized by the operation and the

major structures which are both organizational and processes in nature.
In addition,

the achievement of each plane of reasoning is referred to

as a stage of thinking,

such as the sensori-motor stage or the opera¬

tional stages (pre-concrete and formal).

What Is the Structure of Knowledge?

The Operation
The child,
ment,

through an interactive relationship with his environ¬

gradually forms the mental operation, which is the main struc¬

tural component of the major structures.
characteristics:
ized;

that is,

materially;

(2)

An operation has four basic

"(1) an operation is an action that can be internal¬

it can be carried out in thought as well as executed
it

is a reversible action; that is,

in one direction or in the opposite direction;

(3)

it can take place
it always supposes
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some conservation, some invariant;

(4) no operation exists alone .

.

.

as every operation is related to a system of operations."22
The first characteristic, that of an operation being an internal¬
ized action, can be clarified with a comparison between what Piaget
has identified as a sensori-motor scheme and an operation.
development,

Early in

the child evolves patterns of action which involve ways

of physically responding to the environment in act-specific ways.
Acquiring these patterns or schemes represent learning behavior on the
part of the child and signalize the early manifestations of the child's
efforts to bring order and coherence to the world around him.

Often

they incorporate innate reflexes into patterns of external or physical
action.

Furth states,

"we can assert that a sensori-motor scheme is

related to a coordinated external act in the same way as an operation
is related to a thinking act.

... To put it succinctly, an active

scheme is an external action of coordination while an active operation
is an internal action of coordination."23

This is illustrated by

recalling the example cited earlier of Inhelder and Piaget involving
classification first as a sensori-motor act, the latter as true
classification involving the thinking act of coordination and trans¬
formation.
As for the second characteristic of the operation, reversibility,

99

Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, pp.

21-22.

OO

^JHans G. Furth, Piaget and Knowledge:
Theoretical Foundations
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 56.
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Piaget differentiates two main types of reversibility.

The first is

reversibility by inversion or negation.24
Inversion and negation follow the mathematical format of
+A-A=0 or +1-1=0.

The addition of positive and negative

numbers or the addition of two numbers and then the reversal or sub¬
traction of them serve as examples.

Another example is that the effect

of decreasing the length of a row of objects thereby increasing its
density can be negated by lengthening the row to decrease the density.
In general, return to the starting point is accomplished "by
cancelling the operation which has already been performed;
inversion or negation.

i.e., by

In this case, the product of the direct

operation and its inverse is the null or identical operation."

25

Again,

this is reasoning by inversion or negation.
The second form of reversibility is called reciprocity and
involves "return to the starting point by compensating a difference
(in the logical sense of the term);

i.e., by reciprocity.

In this

case, the product of the two reciprocal operations is not a null operation but an equivalence."

26

For example, with the row of objects with

length and density relations, a change in one dimension is conceptually
compensated for by a change in the other dimension, and the number in

24Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, p.

22.

25Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking:
From Childhood to Adolescence, translated by Anne Parsons and Stanley
Milgram (Basic Books Inc., Publishers, 1958), p.
26

Ibid. , p.

273.

272.
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the set remains the same.

For example, the child reasons that

shortening the row will increase the density but will not change the
number of objects because the child realizes there Is a reciprocal
relationship between length and density.

Before reversibility reason¬

ing, either change would have changed the number in the set, in the
child's mind.
The third characteristic, invariance or conservation, is crucial
to the functioning of operative thinking, for it allows the "dissocia¬
tion" of form and content, between the general scheme and the self¬
specific action in which it is expressed.

The child begins to know

that things are "out there" and independent of his own actions.27

In

the above examples of reversibility, the objects or relations dealt
with must have an independent and invariant existence.

As in the

case of the operations of addition and subtraction, the numbers dealt
with must be conserved in order that addition (7 + 4 = 11) can be
reversed to subtraction (11 -4=7).

In a reciprocal relation involv¬

ing length and density, the number of objects in a set must be con¬
served and the relations compensated.
Before proceeding with the fourth and last characteristic of the
operation, a distinction should be made between the terms scheme and
schemata.

For Piaget, the term scheme is used in conjunction with a

description of sensori-motor intelligence where there is a generalizable aspect to the coordination of external acts and the term schemata

27

Furth, Piaget and Knowledge, p. 247.
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is used in conjunction with reflexive action patterns.

In a previous

example when the young baby is given an unfamiliar object, he applies
reflexive schemata, such as shaking, striking or throwing, to the
object.

Initially, the reflexive schemata may not be used with a

specific coordinated pattern of action.

However, gradually the child

comes to be able to coordinate these reflexive schemata in order to
determine, for example, a more generalizable aspect of the external
actions, such as the use of the object.
as a sensori-motor scheme.

Then this can be referred to

Aspects of the operative mode are still

conspicuously absent however.

For instance, there is no conservation;

i.e., the object once thrown out of the crib no longer has an existence.
In addition, were the unfamiliar object a rattle, there would be no
causal links between shaking the rattle and the noise made, nor would
the noise made by the shaken rattle be internalized and extended to
other objects not making a noise when shaken.

In other words, the

action performed on the object and the resulting noise have not as yet
been internalized as thinking acts which would permit cause and effect
thinking.

Yet because the actions of the baby are directed toward

finding uses, by coordinating reflexive schemata it becomes a sensori¬
motor scheme which is an advance over the uncoordinated use of reflex¬
ive schemata.
The fourth characteristic of the operation is that it never exists
alone but is integrated with other operations as part of a totality of
thought, the structure.
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What Is a Structure of Knowledge?

The notion of structure is important to Piagetian theory in that
it provides a framework for the integration of many separate elements
or operations of thought.

In addition, it is a totality, that is,

there is a unity and self-sufficiency possible in which all that is
needed to carry out a specific task is present.

This includes the

specific operation(s) that are needed and a set of rules that apply
equality to all parts of the structure.

Last, this framework is not

important as a static form but rather is important as a function or
process, as a framework in which all elements needed for a thinking
process are united.
As a first approximation, we may say that a structure is
a system of transformations.
Inasmuch as it is a system
and not a mere collection of elements and their properties,
these transformations involve laws:
the structure is pre¬
served or enriched by the interplay of its transformation
laws, which never yield results external to the system nor
employ elements that are external to it.
In short, the
notion of structure is comprised of three key ideas:
the
idea of wholeness, the idea of transformation, and the
idea of self-regulation.^8
A structure is a totality of thought, a complete system of ele¬
ments or operations which is governed by laws (of transformation)
applying to the whole system and not just to one of the elements.

The

structure is not defined by its elements of sub-parts, rather, "it is
in terms of these laws that the structure qua whole or system is

OO

Jean Piaget, Structuralism, translated and edited by Chaninah
Maschler (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1971), p. 5.
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efined.

The laws of the structure are transformational in effect;

i.e., a structure is active in the sense that as the operation is an
internalized action which deals "not with states but with transforma¬
tions from one state to another,"30 not with the static and figurative
but with a coordination of relations, for example, so is the structure
\

by means of the application of a law transformational.

Piaget mentions,

for instance, that there are many different mathematical structures or
systems in the series of whole numbers, one of which is the "additive

31
group.

The rules or laws of the structure, such as associativity,

commutativity, transitivity and closure, hold for the series of whole
numbers as well as for the "substructure" addition.

(Recognized here

is a fluid conception of the structure, where the major structure with
its rules of transformation has within it a sub-structure, the addi¬
tive group, for which the same rules hold.)

When two whole numbers

are added or subtracted and a third whole number is obtained, it is
accomplished by use of the laws of the "additive group."
"The third characteristic is that a structure is self-regulating;
that is, in order to carry out these laws of transformation, we need
not go outside the system to find some external element.

Similarly,

once a law of transformation has been applied, the result does not end

^Ibid., p. 7.
30Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, p. 14.
31

Ibid. , p. 22.
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up outside the system."32

I„ the example of the addition or subtrac¬

tion of whole numbers, both the rules necessary and the product of
their application exist within the structure.
Of particular importance to the development of number are the
three

mother" or "parent" structures which the Bourbaki group of

mathematicians have identified and Piaget has incorporated.33

The

Bourbaki structures are important to mathematics in general in that
they unite all of the diverse branches, such as geometry, calculus and
number theory, and they are fundamental, that is, they are not reducible
to simpler self-sufficient structures.

The algebraic structure applies

primarily to classes and numbers, and this structure is a prototype for
the mathematical "group,an example of which is the previously men¬
tioned "additive group."

In general, in children's thinking the

algebraic structure is found "most readily in the logic of classes—in
the logic of classification

35

and in mathematics, many "groups" are

found, such as the "group of displacements found in geometry.

The

algebraic structure is characterized by the form of reversibility
identified as inversion or negation; e.g., by inversion, all oranges
plus all other forms of fruit equal fruit whereas all forms of fruit

32Ibid. , p. 23.
33Ibid. , pp. 23-24.
34Ibid., pp. 23-24.
35Ibid., p.
36

27.

Ibid., p. 25.
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minus every form of fruit except oranges equals oranges, (Or + f - F),
whereas (F - f = Or) or by negation, all fruit minus all fruit equals
no fruit (F - F = 0).

Another example of negation would be if one took

two steps forward and two steps backward, the result would be zero dis¬
tance gained.
The application of this structure to the operation of classifica¬
tion can be seen, for instance, in the class of all fruit.

Prior to

the structure becoming operational (in the child five years or younger),
the class of all fruit does not exist in the sense that it requires
that the child has been able to transcend perceptual or figurative
limitations of fruit which come in a multitude of colors, shapes and
tastes, none of which taken separately define the class of all fruit.
Second, the application of the rule of reversibility requires reason¬
ing which supposes conservation and the attainment of the class inclu¬
sion relation.

For example, the orange is a class of objects which is

a member of the larger class of citrus fruit which is, in turn, a mem¬
ber of the still larger class of all fruit.

The manipulation of these

classes involves a mental coordination of hierarchically related
classes.
The second parent structure or ordering structure applies to rela¬
tionships such as in seriation.
the form of reciprocity.

Reversibility in this structure takes

In a seriation problem, such as ordering

sticks according to size, the child coordinates the relationships
"bigger than" and "smaller than," (this one is bigger than this one,
however they are both smaller than this one).

Coordination of the
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"bigger than” and "smaller than” relation is an example of reasoning by
reciprocity.

This last example of comparing three sticks is an example

of the transitive relation where A ^ B and B < C, therefore A < C.
The algebraic structure and ordering structure eventually merge,
the result of which is the structure of number.

This theme will be

developed in the chapter on number.
The third Bourbaki mother structure is the topological structure
based on notions such as neighborhood, borders, and approaching
limits. '

Topological relations are recognized as the foundation of

two forms of geometry and as having application to many other areas of
mathematics.
Although this discussion has been theoretical, in the chapter on
number these structures will be discussed in greater practical detail.
In addition, Piaget extends the concept of structure beyond the logicomathematical to the organization of other forms of knowledge, such as
linguistic structures, sociological structures, and psychological
structures.

38

The Concept of Stages of Development

As the structures of knowledge divide thought into characteristic
patterns, the development of intellect occurs in a sequence of stages
which are invariant in order and hierarchically arranged.

"^Piaget, Genetic Epistemology, pp. 25-26.
38

Piaget, Structuralism, p. 15.

Each stage
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is characterized by a particular approach to knowledge, and an applica¬
tion of knowledge, which is fundamentally different from other stages,
and is progressively dependent upon the previous stage.
Inhelder has identified four main criteria of each stage:
(1) Each stage involves a period of formation (genesis)
and a period of attainment.
Attainment is charac¬
terized by the progressive organization of a com¬
posite structure of mental operations.
(2) Each structure constitutes at the same time the
attainment of one stage and the starting point of
the next stage, of a new evolutionary process.
(3) The order of succession of the stages is constant.
Ages of attainment can vary within certain limits as
a function of factors of motivation, exercise, cul¬
tural milieu, and so forth.
(4) The transition from an earlier to a later stage
follows a law of implication analogous to the process
of integration, preceding structures becoming a part
of later structures.39
These four criteria were advanced as hypotheses which were sug¬
gested by previous research; since the writing of the article, much
evidence has been gathered in support of them.

In addition, Inhelder

identifies three additional supportive criteria:
(5) When the child is given a series of reasoning proce¬
dures, we notice a tendency to homogeneity and
generalization in his reasoning behavior which,
though slight in the course of the formation of a
structure, manifests itself more clearly once the
structure lias been achieved.
(6) The events (of trials and errors as the child's
justifications become more coherent) seem to suggest

39Barbel Inhelder, "Some Aspects of Piaget's Genetic Approach to
Cognition," p. 27.

72

series
"“7“",
U prepared
a continuous
series "771*1
of trials,
but that
once it isby established
invol«7inruf f1:rlytlon?Pendent °f “* Pr°“aa
<?> thirdfirSi/°n?ltUdlnal ‘nvostigations led us to a
hird notion (as a hypothesis); namely, that in the
con777nt ?' lntellectual operations, phases of
continuity alternate with phases of discontinuity.40
These seven criteria or hypotheses will provide a format for the
discussion of stage and provide valuable criteria for examining the
educational importance of Piaget’s work to the ANISA Theory of Development.
Piaget differentiates three major stages of growth:

Stage I, the

Sensory-Motor; Stage II, Concrete Thinking Operations; and Stage III,
Formal Thinking Operations.

Both innate and figurative knowledge are

structured in Stage I, although figurative knowledge extends into the
first part of Stage II where knowledge is in a preoperational stage of
development.
character.

Later, in Stage II the operation attains its full
Stage II offers a particularly clear example of the process

of formation followed by a period of attainment mentioned in Inhelder's
criteria number one.

Stage III represents the period when thought

attains its full and destined character.
The diagram on the following page will serve to introduce a general
format.

(The letter "R" stands for reflexive schemata, MS" for the

preoperative scnema of Stages I and II, and "0" for the operation.)
In keeping with Inhelder's fourth criterion, each of the preceding

40 Ibid., pp. 27-28.

*Rough correspondence
to chronological age
among Western children
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structures, such as a preoperative scheme "S’', are integrated and
transformed into the later structure, the operation "0".

The process

of integration and transformation imply that the later structure are
not simply composed of co-existent structures where previous structures
exist along side of the advanced structure, but the later structures
represent a fundamental change in the nature of thinking.

During the

last stage (the formal operational stage), the operations are grouped
or integrated into complex systems or structures.

In this stage,

operations are performed upon operations.

Stage I;

The Sensori-Motor Stage

The first major stage occupies approximately the first
eighteen months.
It is characterized by the progressive
formation of the scheme of the permanent object and by
the sensori—motor structuration of one’s immediate spatial
surroundings.^-*Characteristically, sensori-motor intelligence begins with the
coordination of reflex movements into action schemes.

The reflex move¬

ments derive from a class of ready-made, highly organized behavioral
systems; e.g.,

(a) sucking,

(b) looking,

(c) listening, (d) vocalizing,

(e) grasping, and (f) various ready-made sensori-motor organizations
of the trunk and limbs.

These have all been discussed in the context

of "innate" knowledge structures.

In addition to reflexive coordina¬

tions, the development of the "precursor" class of operational intelli¬
gence in the form of the scheme begins here, such as time, space,
object permanence, means-end relations, causality and intentional

41

Ibid., p. 29.
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behavior.

Most of the sensori-motor schemes are perceptual In origin

and although it cannot be said that there is a linear evolution from
the reflexive schema through perceptual structures and sensori-motor
schemes to operational intelligence, there is a general pattern of
moving from the simple to the complex, from the innate and figurative
knowledge to operational knowledge.
Piaget identifies six "sub-stages” within the sensori-motor
period.

They are important in that they further clarify the type of

mental activity which undergoes an orderly development.
(1)

Sub-Stage One:

"The Use of Reflexes";

They are

(2) Sub-Stage Two:

First Acquired Adaptations and the Primary Circular Reaction";
Stage Three:

"The Secondary Circular Reactions";

"The
(3) Sub-

(4) Sub-Stage Four:

"The Coordination of the Secondary Schemata and Their Application to
New Situations";

(5)

Sub-Stage Five:

"The Tertiary Circular Reaction"

and "The Discovery of New Means Through Active Experimentation"; and
(6)

Sub-Stage Six:

tions".

A2

"The Invention of New Means Through Mental Combina-

The six sub-stages are divided into two groups, Stages I

and II, comprising elementary sensori-motor adaptations, and Stages III,
IV, V, and VI are characterized by the clear introduction of intentional
behavior or intentional sensori-motor adaptations.
Sub-Stage One is very brief and basically Involves the infant's
first uses of many of the reflexive schema, which in itself involves

42

Jean Piaget, The Origins of Intelligence in Children, trans.
Margaret Cook (New York:
The Norton Library, W. W. Norton and Co.,
Inc., 1963).
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very complex innate adaptive behavior.

Sub-Stage Two is characterized

by the beginning of the coordinated use of these schema,

such as a

coordination with the recognition of the mother's breast whereon the
sucking reflex is employed.

During this period, the infant also begins

to center his attention on objects (although they are as yet not perma¬
nent) and on events around him.

In general, patterns of reflexive

movements are structured into habits and sensori-motor schema.
Beginning with Sub-Stage Three, we find that to the patterns which
were established in previous stages is added intentional behavior which
serves to reinforce developing habits through repetition and experience.
Thus,

they are "circular" in a certain respect.

Intelligence for

Piaget presupposes intention,^3 hence with the inception of clearly
demonstrable intentioned acts is found the origin of intelligence.
From the theoretical point of view, intention, therefore,
denotes the extension of the totalities and relationships
acquired during the preceding stage and, by the fact of
their extension, their greater dissociation into real totali¬
ties and ideal totalities in relationships of fact and rela¬
tionships of value.
As soon as there is intention, in
effect, there is a goal to reach and a means to use, conse¬
quently, the influence of consciousness of values (the
value or the interest of the intermediary acts serving as
means is subordinated to that of the goal) and of the ideal
(the act to be accomplished is part of an ideal totality or
goal, in relation to the real totality of the acts already
organized).
Thus, it may be seen that the functional cate¬
gories related to the function of organization will hence
forth become more precise, from the time of the global
schemata of the preceding stage.^4

^3Ibid. , p.

147.

^Ibid. , p.

44 .
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In the third sub-stage, the means-end goal-oriented behavior is
not yet quite established but there is "secondary circular reaction,"
that is to say, behavior which consists in rediscovering the gestures
which by chance exercised an advantageous action upon things"45 becomes
evident.

The fourth sub-stage is apparent from its title and is

characterized by the appearance of certain behavior patterns which
are superimposed on the preceding ones and their essence is the applica¬
tion of known means to new situations."4^
Here in the fourth sub-stage is found intelligence functioning as
an adaptation to new circumstances,

intention now being fully evident.

"If this stage is to be distinguished from the preceding one with
respect to the functioning of intelligence,

it is to be distinguished

still more with regard to the structure of objects,

space and causality:

it marks the beginnings of the permanence of things, of
spatial

'groups'

'objective'

and of spatial and objectified causality."

47

"At the beginning of the second year, a fifth sub-stage makes
itself manifest, characterized by the first real experimentations and
hence the possibility of a 'discovery of new means through active
experimentation.'

This is the impetus of the instrumental behavior

patterns and the acme of empirical intelligence.
of the behavior patterns,

45Ibid. , P-

151.

46Ibid. , P-

151.

47Ibid., P-

151.

Finally, this totality

the application of which determines the
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beginning of the sixth sub-stage, will be crowned by the 'invention of
new means through mental combination.'"48
In summary,

the sensori-motor period is characterized by several

major developments which include the patterning of reflexive movements,
and their subsequent use; the growth of means-end relations which mark
the beginnings of goal-oriented behavior;

the inception of intentional

behavior marking the beginning of consciousness and human intelligence;
and finally, experimental behavior which begins trial and error of
empirical intelligence.

Of no less importance are events such as the

structuring of object permanence,

the structuring of space and

causality,

etc.

Stage II:

The Stage of Concrete Thinking Operations

This stage is "characterized by a long process of elaboration of
49

mental operations."

This process of elaboration is divided into two

major parts, a period of formation or elaboration (the preoperational
period) , and a period of attainment or structuration from which the
period gains its name (the concrete operations period).

It is during

this stage that the operation attains its fully functional status;
during the first period, preoperational structures are characterized
by neither reversibility nor conservation, whereas during the latter
part

(the concrete operational period), all four criteria of the

48Ibid., pp.
49Inhelder,
Cognition," p.

151-152.
"Some Aspects of Piaget's Genetic Approach to

30.
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operation become functional.

During this stage, however, the opera¬

tion is not yet separated from its concrete content, the here and now,
because they relate directly to objects and not yet to verbally stated
hypotheses.
When Piaget analyzes the preoperational period as a transitional
period between the stage of sensori-motor intelligence (where thought
begins as actions upon things) and the stage of the concrete opera¬
tions thought

(where thought is an internalized action), then it is

possible to designate the sensori-motor stage as Stage I and the preoperational or transitional period as the first part of Stage II and
the attainment of the operational structure in the concrete as the
latter part of Stage II; Stage I roughly corresponds to the chrono¬
logical ages zero to two, and Stage II, first sub-part, between two
and six or seven, and second sub-part, between seven and eleven.

The Preoperational Period
The preoperational period is characterized by the organization of
elementary representations or symbolic functions or the "beginning of
the interiorization of schemes of action in representations."^

This

period is an advance over Stage I's characteristics where the primary
task is the coordination of reflex movements into action schemes.

5®Jean Piaget and Barbel Inhelder, The Psychology of the Child,
trans. Helen Weaver (New York:
Harper Torchbook, Basic Books, Inc.,
1969), p.

100.

^Jean Piaget, The Child and Reality:
Psychology, trans. Arnold Rosin (New York:
Grossman Publishers,

1974), p.

57.

Problems of Genetic
A Viking Compass Book,
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With the advent of the symbolic function, the child is able to
form mental representations which stand for something that is not
present.

Forms of the symbolic function recognized by Piaget in this

period include language,

symbolic play (or imagination)

in contrast to

the simple play of exercise, postponed imitation, and probably begin¬
nings of the mental image conceived as internal imitation.52
The process of interiorization is begun in the preoperational
period and is not complete until the end of Stage II, the concrete
operational period.

Symbolic representations at the beginning of

Stage II are not truly internalized actions nor do they possess the
second characteristic of the true operation, that of reversibility;
that is,

the child is still limited by the necessary presence'Of the

environment or its representation in the symbol signifying the object
and is incapable of performing an action on the object mentally and,
by a reversal in reasoning,
object.

returning to the original state of the

The operation does not become fully functional until the

latter part of Stage II, the concrete-operational period.

Through

Stages I and II, there is a gradual transition from action schemes in
a sensori-motor sense,

to the mental image or figurative knowledge,

to operative knowing in Stage II.
The symbol in the preoperational period is understood on a
figurative or perceptual basis.

For example, even though a child may

have memorized the sequence of numbers one through ten at a relatively

52 Ibid. , p.

57.
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early age, he is unable to apply his reasoning with respect to the use
of number.

For a child whose reasoning is percept-bound, two equiva¬

lent sets of objects (seven each) can become unequal in number simply
by arranging the two sets in parallel rows, one of which is short and
the other long.

For the child, the number of objects in each set is

determined by the spatial arrangement,

i.e., by the density or amount

of area covered.
In addition to the symbolic function,

interiorization and the

figurative knowledge characteristics of the preoperational period is
a transition in the mobility of thought.

Piaget recognized that a

child’s thought initially is centered on himself
a result is immobile.

(ego-centric) and as

During the sensori-motor stage, for example,

the child comes to first recognize an object as existing apart from
himself, where previously no differentiation was made.
becomes separate,
permanent.

it can have its own identity and,

Once the object

therefore, become

Ego-centric thought continues for some time, however.

Through a gradual process,

it is less centered on self and more on

mental images and the figurative aspects of thought.

Finally, when

dealing with relations and logical thinking, thought is decentered or
mobile.

Sensori-Motor Versus Preoperative Thinking
Contrasting the gains made in the preoperational period with the
characteristics of sensori-motor intelligence serves to highlight the
characteristics jnst discussed as advances in thought.
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In summary,

Flavell identifies four major ways in which pre

operational intelligence differs from sensori-motor intelligence
because of the presence of the symbolic function.
(1)

First, sensori-motor intelligence is capable only of
linking, one by one, the successive actions or per¬
ceptual stages with which it gets involved.
Repre¬
sentational thought, on the other hand, through its
symbolic capacity, has the potential for simultaneous
grasping, in a single, internal epitome, a whole sweep
of separate events.
It is a much faster and more
mobile device which can recall the past, represent
the present, and anticipate the future in one tempo¬
rally brief, organized act.

(2)

Second, sensori-motor intelligence, being an intelli¬
gence of action, is limited to the pursuit of concrete
goals of action rather than to the quest for knowl¬
edge or truth as such.
Representational thought by
its very nature can (not that it will) reflect on the
organization of its acts as they bear on things rather
than simply register empirical success or failure.
It
has indigenous to it the wherewithal to be actioncontemplative rather than simply active.

(3) Third, by its very potential to get outside the
immediate present, representational thought can
eventually extend its scope well beyond actual, con¬
crete acts of the subject and actual concrete objects
in the environment.
(A) And finally, since it is confined to action in reality
rather than to representations of reality, sensori¬
motor cognition is inevitably a private event, an
individual, non-shared affair.
Conceptual intelli¬
gence, on the other hand, can and eventually does
become socialized through the medium of a system of
codified symbols which the whole culture can share.

Three Sub-Stages of the Preoperative Period
The preoperative period is viewed mainly as a stage of preparation

->3john H.

Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget

(Princeton, New Jersey:

Van Nostrand,

1964), pp.

151-15~.
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of the operations which become functional in a later phase of the
stage.

During this transitional state,

The first sub-period,

there are three sub-periods.

the child's reasoning, demonstrates that he has

begun the process of the interiorization of thought but can demonstrate
no mastery and may even fall back to the previous stage's type of
reasoning.

The second sub-stage is transitional in nature, where

progress is apparent at one moment and not apparent at the next.

The

third sub-period is one of attainment, where the type of reasoning which
began developing is achieved.
Piaget outlines the three stages as follows:
(1) From two to three-and-a-half or four years:
appear¬
ance of the symbolic function and the beginning of
the interiorization of schemes of action in repre¬
sentations.
(2) From four to five-and-a-half years:
representative
organizations founded either on static configura¬
tions or on assimilations to the action itself.
(3) From five-and-a-half to seven or eight years:
articulated representative regulations.
Sub-Stage I.

The symbolic functions which make their appearance

in this period are language,

symbolic play,

imitation and the mental

image.
In this first part of the preoperational period,

language repre¬

sents an advance over the first use of words in the sensori-motor stage,
as they begin to be used in a truly symbolic manner instead of relating
to the immediate surroundings and actions as in Stage I.

This progress

is gradual as is the case with the growth of all major developments.

54piaget, The Child and Reality, pp.

57-38.
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Symbolic language can represent events which occur in the past, present
or future, and it can represent absent things or events, and, most
importantly,

it serves as an instrument to convey changes in the struc¬

ture of thought and the growth of logic.

The coordination and trans¬

formation of abstractions of the signs of knowledge is associated with
operational thought, the beginning stages of which are constructed in
Stages I and II.
Play is another highly symbolic activity as it often involves
deferred imitation of acts the child has seen other adults or children
do, and it often involves substitute items,
real things.

such as toys,

in place of

Because this involves intellectual activity, play was

recognized by Piaget to be an important intellectual activity.

In

addition, play is an important part of emotional development.
The image and deferred imitation represent a third form of sym¬
bolic activity because an activity observed by the child has been
internalized and reappears at some later time, which is evidence that
the child has represented that activity in the form of a mental image.
Sub-Stage II.

Progress in the internalization of thought is evi¬

dent through elementary organization and structuring of coordinated
action schemes.

At this stage,

the child is able to coordinate proper¬

ties of static configurations in a manner that indicates that associa¬
tions and connections have taken form in either classification or rela¬
tions of order

(seriation)

schemes.

Number develops as a combination of these operations, and this
synthesis will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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S-Ub-.St:age III.

In this last phase of this period,

the process of

internalization is completed and the operations begin to appear func¬
tional,

that is,

the four characteristics of the operation are evi-

55
dent.

Reversibility reasoning is present.

In addition, conservation

reasoning as an aspect of the operation begins to attain stability,
although many specific forms of conservation have yet to become fully
operational.

The Development of Logic, Hindsight and Anticipation
Two additional characteristics begin to emerge near the end of
the preoperational period.

One is the transition from pre-logical

thought to logical thought.

The second

involves hindsight and antici¬

patory behavior.
Piaget states:

"The difference between what

logical) and what is sub-logical

is simply that

is logical

(or pre-

the former deals with

the relations between discontinuous elements while the latter relates
to elements forming part of a spatial continuum.

56

One recognizes here that the quality of reasoning undergoes a
fundamental change,

from a sub-logical level at

period to a logical level at
of objects and

its end.

the beginning of the

In an example involving two sets

the number of objects in each set explored earlier, we

see that reasoning at the sub-logical level is limited by relations in

“^See the discussion of
tics are listed, p.

the operation where the four characteris¬

61.

56Inhelder and Piaget, The Early Growth of Logic in the Child,
p.

282.
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the spatial continuum or in the figurative domain, whereas reasoning
at a logical level is able to transcend and coordinate spatial quali¬
ties as such and to focus on the relationship of the density of the
sets of objects and the length of the rows while conserving the fact
that the equality of number in the two sets remains uneffected.
The second characteristic, hindsight and anticipation, is an impor¬
tant aspect of the reversibility of thought and trial and error thinkin8>

for it allows

coherence between the beginning and what comes

after, and it may even lead them to alter what they have already done
in the light of what followed.
tory schema becomes retroactive,

In other words, as soon as an assimilait also takes an anticipatory charac¬

ter, because one cannot be consistent with the past without eventually
making choices and forming intentions as to the future.

As you

will recall, making choices and forming intentions about the future is
a crucial aspect of gaining volitional competence in ANISA theory.
For Piaget,

the addition of hindsight or retroactive thought and antici¬

patory possibilities have tremendous implications for the type of
interaction that can occur.

This quality is important,

for example.

In the construction of various levels of classificatory reasoning.
Still more important,

this quality has recently been explored

as a fundamental of the process of cognitive development.

^^Ibid. , p.

58

An

286.

"^See Barbel Inhelder, Hermine Sinclair, and Magati Bovet,
Learning and the Development of Cognition (Cambridge:
Harvard
University Press, 1974).

I
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interactive relationship between the substructures of knowledge in the
form of implication gives rise to assimilatory mechanisms of equilibra¬
tion between the substructures.
major section,

This will be discussed in the next

"What Are the Processes of Elaboration?"

Differentiating Preoperational and Operational Thought
Inhelder and Piaget have summarized the qualities of preopera¬
tional

(pre-logical)

thought in a manner which serves to contrast it

from operational thought.

Their analysis is summarized in the follow¬

ing three points:
(1) When the child considers static situations, he is more
likely to explain them in terms of the characteristics
of their configurations at a given moment than in terms
of the changes leading from one situation to another.
(2) When he does consider transformations, he assimilates
them to his own actions, and not as yet to reversible
operations.
We can reduce these two differences to
one by saying that at the level of preoperational
thought the static states of a given system and its
modifications do not yet form a single system, whereas
at the level of concrete operations the static states
will be conceived as resulting from transformations in
the same way as the results of various operations are
also subordinate to the operations.
(3)

Nevertheless, even at this level we find tendencies
toward the organization of integrated systems and we
can discern in them an orientation toward certain
forms of equilibrium.
However, the only instruments
available to the subject for the organization of such
systems are preceptual or representational (regula¬
tions) in contrast to actual operations (regulations
are incomplete or approximate compensations, in con¬
trast to operations which entail complete compensa¬
tions) .
The difference between these two sorts of
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mechanisms is that reversibility remains incomplete
in the first case but is achieved in the second.^9

The Concrete Operational Period
This period signalizes the attainment of the functional property
of many of the schemes or operations which began elaboration or ele¬
mentary structuration in the preoperational period.

Operations which

were previously unstable now reach a period of stability or equilibrium.
A characteristic of this structural stability is full reversibility of
the operation.

The period, however,

is referred to as concrete, as

the thought structure is not yet fully separated from the concrete
content of the event or thing and is limited in that it cannot be
generalized to all properties or contents.

With this period, however,

comes a more fully functional transformational character of adaptive
thought.

Also, a more extensive horizontal integration of the various

operational schemes is begun.
Of this sub-period of concrete operations, Flavell simply states:
It is simply that the older child seems to have at his com¬
mand a coherent and integrated cognitive system with which
he organizes and manipulates the world around him.
Much
more than his younger counterpart, he gives the decided
impression of possessing a solid cognitive bedrock, some¬
thing flexible and plastic and yet consistent and enduring,
with which he can structure the present in terms of the
past without malice, strain and dislocation, that is, with¬
out the ever-present tendency to trouble into perplexity
and contradiction which mark the pre-schooler.
Restated in
Piaget’s lexicon, the concrete operational child behaves in
a wide variety of tasks as though a rich and integrated

■^Inhelder and Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking, p. 246
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assimilatory organization were functioning in equilibrium
or balance with a finely tuned, discriminative, accommodatory mechanism.60
Piaget and Inhelder mention several important limitations on con¬
crete operational thinking, however:
(1)

From the standpoint of content, concrete thought can¬
not be immediately generalized to all physical proper¬
ties.
Instead, it proceeds from one factor to another,
sometimes with a true lag of several years between the
organization of one (for example, lengths) and next
(for example, weights).
This is because it is more
difficult to order serially, to equalize, etc., objects
whose properties are less easy to dissociate from ones
own action, such as weight, than to apply the same
operations to properties which can be objectified more
readily, such as length.

(2) Thus, from the standpoint of content, the 'potential
transformations compatible with the system links'
which determine the boundary line between real and
possible operations are still more limited than is
implied by the form of the operations involved.
(3)

(There remains an instability when fields or systems
have to be coordinated.)
There is no general con¬
crete compositions; that is to say after the subject
has classified or has ordered a set of properties
serially, etc., . . . concrete thought does not solve
all the problems raised by the interference of
heterogeneous operations or by interaction of dif¬
ferent properties. 61

Structures Attaining Stability in the Period.

Many of Piaget's

observations center on the operations of classification and seriation
which are established during the concrete operational period.

Support¬

ing these operations are various types of conservation reasoning,

such

^Opiavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, p.

165.

^Inhelder and Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking, pp.

249-250.
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as the conservation of numerical correspondence, of length, of weight.
and of volume.

The operations relating numbers and their relations

are also established.
Piaget also observes that, "this period of concrete operations
can be divided

into two stages:

one of simple operations and the other

of the completion of certain whole systems, especially in the fields
of space and time."
In addition to the whole system mentioned here are the parent
structures previously referred to,
the ordering structure.

such as the algebraic structure or

Because of the complexities of possible inter¬

relationships among the operations, Piaget uses several terms (actually
borrowed from mathematics and logic)

to describe the operations during

the concrete operational stage and the formal operational stage which
follows.

The terms are "groupings" and "the group."

tional structures are called

'groupings'

"The first opera¬

and give the child the means

to know the world within the stable systems of logical classification,
seriation, numbers,

spatial and temporal coordinates, and causality."

During the stage of formal operations,
associated
essence,

fil

these "groupings" are

into more complex stable structures called "groups."

Tn

they permit operations to be performed on operations and they

are governed by sets of rules, as has been previously discussed under
the section on structures.

^Piaget, The Child and Reality,
OJFurth,

Piaget and Knowledge, p.

p.

58.

247.
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Stage III:

The Formal Operational Stage

This is the last and culminating stage in the development of a
fully functioning intelligence.

It commences at about the age of

eleven or twelve and several years later may attain a functional
maturity.

This stage is characterized by the combination of operations

into complex networks of thought,

groups and lattices.

In addition,

thought becomes propositional in nature and the period is sometimes
titled the hypothetical-deductive stage.

At this stage, thought is

freed from the limitations characteristic of the concrete stage.
Finally, in formal thought there is a reversal of the direc¬
tion of thinking between reality and possibility in the
subjects' method of approach.
Possibility no longer appears
merely as an extension of an empirical situation or of
actions actually performed.
Instead, it is reality that is
now secondary to possibility.
Henceforth, they conceive of
the given facts as that sector of a set of possible trans¬
formations that has actually come about; for they are
neither explained nor even regarded as facts until the sub¬
ject undertakes verifying procedures that pertain to the
entire set of possible hypotheses compatible with a given
situation.64

Formal Thought and The Combinatory System
(Interpropositional Operations)
The most general property in terms which we can charac¬
terize formal thought is that it constitutes a combina¬
torial system, in the strict sense of the term.
... So
the main feature of propositional logic is not that it is
verbal logic but that it requires a combinatorial system.
Secondly, the combinatorial operations are second degree
operations:
permutations are serial orders of serial
orders; combinations are multiplications of multiplica¬
tions, etc.^

6^Inhelder and Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking, p.
65Ibid. , p.

254.

251.
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Piaget and

Tnhelder go on to state that this most general princi¬

ple of combinatorial operations is a direct result of an even more
general principle, the most important distinguishing characteristic of
formal thought, namely,

the reversal from a reality-centered to

propositionally-centered system.
By way of introduction to these last and crowning structures of
the intellect,

it is important to note the variety of characteristics

that an operation can have.

First, operations can function as single

unintegrated structures, as is characteristic of the preoperational
stage.

Beginning with the concrete operations stage, there is a higher

degree of both horizontal and vertical integration as is witnessed in
the grouping,

lattice, and group structure operations.

In this stage,

operations can function within an intrapropositional context.

Finally,

in the formal operations stage there is attained an interpropositional
function of operations.

This is where all of the structures function

in a truly integrated manner,
another in combination.

that is, they can "operate" on one

Finally,

for conceptual clarity,

it is impor¬

tant to state that operations vary with respect to their level of
generality;

i.e.,

there are specific or limited task-oriented opera¬

tions such as conservation, classification, seriation, etc., as there
are also more general operations (because of the width of potential
applications), such as those in the sixteen binary operations and the
INRC

(Identity, Negation, Reciprocity, Correlation) group.
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The Binary Operations:
The Formal Combinatorial System,
Forming an Interpropositional Lattice
Inhelder and Piaget,

in exploring the nature of propositional

logic, have identified sixteen rules of logic which the adolescent uses
in solving complex problems.
mature form of thought.

They constitute part of what is the

The basic sixteen binary operations form a

very flexible system of combinations.

Each of the binary operations

is derived from logic and mathematics.

The system utilizes in a

language of expression the discrete and separate elements of "p" and
"q".

A line above the element p (p) means not p or "it's false."
Since this system of logic does not appear in reasoning until

adolescence is reached (after twelve years of age) and since the major
thrust of development which is concern to the development of number
occurs much earlier than this, I shall limit myself to a brief presenta¬
tion of these operations.^
(1) Disjunction (p v q) =
either, or
(2)

Its inverse,

q)v(p

Its inverse, incompatibility
(p . q) = (p • q)v(p • q)v(p •
Implication (p q) =

(6)

Its inverse

(p •

(p

*

66Ibid., pp.

q),

q), neither

(p •

103-104.

q)

q)v(P *

q)v(P *

9)

q)

(7) Converse implication (q p) =
Its inverse

q)v(p •

q) , both

(5)

(8)

•

conjunction negation (p •

(3) Conjunction (p *
(4)

(p •

q)

(p *

q)v(p •

q)v(p •

q)
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(9) Equivalence (p = q) = (p •

q)v(p . q)

(10)

Its inverse, reciprocal exclusion (p v q) =
(p ’ q)v(p • q)

(11)

Independence of p in relation to q p (q) =
(P * q)v(p • q)

(12)

Its inverse (which is also its reciprocal)

p(q) = (p • q)v(p . q)
(13)

Independence of q and q in relation to p,
i.e., q(p) and q(p) :

(14) These operations are found in (15)
(15)

Complete affirmation or tautology (p * q) =
(P • q)v(p • q)v(p . q)v(p . q)

(16)

Its inverse, complete negation or contradiction (0).

Piaget and Inhelder derived these combinatory operations through
observations of the propositional logic which adolescents use to solve
complex problems.

They observe when commenting on the reasoning used

by one boy in solution of a problem:

"When formal equilibrium has

been attained the combinational system which characterizes the 'struc¬
tured whole'

pays off in full, and the subject is no longer satisfied

with reasoning based on simple concrete correspondence.

For example,

when GOU has observed the non-correspondence of the stopping points
with weights, he does not feel that his proof is adequate ('rigorous')
because he realizes that if weight acted to produce an inclination of
the plane,

it could be combined with other factors.

^Ibid., pp.
67Ibid., p.

103-104.
67.
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The problem presented to the boy was to determine why a metal bar
attached to a non-metallic rotating disk stops when the metal bar
points to one pair of boxes instead of any other boxes placed around
the disk.

The crucial pair of boxes contained several magnets con¬

cealed in wax.
In summary,

Inhelder and Piaget state with respect to the dif¬

ference between concrete and formal operational thought:
Although concrete operations consist of organized systems
(classification, serial ordering, correspondence, etc.),
they proceed from one partial link to the next in stepby-step fashion, without relating each partial link to all
others.
Formal operations differ in that all of the possi¬
ble combinations are considered in each case.
Consequently,
each partial link is grouped in relation to the whole, in
other words, reasoning moves continually as a function of
a 'structural whole.

What Are the Processes of Elaboration?

According to Piaget, a similar mechanism (biological
adaptive mechanism) must account for the first cognitively
adaptive behavior of the child.
Adaptive behavior results
from functional assimilation of pre-existing biological
structures.
The first signs of mental activity are those
behaviors through which new elements are incorporated
(i.e., assimilated) into genetically pre-programmed struc¬
tures, such as sucking objects and extended to a variety
of objects, and, since it has to be slightly modified
(i.e., accommodated) to each different object, it leads to
sensori-motor recognition of objects and events.
Herein
lies the origin of the first 'knowing' activities of the
subject.

(Emphasis is mine.)6^

Piaget's model for the elaboration or development of cognitive

68Ibid. , p.

16.

69Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development^
Cognition, p.

3.
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structures is based on a biological model by analogy,

i.e., as the

origin of biological man is accounted for by biological laws and
mechanisms,

so also is Piaget's theory of intellectual development.

The living functioning organism seeks a dynamic interaction with its
environment, constantly extending itself into the environment and yet
striving to maintain its own organization.

Interaction creates a con¬

dition such that the organism must constantly adapt or change, must
coordinate and transform things around and within its own organization
to survive.

This interaction in the realm of intellectual development

is accounted for by Piaget in the equilibration theory.
For Piaget,

this parallelism between morphogenic development and

the development of knowing structures is so fundamental it is an
unavoidable conclusion:
To sum up, in biological terms it would be out of the ques¬
tion to consider the organization of action schemata inde¬
pendently of endogenetic factors, if for no other reason
than that, as was fundamentally the case with all previous
ones, these schemata constitute dynamic or functional forms
indissolubly linked to the static or anatomical forms
represented by the structure of the organs.
. . . Most
instincts are allied to specialized organs, it is true, but
it is nonetheless true that perception and acquired
behavior, including the higher types of operative intelli¬
gence, do, in a more supple way, manifest certain func¬
tional possibilities or 'reaction norms' of the anatomical
and physiological structure of the species.
In a word,
the general coordinations of action upon which the building
up of the most basic types of knowledge is conditional,
presuppose not only nervous conditions but coordinations
of a much more deep-seated kind, those which are, in fact,
interactions dominating the entire morphogenesis.70

70Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, pp.

9-10.
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In short, Piaget states:

"It is not possible to understand

psychological development without considering its organic roots.
Explication of

this thesis lies within the theory of equilibration and

auto-regulation.

Equilibrium and Auto-Regulation

The essential starting point here is the fact that no form
of knowledge, not even perceptual knowledge, constitutes
a simple copy of reality, because it always includes a
process of assimilation to previous structures.
We use
the term assimilation in the wide sense of integration into
prevous structures.' A
Organisms interacting with their environment incorporate into the
basic structure the materials of the environment.

These materials are

modified or transformed during the process of incorporation or assimi¬
lation.

The process of assimilation is governed by the nature and

state of development of the organism;

i.e., a plant cell assimilates

different materials than does an animal cell according to the internal
makeup of the cell.
established,

Before the organism’s structures are completely

that is, during the period of growth many environmental

factors can determine the ultimate form of the adult; i.e., an organism
can adapt to environmental pressures.

An example used by Piaget

involves the growth of a type of mollusk.

Due to varying conditions

71Piaget
The Child's Conception of Space, trans. F. L. Langdon
and J. L. Lunzer (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), cited by
Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development o£_Co^niL on>
p.

5.

7^Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, p.

A.
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of growth,

specifically,

ment takes place,
ner.

the roughness of the water in which develop¬

the shell can develop in a widened or shortened man¬

Rough water requires greater muscular activity of the snail's

foot under these conditions which in turn determines the modification
of the shell's structure.

The potential for this response to environ¬

mental pressure is built into the snail's genetic endowment, as was
the case with innate knowledge; however,
unless conditions demand it.

it does not become evident

So also, for Piaget, the development of

human intelligence is adaptive and coordinating in character, con¬
stantly responding to the environment in an interactive manner.
Adaptation is either in the form of acquired behavior during the life¬
time of the child or in long term change in the genome.
Piaget's interactionist or constructivist model of development
represents a significant addition to existent models of the evolution
of psychological development.
of biological evolution.

His is an extension of modern theories

Piaget,

in the work Biology and Knowledge,

traces the development of evolutionary theory from Aristotle to Lamark
and Darwin and then to modern theorists such as Waddington.

Lamark

emphasized the importance of environmental pressures which produced
changes, adaptations and characteristics in the organism.

He hypothe¬

sized that these changes are incorporated into the genetic endowment of
the individual and are passed on to future generations.

Darwin

accounted for the evolution of the species through natural selection.
Support for this thesis was gained through the advent of modern genet¬
ics which suggested the mechanism of mutation.
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Waddington, according to Piaget, was responsible for solving the
conflict between these two views of evolution "of the double notions
of structure or organization and of genesis or development, so as to
include the recognition that all development is an organization, and
all organization a development."
The idea that all development is a kind of organization
became obvious from the moment that phylogenetic evolution
was seen to be partly dependent on embryological growth and
on the ontogenetic formation of phenotypes, and not simply
the inverse.
It took a great embryologist turned geneti¬
cist, like Waddington, to make clear, at last, how out of
the question it is to explain evolutive variation simply in
terms of preformation or chance, ruling out any ideas of
intervention by environment.
As soon as it is recognized
that selection is brought to bear only on phenotypes and
that, throughout their period of development, all pheno¬
types continue to be a series of 'responses’ made by the
genome to tensions set up by the environment, or that the
environment is just as much organized by the organism as
phenotype variation is directed by the environment, then it
becomes possible to speak of the 'cybernetic circuits'
. . . and development can be seen as a series of organiza¬
tional ladders, all different and all perpetually subject
to cyclic causality.
Piaget's model of psychological development is based upon this
idea that all life is essentially an organization and that this organi¬
zation forms an interactive whole with the environment.

As the knowl¬

edge structures or intellectual organization of the child are in an
active relationship with the environment, so they respond or adapt and
change with environmental pressures or tensions.

At the same time, the

environment is being organized and changed by the child, hence the
organizational ladders and the perpetual cyclic causality.

73Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, p.

135.

Within the
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context of the interactive whole is the idea that organization places
constraints or limits on the amount and nature of the change that can
take place;

e.g.,

the phenotype, as in the case of the mollusk men¬

tioned earlier, has a limited response to the environmental pressure
of rough water in the form of enlarging the foot and changing the size
of the shell.
i.e.,

For the developing child, a similar limitation exists;

the internal organization through a progressive series of

equilibrations is modified bit by bit.

However, the internal organiza¬

tion imposes a directionality to the course of development.
Equilibrium in action is defined as:

"an active compensation set

up by the subject against exterior disturbances, whether experienced or
anticipated.

Further, equilibrium is a state of balance, a state

of dynamic tension between the organism and the environment function¬
ing as a "regulatory organ."

As a "regulatory organ," it governs the

nature of the interaction taking place between the organism and the
environment.
structure.

This is accomplished through change in the internal
Knowledge at any one time can be at a certain state of

development.

Through contact and interaction with the environment,

the child assimilates or takes from the experience what can be
incorporated.

Again,

from the biological sciences comes an analogy

to intellectual growth:

"Embryological research has shown that the

organism must have reached a certain level of
sensitivity,

competence,

or

to specific environmental stimuli before it can respond

75 Ibid., p. 12.
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to them.

This new approach no longer stresses the role of external

stimuli, but concentrates on the internal competence or sensitivity
of the organism:

stages of embryonic development are characterized by

changes in competence.

The state of internal competence of the

structure of knowing determines what can be assimilated.

That which

is assimilated has an effect or influence on the action schemata or
knowing structure, the result of which is a modification or accommoda¬
tion of the knowing structure.
of competence.

This modification produces a new state

This dynamic relationship between assimilation and

accommodation constitutes the foundation for the equilibration model.

Equilibrium and Equilibration:

Product and

Process—Homeostasis and Homeorhesis

Piaget makes distinction between the formatory process and the
state of equilibrium resulting from it.

Again from the biological

model, systems once established tend to withstand the pressure to
change; i.e., the ability to remain in balance, returning to the
original state.

This is called homeostasis.

For example, warm

blooded animals maintain internal temperatures within certain limits.
Exposure to cold brings into play many homeostasis mechanisms; e.g.,
changing the pattern of blood circulation away from the outer layers
of skin thereby increasing the depth of the insulation layer.
such mechanism is the shivering reflex.

Another

Homeostasis is responsible

76Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of
Cognition, p. 5.
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for maintaining balance in the structure or organization.

So also,

Piaget describes the effects of environmental perturbations on the
functional structures of intelligence.

The process of equilibrium in

an intellectual sense is much like the biological homeostasis.
This process, however, is inadequate to explain the regulation of
systems which are as yet not established.

Tt is inadequate for the

following reason.
No theory which seeks to explain the origin of knowledge as a
system of assimilations and accommodations during interaction with the
environment is able theoretically to account for the fact that no
matter how different the experiences or culture of a child may be, the
learning pattern always passes through the same stages, develops the
same schemes and operations, and encounters the same developmental
problems, because there is a developmental course.

Further, a condi¬

tion of balance or return to the original state, as would be the case
with a homeostatic equilibrium, would not allow for the changes which
occur bit by bit during the normal developmental course.
For this reason, Waddington's internal regulatory mechanism of
"homeorhesis" and his notion of "necessary routes" to development or
"Chreods" have been adopted by Piaget.77

The concept of chreod recog¬

nizes the potentially troublesome possibility of explaining the observa¬
tion of common learning patterns and stages among all children through
a preformation argument.

Preformation would imply, for instance, that

77Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, pp. 12-25.
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any particular piece of knowledge already exists within genetic endow¬
ment.

As such, this answer is completely unacceptable.

Yet, the

problem of common patterns and stages of learning remains.

However,

within the concept of the chreod (necessary routes to development) is
the explanation that development is channeled through a complex inter¬
play of regulations, or homeorhesis.

This idea of channeled formations

relates to the just discussed constraints that a state of internal
organization places on the path of development.

The concept of

homeorhetic equilibrium incorporates the idea that there will be a
change or adaptations to the state of development or internal organiza¬
tion and the idea that this change will occur bit by bit within the
context of constraints placed upon development because there is an
organization.

In the example at the very beginning of this section,

new elements are assimilated into genetically preprogrammed structures
and as a result mental structures are extended.

Within this context,

Piaget accounts for organic growth through the complex interaction of
three developmental regulations:

(1) programming by the genome,

(2) environmental influence, and (3) equilibration or auto-regulation
* „
78
factors.
In cognitive growth, Piaget interprets these three developmental
regulators as (1) maturation of the nervous system,
with the physical reality,

(3) interaction with the social milieu,

and (4) equilibration or auto-regulation.

78 Ibid., p. 35.

(2) interaction

Maturation defined in this
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way takes programming by the genome into consideration as it is this
factor which controls the development of the nervous system.
"The nervous system exerts its influence upon the whole field of
functional regulations in their twin aspects of internal regulation
(coordination of the various physiological mechanisms) and regulation
of exchanges within the environment."^

Environmental

influence is

divided into recognizably important spheres of interaction sites for
the developing child, the physical and human environments.
All of these factors combine in a complex interactive manner
during the process of formation acting as a system of internal controls
which Waddington has described as homeorhesis and which serve to guide
or channel development within its normal course.

Without the con¬

trolling influence and because the environment provides no bounds to
the possible interactions, the growth of the intellect would vary
greatly from person to person, culture to culture.
To sum up, throughout development there is a progression in the
type of equilibration observed.

During the formation process, the

regulatory functions are described as homeorhetic.

Formation leads to

the establishment of structures which maintain balance through a
homeostatic equilibrium.

This differentiation between processes and

function has lead Piaget to distinguish levels of equilibration.

These

levels or states of equilibrium are reflections of the state of the
development of the inner structure.

79 Ibid., p.

33.
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become more mobile or flexible as the child progresses from a preoperational to the operational stage.

This is accomplished through

progressive change in the fields of application or fields concentrated
on.

The child tends at

first to be ego centered (self-centered), then

progresses to a perceptual centration on objects, and finally on to a
free or decentered state, which is characterized chiefly by reversi¬
bility (inversion or negation).

This last state Piaget describes as a

state of operational equilibrium or a "stable form of compensation
„
,.80
systems.

The Assimilation-Accommodation Continuum

Assimilation and accommodation are the specific processes of
equilibration model.

Assimilation basically describes the incorpora-

tive mode of intellectual activity,

that is,

it describes the process

by which an event or thing is taken into the inner structure of the
organism.

For Piaget,

of equilibration.

this is part of the auto-regulatory mechanism

As a result of assimilation, new schemes and struc¬

tures are built, which in turn can assimilate new and different material
as the structure is progressively established.

Assimilation then is

closely related to Piaget’s thesis that knowledge is not a copy of
reality but is transformed by the action schema when it is incorporated.
Knowledge is also conditioned by meaning,

that is,

the meaning that a

specific environmental reality can have is dependent upon the state of

80 Ibid. , p.

25.
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internal development.

Hence, assimilation is closely linked with mean-

ing, as an assimilation cannot take place without it.

Assimilation

also relates to the active aspect of knowing, because knowledge func¬
tions as a transforming system.
Accommodation describes the process of modification as a result
of that which is assimilated, in other words, accommodation is at the
heart of adaptive mechanisms of change in the structure.

As each

accommodation or modification occurs, new assimilations can take place.
In fact, these twin processes are inseparably linked.

Flavell observes

that:
Although assimilation and accommodation are distinguished
conceptually, they are obviously indissociable in the con¬
crete reality of any adaptational act.
As will become
clear, when intellectual adaptation is discussed, every
assimilation of an object of the organism simultaneously
involves an accommodation of the organism to the object, con¬
versely, every accommodation is at the same time an assimilatory modification of the object accommodated to.
Taken
together, they make up the constant attributes of even the
most elementary adaptational act.
Adaptation, through its twin components, assimilation and
accommodation, express the dynamic, outer aspect of bio¬
logical functioning.
But an adaptive act always pre¬
supposes an underlying organization, and is the second major
functional invariant. 1

The Developmental Relationships and Connections Between the
Acquisition Processes and Various Cognitive Structures

Recently, Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet (1974) published a summary
of research directed toward a study of the developmental relationships

81piavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, p. 45
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and connections between the acquisition processes and various cognitive
structures.

Their conclusions lend important support to Piaget's

general equilibration model and constitutes a significant contribution
to our understanding of the processes of learning and the development
of cognition.
The main goal of our learning studies was to get a better
insight into the transition (or construction) mechanisms
which enable children to attain certain concepts that are
essential for scientific thought.
. . . The epistemologi¬
cal conviction that progress in human knowledge results
from dynamic processes which imply self-regulatory mechan¬
isms led us to pay close attention to clashes between the
different patterns of thought that constitute a subject's
competence at a certain level of his development, to the
conflicts resulting from these clashes, and, especially, to
the different ways these conflicts can be resolved. Two
different types of conflict can be observed.
First, dif¬
ferent subsystems, each developing at its own developmental
rate, can create a conflictual situation, since once system
may already have reached a more advanced state than another.
Second, the child's reasoning may be at a level where he
becomes aware that experimental reality does not conform
to his deductions or inferences.82
The subsystems which were studied were different concepts of con¬
servation (numerical, physical and spatial).

These were linked in

learning studies to determine the relationships between them.

As

reported, many of these interactions resulted in conflict of two dif¬
ferent types.

In some instances, the clash did not produce observable

progress in the elaboration of the structures but seemingly functioned
to disturb the state of equilibrium.
or growth in the structures did occur.

In other cases, however, progress
This was particularly evident

82Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of
Cognition, p.

242.
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when problems that required a logical system (class inclusion problems
where logic is most important) were compared with those which seemingly
could be solved by physical manipulations (conservation problems where
objects are of greater importance).
comparison.

Two chapters are devoted to this

The children in Chapter VII were trained in class inclu¬

sion problems and post tested in conservation reasoning.

The opposite

was true in Chapter VIII where the children were trained in conserva¬
tion problems and post tested in class inclusion problems.
clusion reached was that:

"exercises in inclusion,

The con¬

if successful,

have a more marked effect on conservation than vice versa.
There seems to be a fundamental difference between these
reactions to the different types of problems, although both
show the dynamic features of an imminent transition to
operatory situations.
The difference is due to the fact that
in logic it is the subject himself who introduces an organi¬
zation; this organization concerns the hierarchical relation¬
ships of the classes, which may be modified at will, pro¬
vided that this does not entail modification of the logical
system itself.
By contrast, the subject cannot introduce
or exclude at will a property of an object (e.g., weight in
a problem of density), nor modify the dimensions of objects
displaced in a problem of spatial conservation.
To solve
problems where schemes are enriched and modified by the
properties of the object, the subject plans actions whose
result does not necessarily match his prediction; in the
case of logic, there must of necessity be identity, whence
the absence of contradiction and compromise in the solution
of logical problems.
The existence, and even the frequency, of the compromises
in physical problems and their absence in that of logicoarithmetic operations (apart from the modifications of
schemes in the handling of the classes and subclasses
referred to above) must be regarded in the light of the
fact that in logical problems the contradictions lead either

83

Ibid., p.

240.
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to regression or to rapid progress, while in physical ques¬
tions conflicts between the resistances of reality and the
subject's schemes, or between various, but still isolated
schemes, are far from tenacious.8^
In keeping with the fundamental purpose of this entire work,
namely,

to explore the relationship between learning and the development

of cognition,

they conclude:

"The problem is, therefore, to determine

which psychological mechanism is responsible for the progressive improve¬
ments in the successive forms of equilibrium improvements, and perfec¬
tions that Piaget refers to today as
heightening equilibration.'

'equilibration majorante—

The source of the progress is to be sought

in the disequilibrium which incites the subject to go beyond his
O C

present state in search of new solutions."
Many specific transition mechanisms are explored in this work
when considering the specific interaction between subsystems.

As these

subsystems are important to the development of number and as the transi¬
tion mechanisms are important to elaboration of the ANISA Theory of
Development, Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet's specific result will be
discussed in the next two chapters.

The general conclusion, however,

which indicates that it is the child's emerging sense of awareness,
ability to make inferences and implications brought about by conflicts
arising between the structures of knowing, which determines much of
the cognitive development at this stage is an important addition to a
discussion of the Piagetian notion of equilibration.

8^Ibid., pp.
85Ibid., p.

263-264.
264.
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CHAPTER

III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUMERICAL THINKING

Introduction

Once upon a time, so the story goes, there was a squire who wanted
to catch a crow who lives in a nearby tower in a castle.
found, however,

The squire

that as soon as anyone entered the base of the tower

the crow would fly away and stay away until the person left.

The

squire was determined to catch the crow and entered the tower with one
other person.

One left and the squire stayed, but the crow stayed

away until the squire had left also.

So next, he entered the tower

with two others, then three others and still the crow stayed away until
all three or four persons had left.

When five entered the tower, the

crow returned after only four had left.

The crow’s inability to

"count" beyond four proved to be a fatal shortcoming.

This inability

to "count" on the part of the crow is not actually hypothesized to be
an inability to count, but rather relates to a "visual number sense."
Zimiles,

in a study of the development of numbers,

found that in

a series of training exercises in the use of numbers, young children
demonstrate a capacity similar to that of the crow's, regarding work¬
ing with and learning from small groups of objects.

This intuitive

1Herbert Zimiles, "The Development of Conservation and Differentia
tion of Number," Society for Research in Child Development (monographs)
Vol. 31, No. 103-108 (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1966), pp. 1-46.
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sense of the "how manyness"

(numerosity) of small collections of num¬

bers has been substantiated in many studies that will be reported
later.

It is interesting to note that a study of the structure of

many languages reveals that early man, when first beginning to build
languages,

incorporated this intuitive aspect of number in the form

of singular, dual, and plural, and in words that express one, two and
three in the form of single, more, and many.
In most Indo-European languages, the original significance
of the word for ’three* was roughly ’over,' 'across,' or
beyond,
one would imagine, to groups of three being
formerly among those regarded as 'many,' and later, when
distinguished from other forms of 'many,' still seem as
more than or beyond, groups of two.
There is a possibibility a further linguistic indication of man's early aware¬
ness of only 'one,' 'two,' and 'many' in the distinction
made in ancient languages and still retained in some modern
languages, between the singular, dual and plural.2
Man's abilities with number have obviously developed far beyond
these elementary forms.

In general, number as now used, requires an

ability to organize and conceptualize information from the environment
in a highly complex abstract way.

The nature of that construction is

the subject of this chapter.
In a recent and interesting review of the development of the con¬
cept of number, Brainerd

(1973)

traces its origins from the philosopher-

mathematician Pathogoras to the more modern mathematicians and
philosophers Frege, Peano and Russell.

Anita Riess (1947)

in a review

of "number readiness" research (1900-1947), as it was titled then.

2

Donald Smeltzer, Man and Number, Second Edition (London:

Black, Ltd.,

1970), p.

5.
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indicates a trend toward the recognition of the importance of dealing
with the cognitive prerequisites of number instead of a reliance upon
rote memorization of counting from one to ten and rote learning or
addition and subtraction problems which characterized
extent still characterize) educational approaches.

(and to some

A notable example

is the recent television series of young children called "Sesame
Street,

whose major thrust in mathematics has been oriented toward

rote—memorization of the number sequence.
Although there is no universally accepted theory of the cognitive
prerequisites and foundation of number, Piaget’s theoretical formula¬
tions have come to dominate much of the research and educational prac¬
tice around the world.
Piaget, after devoting his attention to an inquiry of the way
children think,

to the changes in their thinking and to the growth of

a structure such as number, has theorized that the period of develop¬
ment of number

(of pre-number to number thinking)

period of the development of logic

corresponds to the

(of pre-logical to logical thinking).

In fact, number and logic form a single and natural system which
culminates in logico-mathematical thought.
This chapter will,

therefore, be devoted to an exploration of the

topic of the growth of the system of logical and number thinking.

This

development, as was discussed in the previous chapter, occurs in a
gradual and hierarchically arranged series of stages.

The major struc¬

tures which are developed through these stages which contribute to
number and logic are the systems of the inclusion relation and the
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asymmetrical relation.

Their eventual operational synthesis forms the

single system of number.

The first part of the chapter is, therefore,

theoretical in orientation.

The second half of the chapter will be

devoted to a review of research as it relates to the major topics of
number development.

A portion of the review of research is incor¬

porated into the next chapter as it is of direct relevance to the
learning to learn of number.

Logic, Number and Inference

Our hypothesis is that the construction of number goes
hand-in-hand with the development of logic, and that a prenumerical period corresponds to a pre-logical level.
Our
results do, in fact, show that number is organized, stage
after stage, in close connection with the gradual elabora¬
tion of systems of inclusions (hierarchy of logical classes)
and systems of asymmetrical relations (qualitative seriations), the sequence of numbers resulting from an operational
synthesis of classification and seriation.
This hypothesis is a highly condensed statement of the central con¬
cerns important to a description of the development of number.
broad sense, the themes evident are:

(1)

In a

the construction of number

goes hand-in-hand with the development of logic;

(2)

there is a close

connection between the gradual elaboration of systems of class and
seriation and the organization of number; and

(3) number results from

the operational synthesis of classification and seriation.
The thesis that number and logic develop hand-in-hand provides a
framework for a developmental description of number.

3Jean Piaget, The Child’s
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc.

Number and logic

Conception of Number (New York:
, The Norton Library, 1965), p. viii.
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both reflect a basic capacity of man to organize what are the qualita¬
tive and quantitative,
of the world.

similarity and difference relations or attributes

Logic imposes the rules and structures whereby such an

organization occurs.

Piaget,

in the following reference, outlines

generally how number and logic form a single system and how the qualita¬
tive and quantitative relations are organized through the two major
structures of the inclusion of classes (based on relations of similar¬
ity) and asymmetrical relations (based on relations of difference).
In our view, logical and arithmetical operations therefore
constitute a single system that is psychologically natural,
the second resulting from generalization and fusion of the
first, under the two complementary headings of inclusion of
classes and seriation of relations, quality being dis¬
regarded.
When the child applies this operational system to
sets that are defined by the qualities of the elements, he
is compelled to consider separately classes (which depend on
the qualitative equivalence of elements) and asymmetrical
relations (which express the seriable differences).
Hence,
the dualism of logic of classes and logic of asymmetrical
relations.
But when the same system is applied to sets
irrespective of their qualities, the fusion of inclusion and
seriation of the elements into a single operational totality
takes place, and this totality constitutes the sequence of
whole numbers, which are indissociably cardinal and
ordinal

A

In a certain sense,
of the two

logic can be thought of as the larger category

(number and logic)

and will therefore provide an orientation

to the major changes which are taking place in development at this
time.

From the above reference, however,

it can be seen that this dis¬

tinction between logic and number is artificial,

^Ibid., p.

viii.

for they form a single.

See also the discussion in the previous chapter

on the Bourbaki "parent" structures, p.

68
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natural system which eventually expresses itself as logico-mathematical
thought in the concrete operational stage.
Piaget describes two basic levels In the development of logic.
The first is the pre-logical and the second

is the logical.

During

the sensori-motor stage, Sub-Stage IV,5 6 7 which occurs sometime around
the end of the first year,

the child's reasoning is characterized by

a coordination of action schemes serving as means to an end relations.
In this stage,

"the child is no longer at the mercy of chance encounters

but begins to follow a
trial and error.

'logic of action'

according to the method of

The child will now eagerly explore new things by

means of numerous action schemes with which he is familiar.
not reach a desired object by himself,
to make her bring it to him.

If he can¬

he will pull his mother's apron

Schemes are active and mutually coordi¬

nated to serve as means to an end

in an action sense.

Piaget illus¬

trates this by numerous observations of the child's removing an
obstacle in order to reach a desire, but inaccessible object."6
"logic of action" is limited
only, however,

The

in that it applies to external actions

it does signalize the beginning of the organization of

reality on the basis of general schemes of action.

"These schemes

include the organization of space and time, of causality, and, most
importantly, of permanent objects, among which is found the self.

5See the discussion of Chapter Two concerning the sub-stages of
the sensori—motor period on p.

74.

6Furth, Piaget and Knowledge, p.
7Ibid., p.

51.

47.
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The next advance in the pre-logical period has been described by
Piaget as the

logic of functions."

operational period.

It occurs during the pre-

It "refers to the child's ability to understand

not merely simple cause-effect relations such as fire-heat, cookingdinner, but functional correlations of dependency.

A four—year-old

will know that the relative size of different containers determines the
quantity of fluid that he can pour into them or that the force of a
push required to displace an object is proportional to its weight.
these law-like generalizations,

In

there is a clear affinity to more mature

logical and causal concepts and a stopping short of the mature opera-

g
tional level."

The logic in this period,

the pre-operational stage,

is still of limited form, as the coordinations are of external actions
now represented in symbolic form but are limited in direction;

i.e.,

the actions are not simultaneously reversible as in operational logic.
During these early stages of development, Piaget explains that
there is an important relationship between causal links made by the
child with respect to actions on objects,

such as pushing and pulling,

and the coordination of these actions into action schemes which are the
precursors of logico-mathematical structures.
Every sensori-motor action is causal in its psychophysiological mechanism and in its results on objects,
since it amounts to using them materially by displacing
them, linking them together, etc.
However, none of these
particular actions remain exclusively causal, since by
being repeated, by being generalized, by being connected
with others, etc., it becomes part of the continuous

8Ibid. , p.

97.
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construction of a schematism dominated by the requirements
of a general coordination, this second aspect of actions
providing the basis for future operations of intelligence.
At the outset, therefore, there are both a close connection
between the causal aspect of actions and the aspect that
can be called logical.9
The importance then of these early causal functions or the "logic
of functions" is that gradually actions are coordinated into what
remains at this stage action schemes which are the precursors to the
latter structures of logic.

There is then a linking or coordination of

discrete or separate actions into coordinated action schemes of con¬
tinuous functions.
With the advent of operational reasoning in the concrete opera¬
tional period, Piaget describes the beginnings of the mature and natural
logic.

This period is divided into two parts also.

The first is the

period of operational logic, where reasoning is fully internal and
coordinations are fully and simultaneously reversible.
period,

During this

the logic of classes and of asymmetrical relations becomes

evident.
During the last and culminating stage of development, the formal
operational period, logical reasoning becomes propositional in form.
Here a mature and formalized system of logico-mathematical thought
characterizes the reasoning of the adolescent.

This period occurs well

after the period of the formation of number; however,

it is clearly

dependent upon earlier formulations.

^Jean Piaget, with the collaboration of R. Garcia, Understanding
Causality, trans. Donald and Marguerite Miles (New York:
W. W. Norton
and Company,

Inc., 1974), p.

114.
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Two dimensions of the growth of logic are to be found in Piaget's
descriptions of the levels of abstraction and inference.
of abstraction were introduced in Chapter Two.
tive assimilation,
tion.

(2) practical reflection, and

They were:

Three levels
(1) recogni-

(3) reflective abstrac¬

During the first stage, the child becomes aware of an action or

a pre-logical class.

For example, a chair may be recognized on the

basis of use as when the child sits down on it or uses it as a stool
to get something out of reach.

At this stage, however, there is no

coordinated or simultaneous recognition of the uses of the chair, as
properties of the same object.

This type of recognitive assimilation

corresponds to the earlier stage of pre-logic, the logic of action.
At this stage, there is a practical or perceptual recognition of
means-end relation.

Reasoning at this stage, because it is based on

perceptual characteristics,

is often arbitrary and ambiguous;

the child does not use logical criteria.

i.e.,

For this reason, the type

of inference used by the child is referred to by Piaget as preinf erential.

Because the criteria used to classify an object are

perceptual and not logical, children often are lead to incorrect solu¬
tions to problems.
Lunzer,

in tracing the development of inferential reasoning, cites

an example used by Piaget in The Growth of Logical Thinking.

The

example involves the reasoning used by children to predict why objects

10E. A. Lunzer, Translator's Introduction to the Early Growth of
Logic in the Child;
Classification and Seriation, by Barbel Inhelder
and Jean Piaget (New York:
Company,

Inc., 1969), pp.

The Norton Library, W. W. Norton and
xxi-xxii.
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sink or float.

At a logical inferential stage, children will invoke

explanations which approximate Archimedes'
based upon a concept of density.

law which is fundamentally

The concept of density requires the

coordination of the dimensions of weight and volume; i.e., density is
directly proportional to the weight or mass and inversely proportional
to the volume

£d =

.

As mass increases, density increases per unit

of volume, but as volume increases, density decreases if the mass is
held constant.

Archimedes'

law involves a further coordination or

comparison of the relative density of the material compared to an
equal volume of water.

Prior to this, operational coordination pre¬

dictions of inferences are based solely on perceptual criteria that
are chosen outside of any logical framework.

As a consequence, often

the predictions made by children are incorrect and, therefore,
arbitrary.
During the transitional stage,

the arbitrary use of criteria and

incorrect judgments begin to conflict in the child s mind with observa¬
tions of the data.

The child becomes aware of the conflict as logical

inferences begin to be made, however,
unstable;

i.e.,

these inferences are often

the child may fall back on purely perceptual arguments

partly because the criteria chosen remain arbitrary and ambiguous and
because a frame of reference of logical "necessity" is not yet present.
Logical necessity would require a deliberate use of criteria, which is
to occur in the next stage.

It is the awareness of conflict during

this stage, however, that provides the incentive to eliminate the
arbitrary and ambiguous use of criteria.

The state of logical necessity
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results from the successful resolution of the problem.
At this level, a certain "practical reflection" of knowledge
becomes evident.
tion.

Practical reflection is the second level of abstrac¬

It is a great advance over simple recognitive abstraction which

involves mere recognition of the uses of an object, for logic begins to
intervene.

There is a coordination of criteria through trial and error

problem-solving.
During the last of these three stages, reasoning becomes logical
and systematic.

This is the stage of reflective abstraction which is

characterized by a logical coordination of actions or events.
example cited involving Archimedes’ Law,

In the

the child at this stage is

able to take into account the relative weights of equal amounts of
water and object.

This requires both a deliberate selection of the

criteria of volume and weight and their comparison with the relative
volume and weight of an object.

The child is able to reason in this

manner because experiential data are assimilated into operational
structures and a kind of feedback or reflecting abstraction occurs
between elements of the internal structure.11
tive abstraction is,

in essence,

This process of reflec¬

a process of reconstruction where

existent structures are reflected and coordinated into new structures
at a higher, more stable level.

In a sense,

it represents the triumph

of the internal operational structure which is logical in form over the
physical

(perceptual) environment and knowledge structures; for instead

^1See Appendix I, which is Furth’s schematic of "The Knowing
Circle," part of which shows how reflective abstraction functions.
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of the imposition of the perceptual field,

logic and the internal

operational structure govern thinking.
Relationships are now conceptual representations at a symbolic
level.

Manipulation of these relationships is now governed by the

rules of transformation characteristic of each structure.12

In con¬

trast to a child at a pre-inferential level who is unaware of the
chain" of reasoning steps used in making the inference, the child at
this stage is consciously aware of the steps used to solve a problem.
The young child, when asked a question requiring a logical and inferen¬
tial explanation of why an event occurred, will often use a one-step
answer to solve the problem.

Mosher

(Bruner,

1964) asked children,

six through eleven years of age, "What caused a car to go off the road
and hit a tree?"

The young child simply would ask, "Did the driver

fall asleep?" or "Was it slippery?"

The older the child, however, the

more structured became inferentiallv consecutive questions of a
"constraint-locating" type.

As the child develops,

logic matures and

the child is able to handle greater numbers of connected steps to more
complex problems.

In a fourth stage, the formal operational stage,

inferential mechanisms fully mature and reasoning is hypotheticodeductive or propositional in form.

This stage of reasoning occurs

12See discussion in the previous chapter under What Is a Structure
of Knowledge, p.

61*

13F. A. Mosher, Strategies for Information Gathering, paper read
at Eastern Psychological Association (Atlantic City, New Jersey,
April, 1962), cited by J. Bruner, Studies in Cognitive Growth, "The
Course of Cognitive Growth," American Psychologist, 1964, 19, pp. 1-15.
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long after number has been established.
To this point, the discussion of logic has been general.

As was

quoted in the beginning of this section, Piaget mentions that "logical
and arithmetical operations constitute a single system."

The specific

operations which apply to both systems are classification (inclusion
of classes)

and seriation (asymmetrical relations).

aspects alone are considered,
When, however,

When qualitative

the logical operation is emphasized.

the system is defined by quantitative aspects, then the

arithmetical or number operation emerges.

A discussion of the qualita¬

tive and quantitative aspects of thought relates directly to the
development of conservation reasoning; hence, this will be discussed
next.

Conservation

Earlier mention was made of Piaget's contention that conservation
is a necessary condition of all rational activity.

Indeed, there must

be a permanence to the definitions used in language, to matter dealt
with physically, as conservation is the ability to preserve the whole¬
ness of an object or concept when it is transformed in shape or form.
Naturally,

this must also be the case with respect to number as:

A set or collection is only conceivable if it remains
unchanged irrespective of the changes occurring in the
relationship between the elements.
For instance, the permu¬
tations of the elements in a given set do not change its
value.
A number is only intelligible if it remains identi¬
cal with itself, whatever the distribution of the units of
which it is composed.
In a word, whether it be a matter of
continuous or discontinuous qualities, of quantitative
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relations perceived In the sensible universe, or of sets
and numbers conceived by thought, whether it be a matter of
the child’s earliest contacts with number or of the most
refined axiomatizations of any intuitive system, in each
and every case the conservation of something is postulated
as a necessary condition for any mathematical understanding.w
The ability to attribute constancy to the environment is one which
is so fundamental to thought that Zimiles refers to it as a "mode of
thinking about reality,

a logical orientation that recognizes that the

number of objects constituting an aggregate is not changed merely by
rearrangement.

He

(Piaget) has regarded the understanding of number as

signalizing the onset of logical reasoning, and the ability to conserve
number as an indication of the presence of an operational mode of
cognition,

that is,

the ability to deal with reality in representa¬

tional terms.
When the child applies an operational system to sets that are
defined by the qualities of their elements (color,

shape, width, etc.),

he is compelled to consider separately classes (which depend on the
qualitative equivalence of the elements)

and asymmetrical relations

which express the seriable differences.

Through perceptual judgment,

qualities are attributed to objects.

Resemblance between these

qualities results in the classification of objects, e.g., a set of
blue objects, no matter what their shape and size, are grouped on the
basis of the quality blue.

Asymmetrical differences, however, can imply

lApiaget, The Child's Conception of Number, pp.
l5Zimiles,
Number," p.

1.

3-4.

"The Development of Conservation and Differentiation of
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more and less and "thus indicate the beginnings of quantification
(e.g.,

'A is larger than B,'

tive form,

or

'A is narrower than D').

In its primi¬

therefore, quantity is given at the same time as quality,

since it is constituted by the asymmetrical relations that necessarily
link any qualities one to another.
exist;

Qualities, per se, do not,

in fact,

they are always compared and differentiated, and this differen¬

tiation,

since it includes asymmetrical relations or difference, is the

germ of quantity."

16

From a psychological and educational point of view, quantity has
its origin in the early differentiations of perceptual judgments.
Piaget formulates three stages in the development of operational
quantification.

Further, he hypothesizes that the notions of quantity

and the notion of the conservation of quantity are one and the same.
The child does not first acquire the notion of quantity
and then attribute constancy to it; he discovers true
quantification only when he is capable of constructing
wholes that are preserved

.^

If we consider conservation and the conservation of quantity one
and the same, then the following discussion of the stages of conserva¬
tion directly relate to the stages of the development of number to be
discussed.

l6Piaget, The Child’s Conception of Number, pp. 10-11.
17 Ibid., p.

5.

125

Conservation and Number

Stage I
At the level of the first stage, quantity is therefore
no more than asymmetrical relations between qualities,
i.e., comparisons of the type 'more' or 'less' contrived
in judgments such as 'it's higher,' 'not so wide,' etc.
These relations depend on perception, and are not as yet
relations in the true sense, since they cannot be coordi¬
nated one with another in additive or multiplicative
operations.IS
Comparisons of the type "more or less" characterize this first
stage as a stage of simple qualitative difference.

Piaget refers to

this type of comparison as that of "gross quantification," i.e.,
"quantification is restricted to immediate perceptual relationships."^
During this stage, which is prior to conservation reasoning, quantity
can increase or decrease according to the perceptual dimensions which
have been differentiated.
The first two chapters of Piaget's treatise on number are devoted
to a study of the stages of the development of conservation of continu¬
ous and discontinuous substances.

An example of continuous quantity

studies is liquid, where beads is an example of discontinuous quantity.
Conceptually, these two types of matter were treated separately because
of the aspect of correspondence;

i.e., it was hypothesized to be easier

to see a one-to-one correspondence between a discrete or discontinuous
substance such as beads than it would be to see a correspondence between

18Ibid., p.

5.

l9Ibid. , p.

11.
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an amount of liquid volume.

In the case of continuous quantity, for

example, when a liquid is transferred from Cylinder
wide diameter)

to Cylinder A2

(short with a

(tall with a smaller diameter), the

level of the liquid perceived by the child rises, hence there is more
in A2 than in A^ according to the child.

In the case of discontinuous

quantity, for example, when two equal sets of beads are poured into
differing containers, placed one by one into different shaped con¬
tainers or made into lines with varying density and length, the largest
perceptual display (height of container or length of chain) determines
the greater amount for the child.

Typically,

the child when asked,

"Which has more?" before any transformation, will answer, "They are the
same."

After pouring the liquid into another container or shortening

or lengthening the line of beads and being asked which has more, the
child will respond that the tallest or the longest has more.

(2)

888888888 -> 8808080800 000

In all of the cases mentioned, there exists a gross quantification,
a perceptually based differentiation.

The criteria singled out, such

as height, width, etc., which form the basis for judgment as solution
to the problem, remain in a single and uncoordinated relation with the
other criteria;
sistently,

further,

the child chooses and applies them incon¬

first one then the other.

Clearly then, it is not a problem

of having no basis for judgment, but rather one of not taking into
account the relationships among the criteria available that leads us to
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the conclusion that the child as yet cannot conserve quantity.

"In

every case (cited by Piaget), perception and concrete judgment attri¬
bute qualities to objects, but they cannot grasp these qualities without thereby relating them one to another."

20

In a conservation of liquid problem, where the liquid changes
shape, there are a variety of available criteria from which to choose.
The child in Stage I consistently applies one and only one criterion
at a time, choosing from among available criteria; e.g., height, crosssection (diameter) , or the number of containers.

This is characteris¬

tic of pre-logical judgment where these criteria are applied in an
arbitrary and inconsistent manner.
The application of one criterion gives a different answer to the
same problem depending upon which is chosen.
constantly contradicts himself.

As a result, the child

Further, "the child behaves as though

he had no notion of a multi-dimensional quantity and could only reason
with respect to one dimension at a time without coordinating it with
others.
"The main characteristic of the perceptual relationships of gross
quantity used by the child at the first level is that they cannot be

22
composed one with another either additively or multiplicatively.
In general,

this simply means,

20Ibid., p.

for example, that as the height of a

10.

21Piaget, The Child's Conception of Number, p.

22

Ibid., p.

11.

10
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liquid seems to rise as you place it in a narrower container, the
child judges there to be more liquid because he is unable to coordi¬
nate the dimensions of both weight and diameter.
A second important dimension of the development of the conserva¬
tion of quantity is that of part-whole relationship;
to partition a quantity into equal units.

i.e., the ability

For example, the child in

Stage I, upon seeing a single large glass of lemonade poured into three
equal, but smaller glasses will judge there to be more liquid in the
smaller glasses because there are more of them.

During a recent visit

to a pre-school Head Start program, I observed a boy, who had been
given two cookies and milk, proceed to break his cookies into many
pieces spreading them out over a large area in front of him.

Accord¬

ing to his explanation, he then had more cookies than he was given.
This apparently had been a daily routine for some time.
It is evident that during this first stage the child’s reasoning
is governed by the perception of apparent change.

Because of this,

judgments are not corrected by a system of the coordination of rela¬
tions and partition which can alone insure the invariance of quantity.

Stage II
During the first stage,
ferentiate gross quantity.

the child establishes the ability to dif¬
During the second stage, the child begins

to coordinate relationships with respect to the multi-dimension nature
of quantity, and begins to partition quantity into equal units.
At this stage, the child is attempting to coordinate the per¬
ceptual relations involved and thus to transform them into
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true, operational relations.
Whereas the child at the
first stage is satisfied that two quantities of liquid
are equal if the two levels are the same, irrespective
of the width of the containers.
The child at the second
stage tries to take the two relations into account simul¬
taneously, but without success, hesitating continually
between this attempt at coordination and the influence of
perceptual illusions. 3
Gradually, reasoning based on the perceptions of apparent change
gives way to attempts to coordinate the perceptual relations thus
transforming them into operational relations.
stage,

During this, the second

this attempt on the part of the child is, however, not consis¬

tently applied, hence this is referred to as a transitional stage.

It

is, nevertheless, a period of great importance for in the previous
stage the child was satisfied with his judgments of quantity.
this stage, however,

During

the incorrectness of a judgment becomes apparent

to the child and judgments based solely on criteria alone conflict
with judgments made using another dimension.
the tall, narrow glass,

"This liquid is higher in

therefore it looks like there is more but it

is the same liquid as before which means that it hasn t changed, but it
looks like there is more,

so there is more."

The child realizes his

judgments are in conflict and he, therefore, begins to coordinate
them or to logically multiply them to use Piaget’s term.
of the row of counters gets longer,

As the length

the density lessens.

These coordinations, however, remain incomplete at this stage.
In addition, the second major aspect necessary for conservation (parti¬
tion)

has yet to develop.

23 Ibid., p.

15.

Partition is the part-whole, whole-part
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1stionship.

You can divide the lemonade into three small glasses of

lemonade but you still have the same amount.
Relationships are coordinated by the child, according to Piaget,
in one of two ways,

i.e.,

through addition or multiplication (not to

be confused with arithmetic operations of addition and multiplication).
What, in fact, is logical multiplication of the relationships
of height and width?
If we have a series of containers of
the type A (A^, A2, A3, etc.) containing liquid at increasing
levels, we shall say that the child can add relations if from
Ai < A2 and A2
A3 he can deduce that A^
A3.
The operation
obviously taking place only on the practical plane, the levels
being clearly perceptible.
If we take another series of con¬
tainers of increasing width (L, B, A, P, etc.) we shall again
say there is addition if there is undimensional coordination
of the relationships.
But we shall say that there is logical
multiplication of the relationships when the child compares
the containers from the point of view of the two relationships
simultaneously, e.g., when the column of liquid L is both
higher and narrower than that in A.24
To logically multiply relations then, the perceptual relations can¬
not simply be taken one at a time (or added) but must be considered
simultaneously whereby the change in one dimension is compensated for
by a change in another dimension.

In order to simultaneously consider

that an increase in one dimension is compensated for by a decrease in
another,

it is clear that a new level of the internalization and mean¬

ing of the dimension considered by the child is being constructed.

The

operation is beginning to emerge.
Piaget also uses the terms "intensive and extensive quantifica¬
tion" in order to further distinguish the difference between types of
quantitative judgments which can result from additive and multiplicative

24 Ibid., p.

20.
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relations respectively.

An example of an intensive quantitative rela¬

tion is where the child coordinates one dimension at a time.

The effect

of this uni-dimensional coordination is to limit the additive effect
of the dimensions considered.
be made in this,

Extensive judgments typically begin to

the second stage, but they are not stable.

Extensive

quantification is where dimensions are considered simultaneously and
the effect is able to be added.
where

.....

An example involving number might be

is changed to

.....

and the child realizes

that lengthening is compensated for by a decrease in density.
The transition from addition of relations described as
intensive quantification to multiplication of relations
described as extensive quantification is bound up with the
introduction of the possibility of using numerical data
and measurement to make more accurate what is merely a
qualitative comparison in the form of, for example, more
or less, wider or narrower.^
During this stage with regard to number, the transition from quali¬
tative correspondence to numerical equivalence is begun, although not
completed until the next stage.

Qualitative correspondence is based

upon the perceptual correspondence of, for example, two sets of counters
| * * *

*

.

As long as the one-to-one correspondence is maintained,

the quantity remains equal for the child.

It is as yet not a numerical

equivalence, however, as when the perceptual correspondence is destroyed,
as in

.*.* *. Y .

the child;

, then the quantitative equality is destroyed for

i.e., the equivalence is not lasting because it is not based

upon "numerical data and measurement."

^Ibid. , pp.

20-21.
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This stage is then referred to as the stage of intuitive
qualitative correspondence because there is no lasting equivalence
between sets,

"because the equivalence of the sets is recognized only

when the correspondence is actually perceived, and ceases to exist
when it is no longer in the field of perception. "2®
This particular stage in the development of number occurs just
prior to the third stage.

With regard to number reasoning, it has been

referred to as the notion of "quotity."

The term originated with

Cournot and was used by P. Greco and is intended to distinguish a state
of reasoning just prior to the attainment of numerical quantity."27
"The child of the level of

'quotity'

is quite capable of giving the

correct answer when asked how many objects there are in one collection
after he has counted those in the other, but he still thinks that there
are more objects in one of the collections:
six there,

'There are six there, and

the same number of counters when you count them, but it's

not the same;

there are more counters there.'

Furthermore, children

sometimes affirm the invariance of the correspondence between the ele¬
ments of the two collections—'there's one red for each blue'—but con¬
tinue to maintain that all the same

2®Ibid., p.

'there's more there than here.'"2®

65.

27P. Greco, "Quantite et Quotite," In Structures Numeriques
Elementaires (Vol. 13 of "Etudes de'epistemologie genetique" by
P. Greco and A. Morf).
Paris:
P.U.F., cited by Inhelder, Sinclair
and Bovet, Learning and the Development of Cognition, p. 37.

28

Ibid. , p.

37.

The notion of quotity provides insight into the level of develop¬
ment at this stage.

Clearly, the child can count and can assert that

there is a numerical equivalence between the sets.

This equivalence

is based on the perceptual strength of one-to-one correspondence, how¬
ever, when the collection is altered,

it is evident that a true

logical equivalence or numerically based notion of quantity has not
yet been established.

Compensation reasoning does begin during this

stage, but it is not firmly established as yet; nor has the notion of
partition (whole-part, part-whole)

come in to being for the unit which

is basic to number requires logical partition of the quantity dealt
with.

These developments take place during Stage III.

Stage III
This is the last and culmination stage in the construction of
number conservation and numerical equivalence.

Invariance, in the form

of conservation and numerical equivalence, involves a processes whereby
compensation and partition are coordinated to create the unit, which
is the fundamental quantitative unit.

This processes essentially occur

through what Piaget describes as an equating of differences.

Several

examples follow.
The first example, although it is not one involving number, is
nevertheless similar in process to that of number conservation.

It is

an example of the construction of continuous quantity conservation.
First of all, Piaget states that in pouring a quantity of liquid from
one beaker to a taller, narrower beaker should be sufficient in itself
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to establish equivalence (it is the same liquid), however, for the child
at either Stage I or II, it is not sufficient.

The child in Stage II

begins to be able to make what are described as qualitative seriations;
i.e., he is able to compare the two levels of liquid poured from the
wide,

short beaker to the tall, narrow beaker concluding that the liquid

is higher in the second beaker.

Qualitative seriation also means that

he is able to coordinate the two relationships of level and width
together.

Piaget designates the two beakers A and L and states:

"This

means that on comparing the liquids in A and L he can at once see that
the level in L is higher than that in A; i.e., that it is equal to that
in A plus a difference.

Similarly, he can compare the liquids and see

that L is narrower than A, the width of L thus being equal to that of
A, less a difference.

But there is no means in these simple comparisons

of quantifying these relationships otherwise than as
This is so for two reasons;

first,

'more* or

’less.’"

the child does not see conservation

or invariance as a necessity, and second, he has not constructed the
notion of partition as yet.

"Our contention is that at a given moment

the child grasps that differences compensate one another, and this is
the beginning of extensive quantification, because then the heterogeneous
qualitative relationship
seen to be equal,
difference.

It

(increase in level and decrease in width) are

though still preserving their value of asymmetrical

is thus that proportion comes into being, through the

combination of equality and asymmetrical relationship."

^Piaget,

The Child’s Conception of Number, pp.

29

22-23.
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This is an example of what Piaget calls the equating of difference.
In essence,

it is when the child is able to understand that the increase

in height in the tall-narrow container establishes the difference in
height and that difference is accounted for or equated through being
able to compensate the change in width and height of the two containers.
"There is arithmetical partition as soon as the elements of a whole
can be equated with one another and yet remain distinct.

Moreover, the

equating of difference, which we have just stated to be the principle
of extensive quantification, gives rise during the third stage to truly
numerical partition, which is not only synchronic but complementary to
the discovery of proportions."^
The second example involves establishing this same equating of dif¬
ferences through use of discrete quantities in the form of counters or
objects in correspondence with one another.
At the second stage, the child is still on the intuitive
plane.
He sees that length and density of the rows are
variable and he is perfectly coherent from the point of view
of the perception in assuming that this variation involves
variation in number, and this prevents him from attempting
composition.
Where he ceases to be logical, however, is in
failing to grasp that in a contracted series the decrease in
length carries with it increase in density.
Instead of
deducing that the result of composition is uncertain, he
dissociates length and density and makes the mistake of
assuming that the number of elements depends on one of the
two only.31
The numerosity of the two comparison sets at this stage is clearly based
on the perceptual value of the type "more" and "less,

30Ibid., p.

23.

33Ibid., p.

92.

for there is no
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numerical or quantitative equivalence but rather there is a qualita¬
tive correspondence.

Qualitative correspondence is based, for example,

on the relative positions in the two sets.

Piaget cites the example of

two sets of three counters, one blue set and the other red, each set
being arranged in a triangular shape, or in a row.

Correspondence and

hence number is related to the position of the counters and not to the
absolute number of elements in the set.
The explanation of the transition from qualitative to numeri¬
cal correspondence can perhaps best be given in terms of
classes.
Let us again consider the case of three blue
counters in a triangle with a corresponding set of three
red counters also in a triangle.
Obviously, any one of the
counters can be used to start the correspondence, but once
it is in the figure, its position is defined absolutely, and
the correspondence is defined by the spatial properties of
the counter chosen.
Order in no way intervenes in the
definition of the total classes formed by the corresponding
elements.
Such is the qualitative correspondence used by
the child (and also frequently by adults).
If instead of
making a triangle with red counters, the child puts them in
a heap or row, or distributes them at random, the one-one
correspondence he makes is a new type, since each counter
no longer carries with it qualities that distinguish it from
the others, but becomes a unit equal to the others.
Each red
counter can then correspond to any one of the blue counters,
but to only one.
Hence the set of red counters acquires its
quality of number three, and is no longer the class of
counters forming a triangle, just as a pair of counters
acquires the number two and is no longer the class of counters
forming the ends of one side of the triangle.
Moreover, any
union of a pair of counters will provide the same class con¬
taining two elements irrespective of their qualities.
Piaget then goes on to directly relate this to the equating of dif
ferences.

In the above example or the other involving longer rows of

counters,

it is easily seen that perceptual one-to-one correspondence

32 Ibid., p.

93.
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between rows or classes that have qualities of position, length and
density is overcome when the perceptual qualities are compensated for.
When length and density are compensated for and combined with the
notion of partition, then the transition from qualitative correspondence
to numerical equivalence occurs.
The correspondence, therefore, ceases to be qualitative and
becomes numerical when the elements are grasped as being
equivalent in all respects, and when the differential pro¬
perties that distinguish them within the set are replaced
by the only difference compatible with their equality; i.e.,
their relative position in the order of the correspondence.
Once again, therefore, we find it is the equating of dif¬
ferences that is the origin of the unit, and consequently
of number.

J

In the third stage then, the child establishes equivalence in spite
of distortion of the corresponding rows.

Qualitative judgments become

numerical or quantitative when increasing length is compensated for by
decreasing density.

The difference between the corresponding rows is

equated through the establishment of extensive quantity and partition
into equal units.
Piaget summarizes the transition through all three stages of
development as follows:
At the first stage, the child confines himself to estab¬
lishing simple, qualitative differences.
During the fol¬
lowing stages, where he is using only logical multiplica¬
tion of relationships, he progressively grades these^dif¬
ferences, in one or more dimensions, into
intensive
seriation of two or more terms.
But these series, except
when there is complete equality, involve only asymmetrical
relationships of difference.
Since these differences can
be seriated, they result in intensive quantification, but

33Ibid. , p.

94.
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when two given quantities show two relationships of dif¬
ference, there is no means of equalling them.
In other
words, multiplication of relationships is multi¬
dimensional seriation leading only to further seriations,
and in no way allowing of the division of a given quan¬
tity into units that are recognized as equal yet dis¬
tinct.
On the other hand, both proportion and numeri¬
cal partition imply the fusion of asymmetrical relation¬
ships of difference with those of equality and it is this
combination of equalities and differences, or, to put it
more briefly, this equality of differences, which consti¬
tutes the transition from intensive to extensive quantity,
and explains the arithmetication of logical multiplica¬
tion.3*

Classification and Seriation

Reflecting for a moment on the original hypothesis which was
presented at the beginning of the chapter,

the only aspect that remains

to be shown is how the development and operational synthesis of the
specific abilities to use the basic qualities of similarity in the
class inclusion relation and difference in the asymmetrical relation of
seriation relates to the formation of number.

In the just concluded

section on the developmental stages of conservation of number, the
fundamental concern has already been established, i.e., the formation
of the unit and hence number depends upon the ability to equate dif¬
ferences,

to equate qualitative seriations (differences) and qualita¬

tive classes (similarity)

so that true numerical equivalence is estab¬

lished .
Piaget summarizes the central issues in that pursuit as
follows:

34 Ibid., p.

22.
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A class is, in fact, a union of terms seen as equivalent
irrespective of their differences.
For instance, all the
counters of a series form a class to which those at the
ends belong on the same terms as the others; red and blue
counters are counters irrespective of their colour; i.e.,
two classes are united to form a third by disregarding
their difference, in this case colour.
An asymmetrical
relation, on the other hand, is the expression of a dif¬
ference; e.g., when counter B is on the right of A and a
certain distance away, A and B are conceived as different.
To unite two asymmetrical relationships in one is to add
two differences.
Symmetrical relationships are those which
unite the elements of the same class, without thereby add¬
ing anything.
None of these qualitative compositions,
therefore, would make it possible to define units properly
so called.
The union of two classes in a third does not
constitute two units, because their union results from
their common qualities, and in the new class their dif¬
ferences are disregarded.
The union of two asymmetrical
relationships also does not produce two units, since the
partial differences which are composed are not necessarily
equivalent.
The construction of number, however, consists
in the equating of differences; i.e., in uniting in a
single operation the class and the asymmetrical relationship.
The elements in question are both equivalent to one
another, thus participating of the class, and different
from one another by their position in the enumeration,
thus participating of the asymmetrical relationship.
More¬
over,

since these differences are differences only of order,

they are equivalent one to the other.33
From a developmental perspective, it is clear that the use of the
class inclusion relation and the asymmetrical relation upon which the
ponstruction of number depends is far from their beginnings.

The

uniting of both similarity and difference in a single operational
system is a development which occurs usually between the ages of five
to eight.

Prior to this operational synthesis, important preparations

are occurring in the child’s thought with respect to classification
and seriation.

35Ibid., pp.

94-95 (emphasis is mine).
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Classification:

Developmentally, classification skills begin

with the differentiation of qualitative attributes of objects.
attributes are,

for example,

shape, color,

size and use.

These

Earlier men¬

tion was made of the child's use of a chair in connection with recognitive assimilation.

Early in development, pre-logical forms of classi¬

fication are demonstrated through the logic of action with respect to
objects;

i.e., the child knows that a chair and stool can be used to

sit on.

As there is no coordination or relationship between these

objects with respect ot use, Piaget notes that this is prior to even
simple classification.

Children nearing four years of age when given

a set of attribute blocks which have size, color and shape can form a
simple class usually on the basis of size first.

Color and shape fol¬

low as attributes to be used in simple classification.

However, chil¬

dren of this stage, because attributes are selected arbitrarily, are
unable to demonstrate the presence of a consistent sorting scheme.
This is typical of the child in the first stage of the construction of
conservation reasoning, of the use of inferential reasoning.
Consistent use of criteria is naturally the next logical step
to be taken by the child, which allows more complete classes to be
constructed.

After this development occurs, more complex patterns of

classificatory schemes become possible.

Described here is a general

pattern of development and not a strict order in which development takes
place.

Kof sky (1966) ,

in a study to see if there is a consistent order

to the development of classificatory skills, administered a series of
tasks typical of types of levels of classification to one hundred and
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twenty-two children between the ages of four and nine.
analyzed by scalogram analysis.

Results were

The tasks used were resemblance sort¬

ing, consistent sorting, exhaustive classes, conservation, multiple
class membership, horizontal reclassification and hierarchical classi¬
fication.

Resemblance sorting is based on the idea that objects

are equivalent because they look alike in some way.

Consistent sort¬

ing involves placing more than two objects considered equivalent in
a class.

Exhaustive sorting extends to all the objects in the class

without number limit.

Multiple class membership required that objects

not belong exclusively to one or another category.

The test of

multiple class membership used involved two different sized sets of
triangles (small and large).

The large triangles were either red or

green and the small ones were all red.

First using just the red ones,

the child was asked if they all belong together.
introduced and the child was asked,
for triangles?"

Then the others were

"Do the green ones go in the bag

Horizontal classification required using one attri¬

bute at a time to form different groupings with the same objects.
Hierarchical classification involves the establishment of a relation
between sets grouped on the basis of a single attribute: e.g., rodents
are members of the class mammalia which is in turn a member of the
larger class vertebrata.36

Although her results did not support a

strict order to the attainment of skills, the first three, resemblance,
consistent and exhaustive classification, did clearly fall respectively

■^Ellin Kofsky,
Child Development,

"A Scalogram Study of Classification Development,

1966, 37, pp.

191-204.
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into a pattern of order of difficulty.

In addition, multiple class

membership, hierarchical classification and the inclusion relation
proved to be most difficult and were attained at a later age.
Piaget and Inhelder see the "coordination of extension and inten¬
sion as the central problem in the development of classificatory
behavior."

As has been mentioned previously, intension refers to

those properties "specific to the given class that differentiate it,
such as 'web feet,'

'color'

and

'shape.'"

Extension refers to

"properties that are common to a given class and the other classes to
which it belongs (ducks are birds as well as ducks since they 'have
OO

feathers,'

'can fly,'

and so on)."

These properties of intension and extension involve relations
which the child must learn to coordinate before multiple and
hierarchical classification can be managed.

These higher forms of

classification therefore involve what is an operational form of
classification in the form of the class inclusion relation.

The class

inclusion relation involves the ability to coordinate common properties
in various ways,

such as a set of objects includes heavy objects, or a

family includes father, mother,

sisters and brothers.

At this point

of reasoning, obviously conservation must be well established as
implied in the relation is the part-whole, whole-part relation.

It is

37Inhelder and Piaget, The Early Growth of Logic in the Child,
p.

283.
38Richard Copeland, How Children Learn Mathematics:

Teaching.

Implications of Piaget's Research, Second Edition (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1974), p.

59.
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easy to understand that after this development has taken place,
quantifiers such as "All," "None" and "One" are now capable of being
understood and used.
to number,

Before proceeding with this aspect which relates

seriation is discussed.

Seriation:

Seriation implies the development of the schemes by

which the child is able to order differences.

Difference is elemental

to attributes of objects since a differentiation and comparison necessi¬
tates the realization of the uniqueness of the specific attribute among
all others.

Therefore, even classification which is a system of com¬

parison based on similarity depends upon differentiation of difference.
The scheme of seriation involves the ability to bring differences
into an ordered relationship.

Simple seriation typically is demon¬

strated through an ability to order different lengths of wood, for
example, on the basis of increasing or decreasing length.

Initially,

the child, as in classification, applies inconsistent and arbitrary
criteria, hence,

is unable to seriate large numbers of pieces.

Grad¬

ually, as logic develops the ability to serially order, larger groups
of objects are developed by the child.

Higher orders of seriation

include double seriation where the child, for example, is able to
seriate one at a time sets of different size dolls and different size
walking sticks,

then position the sets so that there is a correspon¬

dence between doll and walking stick.

A second method of simple seria¬

tion with correspondence is where the child seriates the dolls first
and then directly puts the walking sticks with the proper doll.
third and most advanced method of direct correspondence involves

The
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placing members of each set in direct one-to-one correspondence with¬
out previous seriation.39
The most important aspect of seriation to develop with respect to
number is the transitive relation.
to take, for example,

Simply, this involves the ability

three sticks of different lengths:

A is shorter

than B, and B is shorter than C, therefore A is shorter than C.

The

conclusion that A is shorter than C without direct comparison is an
example of an operational transitivity.
Now that the basic characteristics of the structuring of simi¬
larity into classes and the ordering of difference into seriations or
asymmetrical relation has been explored, the problem remains to show how
these two systems are synthesized into the structure of number.
Classes are formed on the basis of similar qualities, for example,
Object A (a purple wooden bead) and A^ (a red wooden bead) forms the
class B (wooden beads)

such that A + A^ m B.

If the qualitative pro¬

perties of the set B are considered, they do not lead to number for
the addition of the qualities of beads, for example,

such that all sub¬

classes A + A-^ + A2 + A3 still equals B, the class of wooden beads.
Further, B + B = B.

Hence, the addition of qualitative attributes of

similarity or equality, as in the addition of classes, does not lead
to number.
In the same sense, neither can the addition of differences or non¬
equalities in the form of asymmetrical relations when added together

39Piaget, The Child’s Conception of Number, pp. 100-101.
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account for the origin of number.

If A ^ B and B<C, as in differ¬

ences of length, combining A and C gives us the relation A < C, which
is expressive of difference but can in no way be considered a number as
differences added to differences only increases the size of the dif¬
ference.
Piaget mentions two basic conditions for the conversion of classes
and seriations into number.

The first essential condition is that the

terms in a class have to be "regarded as equivalent from all points of
view simultaneously."

Essentially,

this means that the qualities that

define classes A and Aj^ have to be disregarded

(e.g., color,

shape,

wooden, etc.) and the A + A^ = two objects and A + A-^ + B = three
objects.
distinct.

The second condition is that "the equivalent terms must remain
In saying that A + Ai = two beads, we are stating that A is
40

any bead, and Ax any other bead, but essentially different.

Hence,

at the same time A has to be considered equivalent to A-^ and it has to
be different.
Piaget concludes by stating:

"These two conditions are necessary

and sufficient to give rise to number.

Number is at the same time a

class and an asymmetrical relation, the units of which it is composed
being simultaneously added because they are equivalent, and seriated
because they are different from one another.

In qualitative logic,

the operational fusion of these two characteristics is impossible,
since the addition of classes is commutative because the addenda are

40Ibid., p.

183.
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equivalent, while seriation is not commutative because the terms are
not equivalent.

Number, on the contrary,

is the outcome of generaliza¬

tion of equivalence and generalization of seriation.

For instance, the

first unit in two is equivalent to the second, and if their orders of
enumeration is changed, the second becomes the first and vice versa.
This can be expressed using symbols which may help clarify what is
intended.

First, either A +

and 3+1=4.

or

+ A = 2A.

Second, 1 + 1 + 1 = 3

In each of these examples, the unit 1 is considered

both different and the same, hence number requires the equating of
differences.
These basic properties of number has led to the differentiation
of the property of number through its cardinal and ordinal value.
fact that a class or set of objects may contain six,
elements is referred to as its cardinal value.

The

seven or eight

Cardinal value is then

dependent only upon the number of objects in a set and not upon the
color or shape of the objects.
of what is a number.

Cardinality is, however, only one part

The other part is its ordinal value which is

essentially that a set of seven objects differs from the set of six
objects by one unit of value and a set of eight objects differs by two
units.

The ability to order this difference into the sequence six,

seven and eight is the ordinal aspect of number.

Hence, number implies

both the ability to manage the value of the set of six elements with
all other sets of six elements (similarity) and the ability to order

^1Ibid., p.

184.
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sets with six, seven and eight elements on the basis of an asymmetri¬
cal relation.
Therefore, number is the quantitative attribute of the set and the
series.

Each set of objects contains a number of elements but differs

from other sets by a specific number of units.

Counting and Number

A word on the role of counting is necessary in this account of
the development of number, as counting has received a great deal of
attention throughout history.

Piaget boldly asserts "that there is no

connection between the acquired ability to count and the actual opera¬
tion of which the child is capable

...

if the child has not yet

reached a certain level of understanding which characterizes the begin¬
ning of the third stage, counting aloud has no effect on the mechanism
of numerical thought."42

Indeed, this is the only reasonable conclu¬

sion which could be reached if one is working within a stage development
theory of logic and number;

i.e., knowing how to count can provide no

simple formula or key to the solution of problems associated with an
edifice of thought.
In establishing what counting is not, Piaget seems to have left
little room for clarifying what its value is, for he states there is
no connection between counting and the actual operations.

This appears

to provide little solace to the countless numbers of parents who have

42Ibid. , pp.

61,

63.
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carefully taught their children how to count, and to countless teachers
whose main pedagogical thrust involves rote counting and discrimination
of number exercises.

In fact, Piaget provides a framework in which the

value of counting skills can be integrated into the developmental
sequence of number through one-to-one correspondence which leads in the
last stage to lasting equivalence.

In these stages and in the context

of, for example, a provoked correspondence, counting can be used as
pennies and candy are exchanged one for one.

This clearly places

counting within the greater content of the developmental pattern, as
rote counting has been shown to have little correlation with number con¬
cepts (Martin,

1953; Wohlwill, 1960).

In summary then,

it should be clear that the teaching of rote

counting can in no way substitute for what must be the development of a
system of operational number and logic, as has been emphasized through¬
out this chapter.

Greater emphasis needs to be placed upon the develop¬

mental aspects of number and less on the ability to count.

Within this

balanced context, memorization and rote counting may very well have its
place, as it has been found that the memorization of multiplication
tables which was eliminated with the coming of the "new math" must now
be reinstated for there is no substitute for having those numbers
close "at hand."

Summary

In order to summarize the theoretical overview of the development
of number,

the chart following this discussion has been designed.

The

1A 9

horizontal axis is intended to show that each major topic presented
develops through a series of stages.

The major characteristics of

each stage have been selected and presented in outline or word form.
The vertical axis is intended to show the generic nature of specific
concepts as they apply to the relation of equilibration to number.
most general category,

The

that of equilibration, is positioned at the top.

Under this category is the category of logico-mathematical thought.
The specific forms and development of inference presented next derive
directly as a specific aspect of logico-mathematical thought.

The

chart continues vertically in this manner until the discussion of the
basic aspects of number, conservation and reversibility are presented.
In short, the intent was to organize the relationships among the
categories just discussed and present them in a brief and visual form.

A Review of Number-Related Research

A review of the research related to the number development is
incorporated into the remainder of this chapter and into sections of
the next chapter.

As specific aspects of this review applied more

directly to the purposes of the next chapter,

it is cited there.

This

chapter includes the sections "The Developmental Sequence of Number,"
"The Conservation of Number," "Relational Terminology and Conserva¬
tion," "Structure of Language," "Age and the Attainment of Conserva¬
tion:

The Mehler-Bever Controversy," and "Length, Density and Number,

Aspects of the research related to conservation are also reported in
the next chapter.
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CONSTRUCTION OF NUMBER COES HAND IN HAND WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC
(Inhelder and Piaget, 1969, p. 282)

STAGE 1

STAGE 2

Global Perception

(1)

I Pre-Numerica]
[^Pre-Logical

Transitional

(Recognltlve Assimilation) _v Simple __
Recognition
Afiistractions

(2)

of Construction

Hindsi
sight
Antic!
[^Anticipation

Intuitlva
Stags

Operational Thought

(Practical Reflect ion)

O)

y

I
/
Nuafcer \
Logic

J

tlaaanta
Forming
»'-r f
g
Spatial
Continue

(Reflective Abstraction!
Logical Coordination of Actions or

Practical—Figurative Coordination
Uses, Attributes, Events

Pre-Classification—
Recognition of a chair's
use demonstrated by sitting
down on it or using it as a
stool; however, there is no
simultaneous recognition of
the properties or uses of
the object.

Equilibration Lead¬
ing to New Levels

{

SHOE 3

Events.
Internalised Coordination
of Thinking.

e.g., Concept of chair is
abstracted and now
exists as a member of
the group furniture,
Limited abstraction
based on immediate
practical experience.

•I*. Adequate abstraction
of the properties of
object such that the
elements of one
class may belong to
another.

Operational
ClaselflcetIon

********

Logic of Action

-—_

(on a sensori-motor plane)
Logico-Mathematical
Thought

}Logic of Functions —

—

Practical recognition of means and rela¬
tions

********

Preoperational ability to understand not
merely simple cause and effect relations
such as fire-heat but understand func¬
tional correlations of dependency, such
as the relative size of a container
determines the quantity of fluid it can
hold.

********
Perceptual

Inference
"Children similarly
record facts, but
always make
inferences from
situations pre¬
sented to them."

• Mature Natural Logic
Operational Thought

Functional

Operational Thought

Pre-Inference—Perceptual

Conceptual Inference

1)

Perceptual Groupings

2)

Invariance in Perception (the
constancies)

3)

Perception of Stimulus Relationships
(Do not meet the requirements of

Partial Isomorphism Between Perceptual
Inference and Conceptual Inference
(Piaget and Morf, 1958)

1)

operational logic—reversibility,
additivity, transitivity, and
inversion)

Sensory data gradually replaced by knowledge
not immediately available in stimulus
field but in knowledge structures; e.g.,
the class or number.

********

********

********

********
Coordination of

Qualitative

Simple Qualitative Differences
and Similarities

Perceptually
Based

^ Relationships
Intensive Qualification

and
Quantitative

^Partition —
Part Whole Relation
'(One, None, Some| All)

Judgment
Gross Quantitative Discrimina¬
tions

********

Classification

Restricted to
Perceptual Rel
tioni

Tsimple Sorting;
However Criteria

J

Similarity

J

Coordination of
Intensive and
Extensive Pro¬
perties

"None")

/■

********

********
Different ation of
Qualitative Attributes

■ Horizontal Class
Membership
Multiple Class Membership
► Hierarchical
Classification

Differentiation

Inconsistently
Consistently

V. Applied

Class Inclusion
Relation

******

*******

********

********

Extensive
Qualification
and
Quantification
("All," "Some,"

Intensive Quantification*

********
Attributes
of

Conceptual Classes

2) Conceptual Invariance (Conservation)
3) Conceptual Representation of Relation¬
ship at the symbolic level

Forms of Seriation and Correspondence
Attributes
of
Seriation

Difference

(simple Serla< tion; Criteria
|

Different ation of
Ordered D: fference

f

T'V
a••L 1 «
Double

O
„
►IA
Seriation

1

Simple Seriation With Correspondence-

Inconsistently

V Applied

Direct! Correspondence

********

********

Number
Conservation
Reversibility

(1)

Absence of Conservation

(2)

Perception prevails over logical

(3)

operations
Global perception of similarity and

(A)

difference
Child can count and label objects in

(5)

more than one way
Failure to differentiate between the
evaluation of quantity based on
numerical criteria and that based on

Numerical Equivalence

Intuitive-Qualitative Correspondence

Gross Quantification

(1) Beginning the construction of perma¬
nent sets
(2) Transitional Stage—Perception still

(3)
(A)

(5)

spatial criteria
(6) Not able to reverse even actions on a
practical level

prevails but in more specific dis¬
criminations
Analysis is by trial and error
One-to-one correspondence—Perceptual
equivalence (conflict) — qualitative
identity
Stage of "Quotity"— Cournot’s termi¬
nology "child is capable of giving
correct answer when asked how many
objects there are in one collection
after he has counted one of the col¬
lections:
'there are six there, and
six there, the same number of counters
when you count them, but it s not the
same, there are more counters there'"
affirms invariance of correspondence

(6)

but insists they are unequal.
Renversibilite'—Child's belief that
the objects can be returned to origi¬
nal corresponding positions, and that
when the spatial correspondence is
physically resumed, the numerical
equivalence will also be resumed.
Renversibilite' proceeds successively
in one direction.
p. 95.)

(Atehey, et al.,

|

Conservation and quantifying conserva¬

)

tion
Combination of relation and symbolic
representations of similarity and dif¬

ferences
) Dominance of logic over perception
) Numerical equality and conservation
lasting or conceptual equivalence —
quantitative identity
| (5) Numerical quantity
Conservation of discontinuous
quantity, continuous quantity
) Reversibility—Proceeds in two
opposite directions simultaneouslymaking the conservation of numbers a
logical necessity to a child who can
think simultaneously of both destroy¬
ing and re-establishing the one-toone correspondence.
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The Developmental Sequence of Number

A considerable proportion of number-related research after 1960
has been devoted to substantiating Piaget’s general developmental
sequence.

Mentioned earlier in this work is the summary by Anita Riess

who reported on number-related research prior to 1947.

During this

period, the logical foundation for number was referred to as number
readiness.

The child's lack of a "logical foundation" prior to enter¬

ing school was attributed to not being able to comprehend number at
abstract levels.

Piaget's theoretical structure related to stages of

development has slowly changed the basic interpretation of the require¬
ments of the "logical foundation" from that reported by Riess.

Among

the research and interpretive works in the early 1960's were Dodwell
(1960, 1961), Wohlwill
Elkind

(1960), Wohlwill and Lowe (1962), Hood

(1961, 1964), and Lovell

Dodwell

(1962),

(1961).

(1960, 1961) used a similar experimental procedure to

Piaget's and analyzed his results to indicate the emergence of three
stages of development similar to Piaget's.

In addition, he agreed with

Piaget's view that an ability to count did not mean that the child was
able to use number concepts and that the child had attained number
conservation.
Wohlwill

(1960) developed a procedure to examine the development

of number through scalogram analysis.

His basic assumption »as "that

the development of the concept of number has its origin in an essentially discriminative

function of abstraction, proceeding thense by a
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process of the gradual elaboration of mediating structures to an
eventual state in which the concept exists as purely representative
symbolic entity."

43

His was an attempt to interpret Piaget through

the empiricist conception of development.

Three stages of symbolic

mediation were concluded to exist in the formation of number.
were:

They

"An initial, pre-conceptual one, which number is responded to

purely in perceptual terms, without any symbolic mediation; an
intermediary one,

in which the mediating structures representing

individual stimuli on this dimension are developed,

so that the per¬

ceptual support necessary for generalization between two equivalent
stimuli on this dimension is steadily reduced; a final one, in which
superordinate structures representing the number concept in the
abstract, and relating the individual numbers to each other are elabo¬
rated, thereby leading to an understanding of such functional princi¬
ples as the conservation of number and the coordination between ordinal
and cardinal number.
Although Wohlwill found three stages of development, his interpre¬
tation of those stages was not attributed to the growth of the opera¬
tive structure but rather to the mechanism of mediated generalization:
"Responses to numerical correspondence, above the simplist level, are
clearly based on mechanisms of mediated generalization; i.e., on the

^Joachim F. Wohlwill, "A Study of the Development of the Number
Concept by Scalogram Analysis," Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1960, 97,
p.

345.
44

Ibid., p.

367 .
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intervention of internalized symbols representing numbers."^5

The

three stages, therefore, described by Wohlwill are not stages in a
Piagetian sense for they are "mediated" by the developing internalized
rule structure of the operation and not the internalized symbol.
Wohlwill did, however,

find a scalable sequence to a series of tasks,

the simplist of which required simple recognition of the dimension of
number chosen from among other attributes, to number conservation and
last to the use of number in addition and subtraction.

Also, Wohlwill

substantiated Piaget's view toward counting in that it had little cor¬
relation to any of the tests.
Wohlwill and Lowe

(1962) designed a training study which, although

it did not relate to the development of the overall concept of number,
did pertain to the conditions of the development of number conservation.
Kindergarten children with a mean age of five years and ten months were
pre-tested and led through a pre-training exercise of matching numeral
to a set of six, seven, or eight objects.

The children were then led

through a series of training exercises designed to correspond to three
hypotheses which related to causes of development, the reinforcement
hypothesis

("as the child obtains increasing experience in counting

numerical collections of different types and different arrangements,
he gradually learns that alterations in the perceptual dimensions of
a set do not change its number"),

the differentiation hypothesis ("the

child has to learn to differentiate the dimension of number from this

45

Ibid., p.

372.
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irrelevant one”), and the inference hypothesis ("Piaget maintains that
experiential factors can only become effective,

in this realm of

development, to the extent that it builds on the child's previously
developed structures of thought").

The training along lines specified

by each hypothesis involved the manipulation of the numeral-set match¬
ing relationship.

None of the training procedures proved effective in

inducing number conservation as they had defined it.

Their definition

of number conservation differed significantly from Piaget's formulation
which did not involve matching the set to the visual number symbol in
the form of the numeral.
Elkind

(1964),

in a replication study of Piaget, tested to

determine the order of the development of discrimination, seriation and
numeration tasks.

The discrimination tasks were of a type that the

child was asked to select the "largest" and the "smallest" objects from
a set of size graded objects.

In the seriation tests, the child was

asked to construct a stairway of nine elements after it had been demon¬
strated.
elements.

If the child failed with nine, the number was reduced to four
Then the child was asked to insert into the stairway another

set of elements.
doll "climbed."

The numeration task utilized the stairway which a
The child was asked, "How many stairs does the dolly

have to climb to get to this stair?"
mixed,

i.e.,

Then the stairway elements were

the physical stairway was destroyed, and the child was

asked to remember how many stairs the doll had to climb to reach a
certain level.

A total of ninety children were tested, thirty of whom

had a mean age of four years and six months, thirty of whom had a mean
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age of five years and seven months, and the remaining thirty had a mean
age of six years and nine months.
Elkind’s results were in general agreement with Piaget's in that
similar ages and stages were found for the various tasks.
Piaget found that the discrimination problems were passed
at the four-year level, but the more complex of the seriation and numeration problems were not passed until the ages
of six or seven.
Through careful analysis of the typical
performance at each age level, Piaget was able to discern
three stages in children's ability to seriate and numerate
size differences.
At the first stage in the development of seriation (usually
at age four) , children generally are unable to seriate sticks
above a small number (three or four).
At the second stage
(usually at age five) , children are able to make a correct
seriation after considerable trial and error, but are unable
to insert the second set of sticks within the completed
stairway.
Children at the third stage (usually at the age
of six or seven) are able to form a stairway and to insert
correctly new sticks within it.
Piaget observed parallel
stages in the development of numeration.
Children at the
first stage (usually at age four) are unable to count cor¬
rectly and cannot determine the number of stairs the doll
had climbed.
At the second stage (usually at age five),
children are able to tell how many stairs the doll had
climbed when the stairway was intact, but not after it
was destroyed.
Finally, at the third stage (usually after
the age of six or seven), children are able to say how
many stairs the doll had climbed, whether the stairway was
together or was in pieces.
Elkind did observe that there was significant differences between
the three age groups as Piaget’s stage theory predicts.

The least dif¬

ficult tests were the discrimination tasks, whereas the most difficult
seriation problem involved the insertion of a second set of elements

*6David Elkind, "Discrimination, Seriation, and Numeration of Size
and Dimensional Differences in Young Children:

Piaget Rep leatlon

Study VI," Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1964, 104, p.

27/.
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into an already constructed order and the most difficult numeration
problem was the determination of the number of stairs climbed by the
doll after the stairway had been destroyed.

Elkind concludes from this

that the relative difficulty of the three tests in general and specific
tests are consistent with Piaget’s determination.
Elkind also found when he examined the effect of the materials
used

j

(blocks, slats and sticks)

that "although the extent of the dif-

ferences was not great, there was a trend toward more successful dis¬
crimination, seriation and numeration of size differences with an
increase in the dimensionality of the materials in which those differences appear."

Increasing dimensionality in this case refers to

the perceptibility of size differences.

Elkind ends his study first

with an analysis of specific children’s responses with respect to the
stages of reasoning.

This is followed by an attempt to recapitualize

the issues raised by Piaget in his long and difficult to follow book,
The Child's Conception of Number.
Almy, Chittenden and Miller

(1966), in their book Young Children s

Thinking, presented a long and detailed account of Piaget's description
of the child’s construction of aspects of logical thought.

This is

followed by two studies, the first was a cross-sectional study and the
second was a logitudinal study.
ment.
b

The two studies were in basic agree¬

The order of difficulty of the conservation tasks studied were

in basic agreement with Piaget's.

47 Ibid., p.

283.

In addition, they showed that there
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was a tendency in the transitional stage of reasoning for about half
of the children studied to regress from "what had appeared to be an
A Q

understanding of conservation at an earlier period."

They also sug¬

gested that, "while the correlations between progress in conservation
and other measures of mental aptitude and school achievement were only
moderately high,

they were substantial enough and consistent enough to

warrant further investigation of the understanding of conservation, and
other manifestations of operational thought as they may relate to the
curriculum for the child in kindergarten, first and second grade."
Hood

49

(1962) was interested in the relationship of conservation,

cardination and counting to mathematics achievement.

He concluded that

conservation of number was a significant factor in number readiness,
however, his study has received a great deal of criticism because his
assessment was based solely on teacher judgments of the arithmetic
competence of the children studied.
D’Mello and Willemsen (1969) administered a scalogram analysis of
the development of four tasks which represented levels of abstraction
in the use of number terms.

Thirty-eight children were studied who

ranged in age from three to eight years of age.

Their analysis showed

that "the child first learns to recite number words in sequence; next,
to match visual arrays of similar objects (dots) according to visually

^8Millie Almy, Edward Chittenden and Paula Miller, Young Children/s
Thinking:
Studies of Some Aspects of Piaget's Theory,
Piaget (New' York:
Teachers College, Columbia University, 1966), p.
49

Ibid., pp. 108-110.

108.
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perceived equality of quantity;
quantity;

then to match number words to absolute

and finally to match the visual symbol

(numeral) with

absolute quantity.
Siegel

(1971)

studied the developmental sequence of a series of

number-related tasks.

They were Magnitude Discrimination of continuous

and discrete materials, Equivalence, Conservation, Ordination, Seriation
and Addition.

Magnitude discriminations required the child to use the

words "more" and "less" for discrete quantities and "larger" and
"smaller" for continuous substances which were solid areas.

"To under¬

stand these concepts, a child must recognize only simple size differ¬
ences;

the magnitude of the difference is irrelevant."

The task of

equivalence was hypothesized to involve correspondence as the child
was required to choose from among four alternative sets the one with
the same number of dots as the sample.

Conservation was defined as

"the ability to recognize the identity of a set despite changes in
relationship between elements of the set."

The children had to recog¬

nize the equivalence of two sets of numbers with different spatial
arrangements.

It should be noted that no transformation was involved

as the sets were pre-arranged in static arrays.

"Ordination was defined

in the present study by the child's ability to respond to a particular
ordinal position," i.e., the child was instructed to select what had
been previously defined as the second picture from an array of pictures

50Sydney D'Mello and Elleanor Willemsen, "The Development of the
Number Concept:
A Scalogram Analysis," Child Development, 1969, 40,
p.

687.
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in which its position varied.

Seriation was defined by "the child's

ability to choose the middle-sized number in a three-number series."
Addition was defined as "the ability of the child to select a stimulus
which had two more objects than the sample."51
Seventy-seven children, ranging in age from three years to four
years and eleven months, were used.

She found that there were no sig¬

nificant differences between performance on the two magnitude tests,
continuous and discrete.

She also found there to be no significant

differences between the magnitude and equivalence tasks at any age.
This was an unexpected result, as it was expected that the equivalence
task would be more difficult than simple magnitude discriminations.
In a similar experiment, however, Siegel (1974) did find that the
equivalence task used in this experiment was more difficult than magni¬
tude discrimination tasks.

The ordination task was significantly more

difficult than the magnitude discrimination and equivalence tasks and
was easier than the seriation and addition tasks in all age groups,
except the three years to three years and five months group.

The

seriation and addition tasks were found to be of equal difficulty for
all age groups.
The scalogram analysis test was then employed to determine if the
data showed a meaningful developmental sequence.
of difficulty of the tasks was as follows:

"The expected order

magnitude continuous,

-^Linda Siegel, "The Sequence of Development of Certain Concepts
in Pre-School Children,” Developmental Psychology, 1971, 5, 2,
pp.

357-358.
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magnitude discrete, equivalence, conservation, ordination, seriation
and addition.

If this hypothesis was true, the coefficient of repro¬

ducibility determined by scalogram analysis would be high.

The

coefficient of reproducibility corresponds to the proportion of
responses which fit this sequence; each time a task is passed in the
sequence after an earlier one was failed represents an error.

Thus,

the coefficient of reproducibility = 1 - (errors/NK) where N is the
number of subjects and K is the number of tasks.
coefficient for each age group was as follows:
to 3-11,

.93; 4-0 to 4-5,

.89; 4-6 to 4-11,

.89.

The value of the
3-0 to 3-5,

.89; 3-6

The value for all

CO

seventy-two subjects was .89.
She reports that although the coefficients were high, only 57.1
percent of the children exhibited perfect scores in terms of the pre¬
dicted sequence.

This percentage would, of course, have been higher

in light of her 1974 findings.

She was able then to determine that

magnitude discriminations and equivalence do proceed the understanding
of conservation.

Further, ordination develops after an understanding

of equivalence, magnitude and conservation but precedes the develop¬
ment of the ability to understand seriation and addition.
(1974)

findings are reported in the section titled "Length, Density

and Number."

52

Siegel's

Ibid., p.

360.
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The Conservation of Number

Number conservation is a pivotal structure upon which rests not
only the structure of number but according to Inhelder and Sinclair in
discussing the interaction between different fields of knowledge
(numerical, logical, spatial, physical)

in learning, "first, it seems

clear that the possession of an elementary invariant
number)

(conservation of

is a prerequisite of success—even if partial success—in

learning experiments in any field.

Until now we have been unable to

provoke more than figitive moments of operational structuring in
children who are totally preoperational in the pre-tests."
conservation is the first of the conservation to appear.
ducted at Geneva "(Piaget and Inhelder,
and Szeminska,

Number
Research con¬

1941; Piaget, Inhelder,

1948; Piaget and Szeminska,

1941) has already shown

that children acquire conservation concepts studied in the learning
experiments in the following order:
ous quantities
length)."5^

(liquids, solid matter

discontinuous quantities, continu¬
[modeling clay], and then

Chronological order of attainment is not meant to convey

that these conservations are directly derived from one another.
Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet's latest work,

53Barbel Inhelder and Hermina Sinclair,

in fact, is devoted to a

"Learning Cognitive

Structures," Trends and Issues in Developmental Psychology,
Paul Mussen, Jonas Langer and Martin Covington (Eds.), (New York:
Rinehart and Winston,

1969), p.

Holt,

19.

■^Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of
Cognition, p.

246.
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study of some of the non-chronological relationships among the conservations.
Specifically with respect to number, however, Piaget and col¬
leagues see that the native concept of number, in the sense that opera¬
tions can be performed on them, "is slowly built upon from the first
elementary number conservations

(see Piaget and Szeminska, 1941; and

Piaget, Inhelder and Szeminska,

1948).Therefore in a real sense

elementary number conservation is a pivotal notion upon which rests
the understanding of mathematics.
Elementary number conservation is defined by Piaget as "the
invariance of a characteristic despite transformation of the object
or of a collection of objects possessing this characteristic.

The

conservation of number is a particular case of this general definition.
Concerning number, a collection of objects 'conserves'

its number when

the shape or disposition of the collection is modified, or when it is
partitioned into subsets.
A typical procedure used to test whether or not a child has num¬
ber conservation (Piaget and Szeminska, 1941) utilizes sets of
counters (manipulation objects).

For example, the experimenter would

lay out a row of seven blue counters and ask the child to
many of your red counters .
blue ones

.

.

.

55Ibid., p.

.

exactly the same number as I've put

just as many, no more, no less."

The child's response

131.

^6Jean Piaget,
Science, 162,

.

put out as

3857,

"Quantification, Conservation and Nativism,"
1968, p.

978.
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is then recorded and then in order to be sure that the child appre¬
ciates the numerical equivalence, the experimenter may put the red
and blue counters in one-to-one correspondence.

Invariance o£ number

Is assessed next where the experimenter lengthens or shortens one of
the rows and then asks "Are there as many ...
of blue ones as red ones or aren't there?

the same number .

Or are there more?

.

.

How

do you know?"^"
In the procedure developed by Piaget and Szeminska, an attempt
is made next to talk the conserver out of his correct judgment by
pointing out how long one row has become and thus aren’t there more
counters, or in the case of the non-conserver,

the experimenter points

out the original numerical equivalence.

Lastly,

quantity question:

(the experimenter hides the

red ones).
ing them?

'Count the blue ones

the child is asked a

How many red ones are there; can you guess without count¬
How do you know?"

A second arrangement is used to check the results of the first
arrangement where,

for example, the counters are placed in a circle

and the same questions are asked.
Using this series of tests,
stage of development.

it is possible to determine the child's

During the non-conservation stage, neither the

conservation question nor the quotity question are answered correctly.
During the intermediate stage,
be answered correctly.

57

Ibid., pp.

some of the conservation questions may

However,

275-276.

the child is not able to justify his
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responses.

In addition, the quotity question is answered correctly:

"There are seven red ones

...

so I should think that there are seven

CO

blue ones as well."
In the last stage,

the stage of conservation, the child is able

to justify his answers using essentially what is an identity argument,
a reversibility argument, or a compensation argument.
of the arguments are as follows:

Examples of each

"There are just as many blue ones as

red ones because it was right before and we haven't taken anything
away, they've just been squashed up

(identity argument).

We could put

the others in a heap as well, or put one by the other so there aren't
more blue ones or red ones (reversibility argument) .

Here the red ones

are in a long row, but there's space in-between the counters, so that
makes it the same (compensation argument)."

59

Although the specific arguments apply to number,

it is interest¬

ing to note that Piaget sees these operating schemes as applying to
all forms of conservation.

"All conservation concepts have certain

characteristics in common:

they are based on the same operatory schemes

characterized by transformational properties, and their acquisition is
attested by the appearance of astonishingly similar arguments (identity,
compensation by reciprocity, and cancellation through reversibility)."
The fact that all of the various forms of conservation are not
attained at the same time, but acquired over a period of years, is

•^Ibid. , p.

277 .

59Ibid. , p’.

246.
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reemphasized by Piaget and Garcia

(1971)

through an explanation

recognizing that there are actions in the material world and there is
a system of coordinations or a logical part.

"At the level of the

formation of the concrete operations, every action has two aspects:
it has a particular, material result, which constitutes its causal
part, and it requires general coordinations which constitute its logi¬
cal part."

Each of the forms of conservation involves an aspect

unique to its own physical reality whereas the logical aspect remains
essentially the same.
This orientation to number conservation has identified several
issues upon which the rather large array of research issues have con¬
centrated.

One such issue involves a definition of conservation of

number and what constitutes adequate evidence that a child has attained
it.

In the early and mid-sixties, a debate began between Braine

(1964), Braine and Shanks (1965a,
et al.

1965b), Bruner

(1964), and Bruner,

(1966) , who demonstrated that children could conserve number at

least a year or two prior to Piaget’s findings.

This controversy

received new impetus when Mehler and Bever (1967), and Mehler, Bever
and Epstein (1968)

indicated that children as early as two years and

six months could conserve.
many others have found.
later.

It

This is a full three years prior to what

These results will be presented more fully

is important at this point to establish that the criteria

which were presented earlier involving a specific transformational

60

Ibid., p.

257.
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procedure, a quotlty question and justification arguments have not been
used by the investigators mentioned.
were obtained.

Hence, quite different results

Major theoretical differences are apparent when the

need for justification arguments (identity, reversibility, and compen¬
sation) by the child are considered.

Gruen (1966), in an analysis of

methodological and definitional considerations, concluded that differ¬
ences in procedure and a basic disagreement as to the nature of the
psychological processes that underlie conservation account for the dif¬
ference in age of the attainment of conservation observed by Bruner
and Braine, et al., versus those found by Piaget and Smedslund and
others.
A second major area of research relates to the first aspect

(the

physical reality or actions in the material world) of the dual aspects
of a logical operation.

Basically, number always relates to physical

objects and their arrangement.

Piaget has identified a fourth and

earlier stage in the development of number

(Piaget, 1968), that of the

topological relation, where quantitative judgments are based on cri¬
teria such as the length and density of a configuration.

With this

stage as a basis, and prior to elementary number conservation where
number is not present as a concept, which one does the child attend to
in the physical display of objects?
Another aspect which has received considerable attention relates
to the aspect of language and the child's understanding of the rela¬
tional concepts of "less," "more," and the "same," terms which are
integrally linked to methods of ascertaining the level of conservation
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reasoning and is reported next.

Relational Terminology and Conservation

Crucial to procedures used to determine the level of a child’s
reasoning with respect to number conservation (in fact, all conserva¬
tions)

is the child’s understanding of the words "more,” "less," and

the "same."

With some exceptions

[Wohlwill and Lowe

(1962); Osgood,

Suci, Tannenbaum (1957); Braine (1959; 1962), to mention a few], most
experimental techniques have involved the use of the relational forms
or terms.

Investigations were undertaken by Braine and Shanks (1965a,

1965b); Smedslund

(1966); Wallace (1966); Griffiths, Shantz and Sigel

(1967); Sigel and Goldstein (1969); Donaldson and Balfour
Piaget

(1968);

(1968); Rothenberg (1969); and Harasym, Boersma and Maguire

(1971), for the purpose of determining the child's understanding of the
relational terms.
Donaldson and Balfour

(1968) , in a study of elegant design,

investigated children's understanding of the terms "more" and "less."
The children were between the ages of 3;6 years and 4; 1 years.

Dis¬

crete units were used in the form of cardboard apples to be hung or
removed from two cardboard trees with six holes in each.

Both static

and changing situations were used and initially both equal and unequal
situations were used.

Sometimes the subject effected the change and

at other times he or she watched.
ferent questions:

There was a series of eight dif¬

(1) A judgment of static inequality;

(2, 3, 8) A

judgment of static equality (although in 3 and 8 if the child denied
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that one tree had more apples, he was further asked:
same number of apples on each tree?";

"Is there the

(A, 6) A situation of initial

equality which was changed by addition or subtraction (with Question A,
the child was passive and was asked questions; and with Ouestion 6, the
child was asked to "make it so that there are more (less) apples on
this tree than this one.");

(5) A situation of initial inequality was

presented and supplemented by adding or subtracting apples so that the
difference was lessened but never made equal and then the child was
asked to make a comparative judgment;

(7) A situation of initial

inequality was presented and the child was asked to reverse it by mak¬
ing the one which originally had less have more.^
A second study was conducted six months later with the same chil¬
dren in order to check the response patterns over time and to see if
there was an influence of the use of "more" and "less" questions on the
same day.

In this study, only one tree was used which had a number of

apples on it and the child was asked to make it so that it had less
apples on the tree.
"The most consistent and striking finding is that, in the great
majority of cases, responses gave no indication that the children were
differentiating

'less*

from 'more.'

Questions containing the word

'less' were answered in the same way as questions containing
i.e. ,

in a way that would have been correct for

'more.

more ;

In addition,

^Margret Donaldson and George Balfour, "Less Is More:
A Study
of Language Comprehension in Children," British Journal of Psychology,
59,

A, 1968, p.

A63.

169

the children showed a marked tendency to make the same response
irrespective of which the two words were used in the instruction.

In

addition, "more" was the dominant interpretation given to the undifferentiated pair.

62

In the discussion of results,

the authors concluded that using

"less" appropriately apparently comes later in development.

In addi¬

tion, when discussing the context in which children encounter these
terms, they conclude:

"It seems likely, however,

that

’more’

is first

comprehended—and produced—by children in contexts where one entity
changes.

A quite young child can commonly say 'more' when he wants

food in addition to what he has previously been given and it seems
credible that this is ontogenetically the term's more primitive context.
Notice that the word

'less,'

if heard by the child in this context,

might well carry some such meaning as
One adult might say to another:

'more, but not so much more.'

'That's too much.

Give him less.'"63

Others have provided a similar interpretation of "more"
Shanks,

1965a,

1965b; Hood,

(Braine and

1962).

The results of the study by Harasym, Boersma, and Maguire (1971)
confirm in general the young child's lack of understanding of the terms
"more" and "less," although there were some important differences
between this study and the Donaldson-Balfour study.

The main purpose

of this study was to "investigate the relationship between qualitative

6^Ibid. , p.
63

Ibid., p.

A6A.
668.
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and quantitative relational terms and conservation ability by means of
the semantic differential."64

In addition to the terms "more" and

"less," the terms "same" and "different" were added.

The children

ranged in age from six years and two months to ten years and five
months.

The children were divided into three groups on the basis of a

pre-test of conservation (non-conservers,
logical conservers).
"less"

intermediate conservers, and

The terms relevant to conservation, "more,"

(quantitative concepts), and "same," "different," were then com¬

pared to twelve scales of opposites, "low-high," "long-short," "widenarrow," "big-small," "thin-fat," "up-down"

(concrete scales); "bad-

good," "dirty-clean," "strong-weak," "happy-sad," "slow-fast," and
"noisy-quiet"

(abstract scales).

In addition, the words "mother" and

"school" were compared to the scales as terms which came from the
child’s everyday experience and acted as controls.
The results showed that, "For LCs (logical conservers), the pro¬
files for

’more’

and

’less'

seem to be opposite to each other.

pole of the scale is relevant for
be relevant for
'high'

’less.’

is chosen for

’more,’

For example,

'more.'

If one

the other pole appears to

'low'

is chosen for 'less' and

On the other hand, NCs (non-conservers)

do not appear to distinguish 'more'

from 'less.'

to select the same pole for both concepts.

In fact, they tend

Thus both 'more' and

less

64Carolyn R. Harasym, Frederic J. Boersma, and Thomas 0. Maguire,
"Semantic Differential Analysis of Relational Terms Used in Conserva¬
tion," Child Development, 1971, 42, p.

768.
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are judged to be

’short,'

’narrow,’

’small,’

’thin,’ and

’down.”'65

The logical conservers saw the terms "more” and "less" as oppo¬
sites, while the non-conservers tended to confuse the terms.

The logi¬

cal conservers could also give logical explanations while the nonconservers could not.

The intermediate conservers were reported to

see the two terms as different but not opposite.
could not give adequate explanations.

In addition, they

The authors, therefore, con¬

cluded that the status of conservation reasoning and the use of rela¬
tional terms are related.
One difference exists between this study and the DonaldsonBalfour

(1968)

study, and that is that instead of "less" being equated

and undifferentiated from "more," the opposite is true; "more" is
associated with "less."

The authors explain that this may be due to

a different procedure or to the fact that in their test the children
were tested as a group using paper and pencil or that there is a wide
age difference.

Griffiths, Shantz and Sigel

(1967)

showed that "more"

is used more often and with greater accuracy than is "less."
Griffiths, et al.

(1967) also showed in children four years and

one month to five years and two months that the greatest difficulty
was experienced using the term the "same."

They also found that there

was a relationship between the frequency of terms used and the type of
material for which the term was spontaneously elicited
and weight).

(length, number

The children had the least difficulty in using all of the

65 Ibid., p.

773.
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terms with respect to length, number next most difficult, and weight,
the most difficult.
One aspect of Rothenberg's (1969)
understanding of these concepts.
that is,

study related to the child's

Results are in general agreement,

four-year-olds have much greater difficulty with the terms

than do five-year-olds.

Her study differentiated "lower class" and

"middle class" four and five-year-olds.

A very small percentage of

the four-year-olds and less than half of the five-year-old children
designated as "lower class" used the terms "less" and "more" correctly
in conservation problems.

While percentages were higher for "middle

class" children in general, there was a direct age correlation to the
uses of the relational terms.
Piaget

(1968) , in light of the gathering evidence that young

children do not understand terms such as "more," objected to the MehlerBever

(1967)

study partly on the basis that they used the word "more"

to show that three-year-olds could conserve.
also that many,

It should be pointed out

if not all, of the number and conservation studies

prior to 1965 did not take into account this possible confounding
factor.
Before leaving this topic,

it is important to summarize Piaget's

perspective on the relationship of language to the developing struc¬
tures of knowledge.
for Piaget,

Hermina Sinclair-DeZwart

(1969) points out that

"(1) The source of intellectual operations are not to be

found in language, but in the pre-verbal, sensori-motor period where
a system of schemes is elaborated that prefigures certain aspects of
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the structures of classes and relations, and elementary forms of con¬
servation and operative reversibility ...

(2) The formation of

representational thought is contemporaneous with the acquisition of
language; both belong to a more general process, that of the constitu¬
tion of the symbolic function in general.

This symbolic function his

several aspects; different kinds of behaviors, all appearing at about
the same time in development,

indicate its beginnings.

The first

verbal utterances are intimately linked to, and contemporaneous with,
symbolic play, deferred imitation, and mental images as interiorized
imitations."

The link between language and development thus for

Piaget is not a causal one where language and the meaning of words
cause the development of operative schemes.
In a recent study of the effect of verbal learning on the growth
of the conservation of continuous quantities,
Bovet

(1974)

support this view.

Inhelder, Sinclair and

In support of the difference between

language understanding and operational structures, they ask in an open
ing paragraph, "How can it be that a child would come to understand
and use correctly the terms 'more'
'the same amount,'

and

’less,'

'just as much,' and

which are common to all forms of conservation, and

still not interpret weight and volume conservation the same?"

The

issue then of attaining conservation reasoning is not purely a verbal
or semantic one, although as stated, the purpose of the study was to

66Hermina Sinclair-DeZwart, "Developmental Psycholinguistics,"
Studies in Cognitive Development:
Essays in Honor of Jean Piaget,
Elkind and Flavell (Eds.), (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1969)
p.

316.
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determine the influence of verbal training on cognitive structure (the
child's reasoning process).

In order to insure that only the effects

of learning would be related to training in the correct use of the
words, "all cognitive training had to be avoided, no conservation
problems presented, no transformations were effected and there was no
true dialogue with the experimenter, nor any attempt to arouse con¬
flicts in the child's mind.''^7
Initially, the comprehension and use of the terms used by the
children at both the conservation and non-conservation levels was
studied.

Eight-eight children ranging in age from four years and six

months to eight-years-old took part in the experiment.

Although all of

the children understood the terms elicited, there were systematic dif¬
ferences between the expressions conserving and non-conserving chil¬
dren chose to describe situations.

The use of discriptive terms ("a

lot," or "not a lot") and comparative terms ("more" and "less")
example.

Conserving children used the comparative terms while most

non—conserving children used descriptive terms.
tiated

is an

The use of differen¬

("long"/"short," "thick"/"thin") or undifferentiated terms

("big'V'little," "thick"/"little")

is a second difference.

Again, con¬

serving children tend to use the differentiated pair whereas non¬
conserving children tended to use the undifferentiated terms.

The use

of two- or four-part structures where, for example, "In situations
where the child was asked to describe two differences at the same time

67Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of
Cognition, p.

100.
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(marbles Mc" and "d", number and size; pencils "c" and "d", length and
thickness), and conserving children chose the following form for the
pencils:

’This pencil is long and thin; the other is short but fat’;

whereas the non-conservers said:
short;

this one is thin;

’This pencil is long;

that one is fat,'

that one is

if they were capable of

describing both differences and of using differentiated terms."68
After determining the spontaneous use of words and phrases with
respect to the situations presented, these same expressions used by
conserving children were used to determine if they understood what
they had said.
reasons

The materials used to initially determine spontaneous

(modeling clay, marbles and pencils) were used again.

A series

of ten questions using the words "more" and "less" in the same ques¬
tion, "the same," or "as much," "more" and "fewer," "smaller-larger,"
"fewer but larger" and "more but smaller," longer pencil (when compared
with a short,

thin pencil), thicker pencil (when compared to a long,

thin pencil) , a shorter and thinner pencil (when compared to a long,
thick pencil) , and a longer but thinner pencil (when compared with a
short, thick pencil).

69

These same ten questions were then used in a three-part training
study which first asked the child to describe the ten situations;
second,

to carry out instructions relative to them; and third, several

parts of the second procedure were repeated.

68Ibid. , p.

105.

6^See Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, pp.
questions.

The children were given

103-104, for the specific
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one pre-test and two post-tests (the second of which was administered
two weeks after the first).

The tests were liquid conservation tests

which had no direct relation to any of the materials used in the train¬
ing procedures.
At the beginning, eighty-eight subjects were classified as
seventeen conservers,
non-conservers.

sixteen intermediate conservers, and fifty-five

Almost all of the children made no operatory progress.

"Some children made neither operatory nor verbal progress and used the
higher level expressions only sporadically at the experimenter's
insistence.

For each new question, they returned to typical non¬

conservation expressions.

All the other subjects, however, definitely

benefited from the verbal exercises, regardless of whether they made
operatory progress."70

Three subjects progressed from non-conservation

to conservation; however, one of them regressed to an intermediate
level at the second post-test.

One child who was a non-conserver at

the first post-test progressed to a conservation level at the second
post-test.

Seven children progressed from a non-conservation level to

an intermediate level.

Nine children, although they remained at a non¬

conservation level, modified their arguments in the post-tests.
We think that this effect of our training procedure is
instructive, particularly for the following reasons:
(1)

The subjects who progressed to the interme¬
diate stage of conservation were clearly
aware of the co-variation of the dimensions.
This led to a temporary coordination expressed

70Ibid. , p.

Ill•
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in the form of the compensation argument
resulting in a conservation answer.
Only one
of them justified his correct answer by ’if
you put it back, it will be the same,' an
argument often given alone or initially in
other experiments.
All the others supported
their conservation answers only by compensa¬
tion arguments.
(2) The children who achieved conservation started
off by giving the compensation argument, but
then, without any prompting from the experi¬
menter, added those of identity or reversi¬
bility.
(3)

It was quite easy to teach non-conserving chil¬
dren the differentiated terms, but, as we saw
during our preliminary investigation, the use
of such terms is the least reliable indication
of conservation.

After making these observations, they were able to make three
major conclusions.
(1) The hypothesis that a child needs only to under¬
stand and use correctly certain expressions to
attain conservation should be discarded.
However,
there seems to be a clear parallel between the
structuring of the cognitive operations and the
acquisition of the terms necessary for their
expression.
As long as we remain at the level of
the lexicon (differentiated terms), verbal learn¬
ing is easy; however, as soon as we come to a more
structured level, then verbal training is faced
with the same obstacles as the acquisition of
the concept itself; namely, lack of coordination
and of decentration.
(2) Acquisition at the level of the lexicon enables
a child to direct his attention toward the
relevant aspects of the situation (argument of
co-variation).
(3) Verbal training helps some children who have
already acquired conservation but are unable to

71 Ibid., p.

114.
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Justify their answers to give clear explanations
during the post-test.
This effect of verbal
training is well known.
The very nature of
language permits rapid coding and an efficient
storing and retrieval of data, as has been
realized by many researchers and educators.72
It should be remembered, however, that the experimental design
here attempted to isolate the effects of training to verbal word learn¬
ing;

i.e., all cognitive, conservation, transformations, dialogue

between the experimenter and child, and an attempt to arouse conflicts
in the child's mind were eliminated.

A few training studies have used

verbal learning procedures without these limitations (Beilin, 1965,
1969; Braine and Shanks,

1965; and Wohlwill, 1960a, 1960b).

Greater

training effects were seen in these studies in the absence of the
above limitations.

These and other studies will be discussed later.

Within the general context of learning, however, verbal learning does
have a place.

Structure of Language

One result of the Inhelder, Sinclair, Bovet

(1974)

study not yet

discussed was that it was easier for children to learn to discriminate
between comparative terms such as "more" and "less" than it was to use
several comparative terms as in a two-part structured question; e.g.,
more but smaller marbles.

Rothenberg (1969), in a summary introduc¬

tion, reported that many studies have used, for example, three-part
conservation questions "Does this row (or side) have more, or does

72Ibid., p.

115.
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this row have more, or do they both have the same number (amount,
etc.)?" or two-part questions "Do these two rows have the same number
or does one have more?"

She hypothesized that for the young child,

long and complex questions are difficult not only to remember, but
to answer with a single response.
Hood
question,

(1962) noticed that when children were asked a three-part
they tended to repeat the last thing they were asked; i.e.,

the child tended to choose the last alternative in a series, especially
if the question was long and confusing.

Hood's observation inspired

Siegel and Goldstein (1969) to conduct a study on the conservation of
number which tested the child's use of the most recent

(recent hypothe¬

sis) part of the question presented versus the use of a relational
response strategy.

Sixty-six children ranging in age from two years

and seven months to six years and one month were tested.
dure involved a two-part test,

The proce¬

the first part of which tested the

children's understanding of relational terminology.

In support of

previous findings, only the older children understood the relational
concepts.

The second part of the test involved conservation of number

situations and questions which systematically varied the use of the
terminology.

The younger children chose the most recent stimulus and

this tendency decreased with age.

With increasing age, children

tended to use the relational terminology.

In addition to the terms

"more" and "less," the word "same" was included.

The majority of

children did not understand the word the "same" until the age of four
years and seven

months.

In the oldest group of children, five years
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and seven months to six years and one month, only one-half were reason¬
ing at a conservation level and even then the data showed that in over
fifty percent of the cases the children still responded to the most
recent part of the question asked.
These results indicate that in the absence of the concept, chil¬
dren tend to depend upon other factors to respond to the experimenters'
questions.

In a related finding, Achenbach (1969) reported that when

the position of sets is controlled in conservation tests with very
young children, the responses of the children do not differ signifi¬
cantly from what would be a random responding to the question.

Age and the Attainment of Conservation —
The Mehler-Bever Controversy

One recent aspect of studies related to the Piagetian notion of
conservation has been an effort by some to show that very young chil¬
dren in the late two's and early three's are conservers.

Many of the

determinations made with respect to the child's understanding of the
terms used in conservation assessment apply directly to this discussion
In addition, according to Gruen (1966) many of the issues relate
directly to the theoretical orientation of the author with respect to
the nature of the psychological processes which underlie conservation.
In the first half of the 1960's decade, a controversy began involv
ing Smedslund

(1963, 1965a,

Shanks (1965) and Bruner

1965b)

and Braine

(1959, 1964); Braine and

(1966); Frank and Bruner

(1964).

Both Braine

and Bruner showed that children four and five-years-old could conserve
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where Smedslund, when using the prescribed Piagetian tasks to determine
conservation, found results basically in support of Piaget

(i.e.,

children do not attain conservation until six, seven or eight years
of age).

The differences in age results were secondary to the deeper

issues of the psychological nature of conservation and the tests used
to determine it.

Both Frank and Bruner, and Smedslund, in their

determinations, used liquid conservation tests with a transformation
which was accomplished by pouring one of two standard beakers into a
wider-shorter and thinner-taller beaker.
ing response,

If the child gave a conserv¬

the child was asked to explain why, whereas Frank did

not ask the question.

Gruen (1966) , utilizing this difference alone,

reinterpreted both sets of data and concluded:

"The Frank-Bruner

procedure for assessing the presence or absence of conservation clearly
results in more (and probably younger) children being labelled conservers than does the Smedslund procedure.

.

•

.

If Frank had used the

Smedslund criteria for assessing the presence or absence of conserva¬
tion, her age norms would have been older than the ones she obtained;
and vice versa,

if Smedslund had used the Frank-Bruner criteria, his

age norms would have tended to be younger.'
Mehler and Bever

73

(1967) and Mehler, Bever, Epstein (1968) pre¬

cipitated the next chapter in the age controversy.
methodological differences are evident here also.

Definitional and
However, of even

greater importance is the fact that the original study by Mehler and

73Gerald Gruen, "Note on Conservation:
Methodological and
Definitional Considerations," Child Development, 1966, 37, pp. 981-982
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Bever

(1967) has only been partially corroborated by Calhoun (1971).

The overwhelming majority of replication studies have been unable to
duplicate Mehler and Bever's results:

Rothenberg and Courtney (1968);

Piaget (1968) ; Beilin (1968) ; Goldschmid and Buxton-Payne (1968);
Achenbach (1969); and Willoughby and Trachey (1972).
Bacially, Mehler and Bever

(1967)

showed that children two years

and four months to two years and eight months gave one hundred percent
verbal and eight-one percent non-verbal conservation responses.

Con¬

servation responses grew steadily worse until nearly four years of
age where they started to improve again.

They hypothesized that this

period of a temporary inability to solve conservation problems
"reflects a period of overdependence on perceptual strategies
eventually,

.

.

.

the child develops a more sophisticated integration of the

logical operation with his perceptual strategies which allow him to
r
„74
count members of an array.
Strenuous objections have been voiced with respect to Mehler and
Bever's use of the term conservation for the procedure essentially
required the correct use of the word "more

and did not utilize what

are standard transformational procedures to determine conservation.
Mehler-Bever

(1968) modified their terminology of "overconservation"

in response to Piaget's objections (1968).

Their study also indicated

that very young children do correctly understand and use the term "more
and the "same."

This stands in marked contrast to the studies reported

^J. Mehler and T. Bever, "Cognitive Capacity of Very Young
Children," Science,

1967, 158, 3797, p. 142.
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earlier.

To date, Mehler and Bever’s results remain largely uncor¬

roborated and more importantly no adequate explanation for them has
been advanced.

Rothenberg and Courtney (1968) do point out in connec¬

tion with the demonstrated lack of understanding of the realm meaning
of the word "more” that Mehler and Bever's technique always associated
the word "more" with the group that was manipulated and, therefore,
led to the possibility of a spurious cue for the child in that in
answer to the question of "more" the child pointed to the group that
had been manipulated and therefore seemingly gave a correct answer.

Length, Density and Number

In a set of objects,
attended to.
objects,

there are several dimensions which can be

For example,

...

in this single set there are four

they occupy a certain length and they are a prescribed dis¬

tance apart.

In a more complicated set, as used in number conserva¬

tion exercises,

two sets are compared; e.g.,

.

.

. Now each set has its

own number of elements which can be the same or different, in this
case 5,

6.

The two rows can also be compared as to their relative

length, which can be the same or different.
also an attribute;

i.e.,

Density (or crowding)

is

it can be the same or different.

Prior to number conservation, when a child is asked which set has
more or less or are they the same number, it has been found
hypothesized by Piaget)
question.

(as was

that children do not use number to answer the

Prior to number conservation, there exists not only a gross

quantification capacity (or numerosity sense)

in the child but also a

1 84

topological sense which influences the child's Judgment of a question
dealing with number;

i.e., the longest row just because it is longest

■nay have "more" for the child than a shorter row.

The same may hold

for density.
A number of studies have been devoted wholly or in part to the
subject of perceptual cues and how children use them in conservation
situations:

Zimiles (1966); Wallach, Wall and Anderson (1967); Gelman

(1969, 1972); Peters (1967); Rothenberg (1969); Rothenberg and Courtney
(1969); Calhoun (1971); Pufall and Shaw (1972); Pufall, Shaw and
Syndal-Lashy (1973); Smither, Smiley and Rees

(1974); Sigel (1974);

Lawson, Baron, Siegel (1974); Baron, Lawson, Siegel
Zimiles

(1975),

(1966) , in a study with one hundred and forty-six children

ranging in age from five years and three months to seven years and
three months,

found that children at this age had no difficulty in

differentiation magnitudes such as width vs. depth, length vs.
ness, etc., even if they were non-conservers.

thick¬

He was able to confirm

the hypothesis that the conservation of aggregates small enough to
be intuitively or immediately grasped occurs prior to conservation of
larger aggregates.

The small children used sets of three elements,

whereas the large condition used sets of seven elements each.

Further,

he found that the first experience a child had in his conservation
trials with either the large or small condition had an important
influence on behavior.

If the large condition was used first, chil¬

dren had much greater difficulty in subsequent problems than those
children whose first experience was with the small condition.

This
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suggests that there may be greater transfer of number (numeroslty)

from

the small condition used to Illustrate a concept such as conservation.
This conservation of the importance of a recognized intuitive numeroslty
ability has been shown to be of importance in the next studies to be
discussed.
Pufall and Shaw (1972)

tested one hundred and sixty-three

three to six-year-old children on seven conservation-like number prob¬
lems.

Seven configurations were used, each having two rows of dots.

The seven configurations were variations of four rules:
Lengths and densities equal,

"Rule 1:

therefore number equal; Rule 2:

Lengths

and densities directly related, therefore rows unequal numerically
(the set with the greater—lesser—length is also the set with the
greater—lesser—density,
Rule 3:

then the sets are numerically unequal) ;

Lengths equal and densities unequal, therefore rows unequal

numerically; Rule 4:

Lengths and densities inversely related, there¬

fore numerical relation could be equal or unequal.

Assumptions were

made with regard to stage and the possible reaction a child might have
to these situations.

A Stage 1 child bases his judgments on the global

similarity or differences between two rows.

The second stage child

intuitive thought—is characterized by at least a partial coordination
of length, density and number.
lence,

In the third stage of lasting equiva¬

the child understands that spatial and number correspondence

are not identical, and yet they are systematically related."75

75Peter Pufall and Robert Shaw, "Precocious Thoughts on Number:
The Long and the Short of It," Developmental Psychology.
No.

1, pp.

62-64.

1972 » Vo1'

7’
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They found first that only forty-two percent of the three-yearold group made correct judgments on whether or not two sets of seven
dots,

same length and density and set in one-one correspondence, were

equal, while all the older groups correctly made this judgment.

No

child consistently judged number with respect to density (equal
density,

equal number or more dense, greater number or less dense,

smaller number).

However,

22 of 96 four and five-year-old children

did judge in terms of length;

i.e., equal length means equal number or

greater length means greater number.

None of the six-year-olds did

so, however.
In configurations

■]

[•

found that ninety percent of the middle-age groups
judged that the longer rows had more.

they

(four and five)

In this age group in general,

approximately one-fifth of the children exclusively based their judg¬
ments on length.

This led to the general conclusions that younger chil¬

dren tended to base number judgments on differences in either length
or density;

children at the next stage tended to judge number in terms

of relative length.
(1966).

This conclusion was generally supported by Zimiles

An analysis of differences between the youngest three-year-old

group and the oldest, the six-year-old group, resulted in the conclu¬
sion that the older child appears to multiply (coordinate)

length and

density relations in making number judgments.
Their data was not analyzed from a perspective of how many chil¬
dren used a numerical scheme to answer the questions.

It is also impor¬

tant in terms of later studies to recognize that they used what would
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be described as a large condition which would preclude reliance upon
an intuitive numerosity judgment.
Gelman (1972) and Lawson, Baron and Siegel (1974) demonstrated
that number is indeed a salient cue provided that the array is suffi¬
ciently small so that the child can estimate its numerosity.

The dif¬

ference between Pufall and Shaw s (1972) data was discussed by Lawson,
et al.

(1974) when they noted that Pufall and Shaw used collections

of five to seven or seven to nine elements where theirs were configura¬
tions of three to five elements.
Gelman
ber,

(1972)

found, however, that when the differences for num¬

length and density were all large, children four and five-years-

old made accurate judgments for numbers than five but did attend to
length with larger numbers when the rows were more dense.

Therefore,

if the array was sufficiently small, number is an important cue.
Smither, Smiley and Rees (1974) conducted a study of the use of
perceptual cues of length, density and number as used in number judg¬
ments.

They varied the magnitude of number

(large and small collec¬

tions) , and varied the number length and density differences.

They

reported that when the numbers used were large and the number dif¬
ferences between the collections to be compared were small, that chil¬
dren at a three to six years of age spread tended to judge on the basis
of length, although the older children did better than the younger chil¬
dren when the number difference was great.
They summarized their results as follows:

"The use of length

and density cues depends not only on age and the salience of those

188

dimensions but also on the magnitude of number and number differences.
When the length differences and the numbers were both small and the
density and number differences were both large, all age groups made
accurate number judgments.

When the numbers were large and the number

differences small, all age groups judged on the basis of length."76
Siegel
and Siegel

(1974) ; Lawson, Baron, Siegel (1974); and Baron, Lawson
(1975) do not support the view of the previous findings

regarding the salience of the length cue in the judgment of number.
Siegel

(1974)

offers an alternative hypothesis to the interpretation

that young children tend to use length to judge number.

"Rather than

using length to judge number, the children may be manifesting an
ability to separate the dimensions of length and number.

The critical

test of these two alternatives is a situation in which length provides
a conflicting cue to numerical size;

for example, a task in which the

child is required to judge the relative numerosity of two sets in which
the shorter row always contains the greater number of dots.

If the

child is operating on the basis of length, this should be a relatively
easy task,
length.

since number is perfectly correlated

(negatively) with

If, on the other hand, the child has difficulty in coordinating

the dimensions of length and number,

this should be an extremely diffi¬

cult task because the dimensions are in conflict.
Siegel

Lawson, Baron and

(1974) have shown that children tend to confine the dimensions

7^Suzanne Smither, Sandra Smiley and Red Rees, "The Use of
Perceptual Cues for Number Judgment by Young Children,
Child
Development,

1974, 45, p.

698.
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of number and length when asked about both simultaneously in situations
where their dimensions conflict.

Therefore, in situations where

numerosity and spatial extent are negatively correlated, magnitude and
equivalence concepts were expected to be difficult."77
Her hypotheses were shown to be true where children had the
greatest difficulty in tasks where the shortest length always indi¬
cated the smaller number.

Number and length were interpreted to be in

conflict for the reason that children had the greatest difficulty mak¬
ing a judgment where it would have been an easy decision to make if
length alone were used.
Lawson, Baron and Siegel

(1974) , and Baron, Lawson and Siegel

(1974) extended this basic idea of conflict between number and length
;

by suggesting that

some children expressed a consistent preference or

bias for either the use of number or length as a strategy for solution
of judgment questions.

If the child attempts to use number and it is

conflicted strongly by length,

the conflict remains unresolved.

The

opposite is true also if the child's bias is for length judgments.
In general,

there is a failure to differentiate length and number,

although the choice of the strategy to use is in addition to the bias
of a child determined by the number of elements in the set
favor length,
et al.,

small sets favor numerosity).

(large sets

In this context, Lawson,

suggest a possible rule used by the child that summarizes

77Linda Siegel, "Development of Number Concepts:
Ordering and
Correspondence Operations and the Role of Length Cues," Developmental
Psychology,

1974,

10, 6, p.

908.
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behavior seen during the development of number conservation.
The rule prior to the development of mature concepts of
length and number may be:
When the numbers are beyond
estimation range, use length for quantity; when the
numbers are within estimation range, use number for
quantity.
Within this context, Lawson, et al., suggest that the child may
have a superordinate concept of "bigness" into which both number and
length are assimilated prior to the establishment of the discrete
unit in number conservation.

Their superordinate concept is not

unlike Piaget's description of this stage of reasoning by titling it
the stage of gross quantification.
The logic and consistencies of the children's responses
would seem to indicate that the majority of the children
do have some understanding of 'more,' 'same,' and
'longer.'
However, a concept of length which does not
include, as the primary comparative dimension, spatial
extension, would not appear to be a mature concept; the
same is true for a number concept which does not include
rules for appropriate and inappropriate applications.
Baron (1974) has suggested that a theory of acquisition
of concepts component by component might provide a reason¬
able interpretation of these findings.
This interpreta¬
tion views the child as being in possession of a super¬
ordinate concept of 'bigness' to which both length and
number are assimilated.
Children in the present study
do appear to lack the necessary components for distin¬
guishing length and/or number from bigness.^
This interpretive summary necessitates comments.

The "super¬

ordinate" concept of "bigness" from which number and length have not
been differentiated seems to be in basic harmony with Piagetian notions

^^Glen Lawson, Jonathan Baron and Linda Siegel, "The Role of
Number and Length Cues in Children's Quantitative Judgments," Child
Development, 1974, 45, p.
79 Ibid., p.

735.

734.
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of this stage of reasoning.

The criteria that the concept of number

at this stage does not include rules for appropriate and inappropriate
application is not in harmony with Piaget nor is it in agreement with
much of the previous work regarding the application of number.
application of number which is being referred to is counting.

The
Although

Piaget points out that the ability to count has no connection with the
beginning of a level of understanding as is found in Stage Three, where
the unit exists and is conserved, nevertheless, many researchers have
pointed out

that children do try to apply number to the situations

which seem to require it.

This is especially true during the second

stage which is characterized by quotity reasoning.
count each set and say that they are equal.

Here the child can

Then because number is

not an invariant yet and because the perceptual transformation is more
salient, judgments of quantity are made on another basis.

In the static

configuration which was used in Lawson, et al., research, there very
well may be a perceptual concept of bigness to which judgment is assimi¬
lated.

With respect to rules for the application of number, it is

difficult to conceive of the inappropriate application of number in
situations requiring number judgment.
Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet

Number, as was shown by

(1974), can be inappropriately applied

when considering the conservation of length.

80

The factors responsible for a mature concept of number for the
invariance or conservation of number have been discussed in the chapter

80See Chapter Six,

Inhelder,

the Development of Cognition, pp.

Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and
131-166.
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on number and in the section on the conservation of number earlier in
this chapter.
world

Piaget recognizes that both actions in the material

(which involves perceptual cues) and a system of coordination

or a logical part based on identity, reversibility and coordination
ere the factors which contribute to number conservation.
The research related to the material and language aspects of
the concept of the conservation of number has been summarized in the
preceding sections.

There is basic argument among most of the

research cited in this section that number conservation does not begin
to be attained by most children until the child is nearly six years
old, although there are exceptions as has been noted
Bruner; Mehler and Bever).
Gruen (1966)

(Braine and

These exceptions have been explained by

and Rothenberg (1969) and are due to methodological and

theoretical differences.

It is generally agreed that with regard to

relational terms such as "more" and "less" that most young children
do not attain an understanding of them until or at about the same as
the various forms of conservation begin to be attained.
to complex multi-part questions,

With regard

it has been determined that young

children tend to respond to the last part of the question asked.

With

regard to the available perceptual cues of length, density in number
situations,

it has been determined that young children often do confuse

length for number.

Density confusion for number appears to occur less

often.
There is general consensus that length is more often chosen as a
criteria for judgment of number when the collection is larger than can
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be grasped by the child's intuitive numerosity sense.

It has also

been found that when number problems have been presented that are
within the bounds of an intuitive number sense that the learning of
conservation related tasks is facilitated, whereas, presentation of
a large collection often results in a confounding effect.
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CHAPTER

IV

LEARNING COMPETENCE AND THE NATURE OF PIAGETIAN STRUCTURES:
THE LEARNING TO LEARN OF PRE-NUMBER CONCEPTS

Introduction

Through the first three chapters, a discussion of the ANISA Theory
of Development, Piaget and Number has been presented.
devoted to their integration;

This chapter is

i.e., the two theories through an analy¬

sis of topics related to number development will be integrated for the
purpose of developing implications for the ANISA Theory of Development.
Although a survey and analysis of all theories of development and
learning have not been attempted,

it is generally agreed that Piagetian

theory lies somewhere in between two extreme positions taken by various
schools.

On one end of the spectrum of theories is the empiricist tra¬

dition which attributes the central causal role in development to
external sensory factors.

At the other end of the spectrum is the

rationalist philosophy which attributes development to purely internal
causes; e.g., Kant's pure reason.

Piaget's theory attributes growth and

development to a combination of both external and internal factors,
hence, Piaget is positioned between the two extremes.

This orienting

frame of reference also places the ANISA Theory of Development between
the two extremes for it recognizes both as functioning in development.
In

fact, the ANISA Theory and Piagetian theory are positioned in close

proximity to one another, because growth and development for both
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ANISA and Piaget are accounted for through a complex interaction
between internal structures,

internal processes and the environment.

The proximity of the two theories does not in any way imply, how¬
ever,

that they account for development

in an identical manner.

fact,

the matter of the general compatibility of the two theories is

a matter for extensive scholarly analysis.

Many tempting perspectives

are open at this time for this analysis, among them:
origin of knowledge—Pre-formed Structures vs.
Sense (the five domains of Potentiality) vs.
Operative Knowledge;

creativity, vs.

Potentiality in an ANISA

Innate, Figurative and

learning competence and conscious control,

concrescence; Piagetian stages vs. ANISA's general

pattern and rhythm to development;
to ANISA vs.

The matter of the

the equilibration model auto-regulatory homeo-

rhesis to homeostasis vs.
vs.

In

the role of purpose which is central

Piaget who, as a genetic epistemologist, makes no mention

of purpose.
This chapter is limited to an analysis of those aspects of prenumerical thinking from a perspective of Piagetian theory and research
which apply to the general issue of learning competence as an aspect of
ANISA's Theory of Development.

The fundamental issue in this analysis

is the specific nature of learning and development as seen by each
theory.
A brief summary of the theoretical issues important to the elabo¬
ration of the ANISA Theory of Development is presented first.

Most

broadly, the issues are related to the possible similarities and dis¬
similarities between ANISA and Piaget with respect to learning.

In a
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narrower sense, the issues of stage and structure as they relate to
development are discussed in a similar manner.

Following these topics

is a review of current research on Number as it relates to these three
themes.

The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the themes and

research as they relate to the ANISA Theory of Development.

Learning and Development

ANISA
Learning is the key to the release of psychological potentialities.
Learning can be organized to gain conscious control over those processes
central to psychological development.

Those processes are differentia¬

tion,

Conscious control over those

integration and generalization.

processes is described as learning competence; or knowing how to learn.
Learning then is fundamentally an expression of man's creative potential
which becomes self-actualized as conscious control over the fundamental
processes is gained.
Differentiation involves the ability to break down experience,
whether internal or external,

into separate elements.

Integration is

fundamentally the ability to reassemble those separated elements into
new patterns of relationship,
ings,

thereby providing new information, feel¬

skills, perceptions and new patterns of thought intentions,

and generalization involves the extension in thought or action of
the integration to similar but not identical situations.

This entire

process occurs as the child interacts with the various environments as
defined by ANISA:

the physical,

the human, the unknown and the
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environment of the Self.

Learning then is an active process which

occurs within the framework of the environments.

Development is

broadly defined as the process of translating potentiality, both bio¬
logical and psychological,

into actuality.1

Piaget
Both Piaget's and ANISA's theory are process models with respect
to development;

i.e., development is a result of the interaction of

internal structures,

internal processes and the environment.

Emphasis

in ANISA is placed upon the manner of the interaction through mastery
or conscious control over the processes of learning.
results in new stages of development.

This interaction

In a sense, learning for ANISA

determines development.
A different emphasis is placed upon this mix of ingredients for
Piaget.

For Piaget, the state of development determines the nature of

the interaction and the forms of learning which can occur.
development of knowledge is a spontaneous process,
process of embryo genesis."

2

"The

tied to the whole

Life is active and coordinating by nature.

This active process of coordination and adaptation is the process of
equilibration.
Equilibration finds expression through the internal structures.

1These topics have been fully discussed in separate sections of
Chapter One:
"Learning," pp. 15-16; "Differentiation, Integration and
Generalization," pp. 16-17; and "Environments," pp. 24-26.
^Jean Piaget,

"Development and Learning," Journal of Research in

Science Teaching, 2:176-186,

1964, p.

176.
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Development begins with an interaction between the environment and the
innate structures of reflex-motor patterns in the sensori-motor stage.
Development finds its ultimate expression in the interaction and
coordination of the internal structures of knowledge.

The governing

process of the interaction is the auto-regulated state of equilibrium;
i.e., each structure maintains itself as an integrated whole possess¬
ing its own mechanism of reacting to disruptive pressures from both
the physical, environmental and

internal structures which in some way

do not correspond with what the child has just experienced.

Hence, he

concludes that by way of the equilibratory mechanism the development
of knowledge is an active process of construction which is regulated
by the internal contributions of the child.
"Learning presents the opposite case.

In general, learning is

provoked by situations—provoked by a psychological experimenter, or
by a teacher, with respect to some didactic point; or by an external
situation.
In addition,

It is provoked,

in general, as opposed to spontaneous.

it is a limited process—limited to a single problem, or

'
3
to a single structure."

The theme which is being developed here

essentially allows Piaget to distinguish between what the child gains
from outside contributions from the "opinion that development is a sum
of discrete learning experience"^ and those processes which regulate
the growth of operative schemes.

•^Ibid. , p.

177 .

^Ibid., p.

177.

Within this framework, Piaget uses
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the term learning in a restricted sense,
operations,

for he does not take the

such as classification, seriation, conservation, etc., to

be the product of learning.
A new scheme is the product of learning in the strict
sense, insofar as it results from the differentiation of
a previous scheme and insofar as this differentiation
involves an accommodation that depends on experience.
But
for this learning to take place, there must exist previous
schemes that can be differentiated during assimilation of
new objects.
Moreover, the structure of these schemes and
the assimilation, considered strictly as the prerequisite
of the structure, are preconditions and not the products
of learning.
In a word, learning relates to the content
of the schematism while the generalizable character of its
form does not result from learning but is a necessary con¬
dition for the functioning of the schemes.
. . . What is
learned in the strict sense is the totality of differentia¬
tions due to accommodation as the source of new schemes
vis-a-vis the increasing diversity of contents.
But what
is not learned in the strict sense is the assimilative
activity with its consequence of an equilibration between
assimilation and accommodation.
Assimilation is the source
of the gradual coherence of schemes and of their organiza¬
tion in equilibrated forms in which one can already discern
a sketch of logical classes with inclusion, intersections,
and groupings within a totality.
The interactions between
assimilation and accommodation imply therefore two factors,
learning in the strict sense and equilibration.
These two
factors underlying the functional process in its totality
can be called learning in the broad sense and are prac¬
tically identical with development.^
Piaget continues by proposing four possible forms of relationship
between learning in the strict sense and equilibration.
pendence is maintained between the two processes;

"(1)

Inde¬

(2) Learning is a

precondition (necessary but not sufficient) of equilibration, in the

■^Jean Piaget, "Apprentissage et connaissance" in Etudes
d'eplstemologie genetique VII, pp. 62-63 (Paris:
Presses
Universitaires de France, 1959), translated and cited by Hans G.
Furth, Piaget and Knowledge, p.

236.
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sense that the strategies leading to equilibration involve a learning
(this would constitute a learning of equilibration);

(3) Equilibration

is a precondition (necessary but not sufficient) of learning in the
sense that every learning presupposes the intervention of activities
not learned that bring about its equilibration;

(4) Equilibration and

learning are mutually required conditions that in their interaction
result in a complete reciprocity.
Piaget then chooses from among the four propositions by summariz¬
ing previous results into two propositions:
(a)

/

All learning presupposes the utilization of coordina¬
tions not learned (or not entirely learned); these
coordinations constitute a logic or prelogic on the
part of the subject;
(b) Learning of logical structures supposes the utiliza¬
tion of other pre-existing logical or prelogical
structures not learned (or not entirely learned).
These coordinations that were not learned in the
strict sense are the specific domain of equilibration; their development consists in a progressive
organization oriented in the direction of an operative
reversibility; i.e., compensations that are increas¬
ingly more complete.
Precisely insofar as they are
mechanisms of compensation, coordinations are not
learned in the strict sense but derive from the
activity of the subject in response to external
changes.^
Piaget concludes on the basis of these two propositions that the

third and fourth relationship between learning and equilibration are
supported because learning presupposes a logic or prelogic

(the exis-

tence of previous structures) which are the result of a stabilization

6Ibid., p.

237

^Ibid., p.

237.

(translated from Vol. X, pp.

183-184).
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or equilibration response after a learning encounter has occurred.
Clearly, the stabilization or accommodation which occurs during
development is an internal process due primarily to the interaction
caused by an assimilation into already existent structures.

Stabiliza¬

tion occurs as a result of the resolution of conflict to which the
l

child brings his previous knowledge structures.

Stage

ANISA
The ANISA Theory of Development at this time includes a general
acceptance of the patterning and rhythm of growth and views develop¬
ment as a series of hierarchical, qualitatively different series of
stages which do not necessarily appear in the same order.

A specific

hierarchical pattern of development has been proposed and accepted
which would ultimately describe a series of stages not necessarily
invariant for the multitude of dimensions which develop in all five
domains of human potential.

However, Piaget’s description of the

stages of growth in the cognitive domain, therefore,

in no way con¬

tradicts basic conceptions of the ANISA Theory of Development and have,
therefore,

been accepted in their broad outline.

The specific aspect

of stage and the equilibration model, however, does warrant further
analysis, as there is no general provision for equilibration in the
ANISA model unless the ANISA concept of generalization, which consti¬
tutes evidence for consolidation of a structure, may be interpreted
as a kind of equilibration.

If this be the case, then equilibration
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would be seen as the integrative aspect learning itself;

i.e., it is

one of the capacities the child consciously develops in learning how to
learn.
If this were the case for Piaget,

there would be no reason for him

to make a distinction between learning and equilibration.
dictory as it may seem,

this may,

As contra¬

in fact, be exactly what is meant by

ANISA’s use of learning how to learn.

Piaget
Piaget has recognized and described an invariantly ordered and
hierarchically arranged series of stages.

Each stage is qualitatively

different from the preceding stage yet is dependent upon it, in that
prior stages are integrated and thereby changed into successive
stages of development.

Stages are, therefore, transitional in nature,

i.e., each is characterized by a period of genesis,

transition, and

consolidation, and each becomes the basis of the next stage once con¬
solidation or attainment has occurred.
of organization;
of knowledge.

Stage also implies the notion

i.e., each stage represents a level of the structuring

These structures, as the stages advance, become inter¬

connected in ever-increasing patterns of complexity.

Lastly, at the

heart of the process of formation within each stage is the notion of
equilibration.

As the development of stages proceeds, the equilibra-

tory mechanism is extended to wider fields of application, becomes more
mobile in terms of flexibility of the types of assimilations and
accommodations which can be managed, and it becomes more stable in the
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manner in which transformations are handled.
Stages are established on the development of unitary structure
of knowing the operation;

i.e., development proceeds in the direction

of the establishment of stable structures of knowing, the most funda¬
mental of which is the operation.

Prior to operational thought,

reflexive or innate action patterns are coordinated with one another
establishing sensori-motor thought

(Stage 1).

During this stage, the

child gradually differentiates himself from the outside world and
establishes the permanent object.

The internalization of the object

and the action in the form of symbolic representation commences the
second major stage,

that of preoperative thought.

operational thought evolves and becomes stabilized
operation which is the concrete operational stage.

Gradually, prein the form of the
During the next

stage, operations are combined with one another in an interactive
whole which establishes the last stage of formal operational thought.

Structures

ANISA
The concept of the competencies in each of the five areas of
human potential is as formalized as the notion of structures in the
ANISA model has become,

in that the competencies describe the struc¬

tural organization of that which is actualized in the process of becom¬
ing.

In the cognitive domain,

classification and seriation,

these competencies include number,
in addition to many others.

There are

also a broad range of other competencies which relate to each of the
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other domains.

Last, higher order competencies are delineated.

They

entail a complex hierarchical integration or structuring of basic
competencies in the five categories of potentialities.

The resulting

structures—patterned uses of energy—make up the structure of the
Self.

These patterned uses of energy are the values and attitudes

which constitute the identity of the person.

Piaget
Three key ideas characterize the structure, the idea of wholeness,
the idea of transformation, and the idea of self-regulation.

8

These

three ideas essentially characterize the structure as a totality of
thought which is governed by laws of transformation and is active or
self-regulated according to the idea of equilibration.
The basic structure of knowledge is the operation.
in innate, physical and logico-mathematical knowledge.

Its roots are
It

is gradual1\

structured through the sensori-motor and preoperational stages and
attains its full dimensions in the concrete operational stage.

The

operation has four basic characteristics:

(1)

action;

It always supposes some

(2)

It is a reversible action;

conservation; and

(4)

(3)

It is an internalized

It is always related to a whole system of opera¬

tions.
Piaget attributes a regulatory role in the operation;
uses the term regulation and operation synonymously.

8See Page 66 in Chapter Two.

in fact, he

As the operation

or regulation becomes more precise, reversibility establishes for
Piaget the primary characteristic of a mature logico-mathematlcal
level of thought.
Thus, it can be seen that during the gradual extension of
the knowledge
environment,' that is, the sum total of
external objects on which intelligence is brought to bear
and during the gradual disassociation of forms and their
contents, that^is, the elaboration of abstract and con¬
ceptual
forms
as opposed to perceptual or sensori-motor
forms and, a fortiori, as opposed to the material forms
of the organism, the regulations whose task it is to
control cognitive exchanges with this environment, that is,
to organize experience in terms of deductive frames, will
reach a level of precision never found in elementary regu¬
lations.
Instead of being restricted to corrections after
the event that bear only on the results of processes or
behaviors, or to an approximate guidance of anticipations
that are never more than probabilistic, they carry out a
function of precorrection in the proper sense of the
word.9
Trial and error, compromise, retroactive correction and anticipa¬
tion, all of which function in the developing intelligence, eventually
lead to a fully and operationally defined reversibility which, as
Piaget points out,

is precorrective in nature because the child can

reason back to the starting point of an action or to the end point of
an action without actually carrying it out physically.
Piaget cites an example emphasizing the relation between the
gradual growth of the regulatory function and conservation;

in fact,

he concludes the reversibility is the very process from which con¬
servation is produced.

^Jean Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, p.

211.
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Before going any farther, we should point out that there is
nothing sudden about this transition and that the earliest
representational, though preoperational, regulations make a
transition between sensori-motor regulations and operations.
For example, a child of five or six years will maintain that
a meatball rolled into a sausage contains more meat because
it is longer, but if one continues rolling that sausage out,
the child will then think it contains less because it has
become ’thin.'
In this case, the error is reversed by means
of a regulation based on the very exaggeration of the error.
The reversal will, in turn, lead to the idea of inter¬
dependence between the lengthening and the thinning down
and so finally to an operational compensation 'longer x
thinner = same quantity.'
Thus it can be seen how a
reversible operation, followed by conservation, may be
derived in an absolutely continuous fashion from the inter¬
play of regulations.
... It may be said that such a regu¬
lation presupposes conservation.
But that is not true at
all, for it is precisely the reversibility which brings
about the conservation, as can easily be demonstrated in
the psychological field; reversibility is the very process
from which conservation is produced, and this process varies
in degrees of approximation as long as it remains in the
state of a regulation in the usual sense of the word.10
Piaget continues this discussion of the relationship between con¬
servation and reversibility by stating that even when the child is
able to use an identity argument to establish conservation of substance
by stating "its the same sausage" is,

in fact, using a reversibility

argument of "sausage - sausage = no sausage," which is, in fact, a
reversibility argument.
It is clear then that the structure of knowledge for Piaget is
that which controls cognitive exchanges with the environment.

It is

a system of transformation whose rules allow an eventual disassociation
of form and content;

10Ibid. , pp.

i.e.,

208-209.

the substance from which knowledge is built.
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objects and actions, leads eventually to logico-mathematical construc¬
tions which are no longer tied to concrete content.

A Review of Number-Related Research

In the recently published work of Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet,
Learning and the Development of Cognition, is an important wealth of
experimental results,

learning experiments and analyses which directly

relate to many of the issues raised in the previous section.

Although

their learning experiments did not directly deal with the development
of number conservation, many other conservations were experimentally
dealt with (continuous quantity, physical quantity, and the conserva¬
tion of length).

The psychological similarity of the conservations

has been previously discussed;

i.e.,

they all eventually involve the

use of identity, reversibility and compensation arguments in the
presence of a transformation of some sort.

The learning experiments

in this work were designed to reveal the interactive effect that one
type of conservation or type of training had upon the attainment of
the conservation under study.

As a result, they were able to clarify

many dynamic effects of cognitive growth which relate directly to
issues of stage and the equilibration model.

These results, in turn,

will be utilized to address many of the issues raised earlier in the
pursuit of the elaboration of the ANISA Theory of Development.
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The Role of Inference in the Development of Conservation

The first experiment to be reported is one in which the processmaking inferences from observations were analyzed with respect to the
development of the conservation of continuous quantity.

In the main

experiment of this chapter, the children were concerned with the flow
of liquids through two parallel rows of containers.
containers arranged so that

the flow could be regulated starting at

the top and ending up in the bottom.
size A and A'.

Each row had three

On the top were funnels of equal

Each funnel had a valve as did the next two below.

The

funnels at the second level were not of equal size and were designated
B and E or N.

Finally, at the bottom level were either two equal

beakers, C and C*, or two unequal, long-necked flasks, F and F'.
Thirty-four children, ranging in age from five years and one month
to seven years old, were used.

As in other conservations, three stages

have been found in its development.

Fifteen of the thirty-four children

were selected because they were at a Stage 1 Level of Non-Conservation.
The remaining children were all at an Intermediate Level.

The Interme¬

diate Level was further sub-divided into three levels, Non-Conservation
Intermediate II, Intermediate-Intermediate III, and Intermediate
Conservation IV.

None of the children was at a Conservation Level.

Prior to the experiment, they summarize some of the previous
findings which,

in turn, assisted in the design of this study.

were:
(1)

It was evident from these preliminary investigations
that the effects of teaching techniques are governed

They
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by the child's initial level of cognitive develop¬
ment, as measured by a pre-test.
(2) No differences were noted between the results of the
three techniques . . . verbal training, conflict due
to a discrepancy between prediction and outcome, and
the pouring of liquid back into the original glass—
was particularly effective when used alone.
(3)

Even the cumulative effect of the three techniques
used together was less predictive of the result of
the post-test than the child's initial level of rea¬
soning.
Apparently, the child's capacity to inte¬
grate the information drawn from the exercise is the
factor that mainly determines progress.
It seems,
therefore, that the benefit a child is likely to gain
from the three techniques depends more on his level
of cognitive competence than the specific type of
teaching technique used.

(4) Finally, there remains the question of comparing
the progress of the subjects of this experiment with
that of children who are given no such training.
This
question later became one of our major concerns and
was constantly borne in mind when we tried to improve
our technique and the design of our pre-tests and
post-tests in order to evaluate the progress accom¬
plished by the subjects in the course of the experi¬
ment s. !■*These guiding conclusions were derived from the original experi¬
ments which developed from a collaboration of the Harvard Center for
Cognitive Studies lead by Bruner and the Genevian group.

The conclu¬

sions were those reached by the Geneva group, as Bruner's results were
reported in his Studies in Cognitive Growth, a work which was cited in
the previous chapter and contained the Frank-Bruner

(1966) experiment.

From the above four conclusions, Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet
were able to form a main hypothesis which guided the experiments in

UInhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of
Cognition, pp.

40-41.
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the work being reported.
We adopted the hypothesis that any increase in knowledge is
the result of contact between a person’s already established
schemes and reality, and we postulated that the systems into
which schemes are organized change with development.12
Returning now to a specific discussion of the training experiment,
in the conservation of continuous substance, it was stated that the
training sessions were designed such that the child actually performed
all of the manipulations of opening and closing the valves.

The child

was asked to "make predictions as to what would happen and then to
compare these predictions with what actually did happen when they per¬
formed the actions."

We also tried to help the child by trying to

shift his attention away from the static result,

i.e., the level of

the liquid, as this is an inherent characteristic of non-conservation
reasoning.

Therefore, we directed his attention toward the continuity

of the filling and emptying of a series of jars in a virtually closed
system.

In this way,

the child was provided with the opportunity of

witnessing the causal aspects of a continuous physical process (the
initial and final states are the same) as well as the kinetic aspects
(the rate of rise of the level of liquid depends on the diameter of
the jar).1"^
Four protocols of individual children at each stage are presented
below which provide excellent examples of the transition in the stages
of reasoning.

There is one protocol for each of the four levels

■^Ibid. , p.

41.

13Ibid., p.

43.
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mentioned earlier:

I, N-C; II, NC-Int.;

Ill, Int.-Int.; IV, Int.-C.

The abbreviated names of the children are BAB, GER, JAC and POU.
None of the fifteen Non-Conservation children ever made a conserva¬
tion judgment.

As can be seen, the child clearly focuses on the action

being carried out; e.g.,

the pouring in this experiment.

In addition,

they are unable to relate the fact that the final appearance of the
material is determined by the actions carried out during the transforma¬
tion.

In short,

"these children did not know how to use the observa¬

tions."^
BAB (5;6) is at the preconservation stage:
his reasoning
is based on the changes of the dimension or on the actual
act of pouring the liquid or changing the shape of the
modeling clay.
In the first phase of the experiment, he thinks that the
quantity of liquid increases when it is poured into N
and then diminishes when it is poured back into F.
He
is amazed to find that F contains the same amount of
liquid at the end of the experiment as at the beginning.
In the second phase, he begins to notice the co-variation
of the dimensions, but without realizing that his suc¬
cessive judgments contradict one another:
'If you look at
it from the side, there's more here (N); if you look at
it from the top,

there's more here (B).'

During the third phase, BAB seems a little unsure of him¬
self.
At first he stops the flow of liquid into B and N
at the same level, but when he is asked, 'Is it the same
or different when you drink it and when you look at it?
he says nothing and his expression betrays his confusion.
He finally opts for a compromise solution, and lets a few
more drops of liquid flow into N (so that the level of N
is higher than the level of B, but there is still some
liquid left in A').
But, and this is striking, he expects
that the levels of C and C' will be equal and that C and
C' will contain the same quantity of liquid.
It is only

14 Ibid., p.

53.
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later that he notices the liquid left in A', and when
questioned again on the quantities in B and N, he admits
that there was less in N.
This retroactive correction
seems isolated, in the sense that it has no effect on his
other judgments; when the procedure is repeated (using W
instead of N), he once again makes the levels in B and W
equal, and does not notice the liquid left behind in A
until later.
In the fourth phase, BAB thinks that the quantities are
equal as long as the middle jars are hidden by the screen.
When the screen is removed, he seems very intrigued, and
spontaneously says, 'There's nothing left at the top';
but when he sees that the levels are not equal, he goes on
saying that the quantities are not equal.15
At the second level, NC-Int.,

the child begins to make retroactive

corrections of previous judgments because the discrepancy between
observation and prediction begins to become obvious; however, the child
is unable at this stage to organize his observations into a coherent
system of schemes.

This is most strikingly illustrated by GER's pro¬

tocol .
GER (6;2)

starts off at Level II and reaches Level IV after

the training sessions.
During the pre-test, the only difference between GER and
the Level I children is that she gives a correct conserva¬
tion answer for the situation where liquid is poured into
several small glasses.
The argument she gives is that of
primitive identity:
'because in there (original glass) and
in there (glass from which the liquid was poured into the
smaller ones) there was also the same.'
However, she does
not use this reasoning in any of the other situations
(liquid conservation task and modeling clay conservation
task).
During the training sessions, she begins by reasoning in the
same way as the Level I children, except that during Phase 2
she correctly predicts the inequality of the liquid in
and C':
'more here (C) and less here (C') because there s

l5Ibid. , p.

53.
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still some left at the top.'
This is the beginning of an
inferential process.
However, her progress is minimal,
because when she lets all the liquid run into N she is’
bothered by the fact that the levels in B and N are unequal.
She does not try to explain how equal quantities in A and
A can come to different levels when they are in B and N.
Only in the following phase does real conflict occur:
GER
continually changes her mind:
'There's more lemonade in N
because it's thinner, and there (B) it's fatter,' she says;
then immediately afterward:
'No, it's the same' — 'How
do you know?' — 'Because I can see it.' — 'How can you
see it?
I just know.'
She does not yet attempt an
explanation based on compensation of the dimensions.
At the beginning of the fourth phase of the experiment,
she seems to understand that unequal quantities of liquid
in A and A' can come to the same levels when they are
poured into B and N.
However, she abandons the idea of
conservation of inequality by predicting that the levels
in C and C' will be equal.
But she later explains the
inequality between C and C' by referring to the middle
jars:
'(not the same) because one's thinner (N) and the
other's fatter (B) , that still makes more lemonade
(despite the equal levels).'16
JAC, on the other hand, typical of children at the level Int.Int.,

started off by at least considering the possibility of conserva¬

tion—even if,

influenced by the striking changes in shape of the

modeling clay,

they give preconservation answers—can later modify

their judgments because of their own inferences.

The observable fea¬

tures of the situation, although they are not the direct source of
knowledge, force the child into comparing his successive judgments.
In this way he can become aware of the contradiction between them.
During the pre-test, JAC continually switches between con¬
servation judgments and preconservation judgments (Int.Int.) .
He takes a lively interest in the problem and is
able to think both in terms of an empirical return and In
terms of the co-variation of the dimensions.

16 Ibid., p.

55.
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In the first phase, he correctly predicts that the levels
and quantities in C and C' will be equal.
When the liquid
flows from A' to N and then to C', he says:
’Gosh, it's
coming up very high (in N) , but I've poured with the same
flask (F), I poured it all.'
In the second phase, he expresses a conflict:
'How can I
do it?
If I stop at the same place (equal levels in B and
N), I won't have enough to drink at the end (C') ; look,
I left a bit up there (A').
To have the same at the end,
I've got to put it all in, but then it comes up to a dif¬
ferent place.'
He lets all the liquid flow into B and N
and spontaneously says:
'That looks like too much,
doesn't it?'
When the liquid flows into W and N, he is
very perplexed:
'It's even funnier, if I don't leave
this little bit at the top I don't get the same (pointing
to the levels) in that one, it's so wide (W), and in that
thin one . . . Well, it must still be the same amount of
lemonade, it's all there ... I know, it just looks as
if there's more ... in the thin glass the lemonade is
all squashed up, it has to go up; in the wide one, it's
spread out.'
During the third phase, once the screen is removed, he is
delighted to find that his predictions are confirmed:
'Ah, I know, it's like last time (previous session),
there's always the same amount of lemonade to drink, it
just looks as if there's more, the lemonade is in dif¬
ferent places in the glasses.'
During the fourth phase, he is at first perplexed by the
equal levels in B and N:
'How come?
I poured into there
(A') with the little bottle (F'), and now it's equal
. . . Ah!
I know, it's still less, we'll see at the end;
wait a minute, wait ... I know, there's always less
in this line (column), we haven't added any in the middle
so it must be right.'
In the post-tests, JAC clearly understands the conservation
of the liquid and the modeling clay; he gives arguments
based not only on compensation and identity, but also on
reversibility:
'It's when I make it into a ball again,
when I think about that, I'm quite sure.'17
POU's protocol is an example of a child who was pre-tested to be
at a level of competence just prior to conservation Int.-C, IV.

17Ibid., pp.

56-57.

He
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is able to compensate and coordinate the dimensions involved.
POU (5;6) in the pre-test gives conservation answers based
on the reversibility for the modeling clay conservation
task:
'If we make a ball again, it's the same.'
But he
is still unsure of himself in the liquid conservation
task, and after some hesitation returns to his original
preconservation judgment:
'More in the thin glass because
it's narrower than this (original glass).'
During the training sessions, his reasoning becomes more
explicit and at one point he refers to the compensation of
the dimensions.
In the second phase, he thinks:
'There
(N) it's longer, and there (W) it's wider, so it should
come lower.'
He also uses a transitivity argument:
'If
you want to have the same here (C) and the same as there
was in the beginning, there must be the same here (middle
pair of jars) . . . when it runs down into the bottom
glasses, it's as if we put it back into the top ones.'
In the fourth phase, he triumphantly exclaims:
'There I
poured from the big bottle (F) and there from the little
one (F').
Everything ran out, so in the end you have to
have a little lemonade here and a lot there.'
When ques¬
tioned about the equality of levels in the middle pair
of jars, he says:
'You can make a mistake when you look
at it like that, but there can't be the same to drink.'
In the post-tests, he gives conservation answers for all
the situations.1°
Development in these examples is clearly related to the fact that
contradictions between observable features and predicted outcomes lead
the child to retroactive corrections of his or her judgments.

These

corrections remain inadequate until a system of compensations in the
form of the coordination of relations is established.

For Piaget,

these coordinations are clearly linked to operational thought for the
child who attains conservation reasoning using identity reversibility
by cancellation and compensation arguments to justify his answers.

18 Ibid., p.

57.
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Inhelder, et al., state that a grasp of conservation "indicates the
presence of an underlying system of mental operations that is charac¬
terized essentially by two forms of reversibility,

inversion or can¬

cellation on the one hand, and compensation of reciprocal relationships
on the other.
The transition in reasoning which characterizes the development
of conservation reasoning is evident when the reasoning of BAB, GER,
JAC and POU are compared.
BAB attention is directed to the changes in one dimension at a
time, or upon one of the actions performed.
focus on one dimension alone,

Because he is able to

such as the height of the liquid, his

predictions in the form of successive judgments are often incorrect
and contradictory.

This produces an effect on BAB of him being unsure

of himself, which in turn leads to compromise and retroactive correc¬
tions in isolated cases.
"The reaction of the Level I children seems to confirm the
hypothesis that as long as the child does not incorporate the observ¬
able features of the situation into a system of inference allowing him
to link the various observations made in the successive phases of the
experiment, he cannot make any progress.

The observable features them

selves cannot alone lead to change in the thought processes."

The

system of inference refers, according to Piaget, to the already men¬
tioned structures of thought identity, partition (mentioned in the

■^Ibid., p.

31.

20Ibid., p.

54.
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previous chapters) and reversibility by inversion and compensation.
GER, who is slightly advanced over BAB, begins to use some of these
operations.

GER's initial argument by which she explains conservation

of liquids poured from one large glass to smaller glasses involves
identity, "because in there (original glass) and in there (glass from
which the liquid was poured into the smaller ones)
same."

there was also the

Her reasoning, however, does not extend conservation to all

problem situations involving continuous quantities.
however,

During training,

she begins to make correct judgments indicating the beginning

of the inferential process, but her reasoning is not stable as she
cannot justify her answers and she later abandons conservation reason¬
ing in the face of what seems to be an end equality.

GER then wavers

between conservation and non-conservation reasoning, whereas BAB was
not advanced enough to ever give a conservation answer.
JAC begins the training experiment as one who wavers between con¬
servation and non-conservation reasoning.

He can use an empirical

reversibility (he has to actually return the substance to its original
state,

thus proving its equality)

in contrast to operational reversi¬

bility which takes place solely as a mental act.

Through the training

exercises, JAC advances in his understanding and attains both the con¬
servation of liquid and modeling clay and his explanatory arguments are
based upon operational compensation,

identity and reversibility.

Throughout the eight studies conducted by Inhelder, et al. , the most
dramatic progress came from this group of intermediate reasoners with
respect to the specific operation being studied.

Besides those
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children who fully consolidated their reasoning with respect to con¬
servation, class inclusion or number conservation, many of the children
"made real progress."

21

The most outstanding conclusions thus reached

was that "the nature and extent of the subject's progress was always,
in fact,

strikingly so, dependent upon their initial level;

in other

words, progress depends on the assimilatory instrument a subject
already has at his disposal."

JAC, as an example, shows "how chil¬

dren who have started off by at least considering the possibility of
conservation—even if influenced by the striking changes in the shape
of the modeling clay they give preconservation answers—can later
modify their judgments of the situation, although they are not the
direct source of knowledge, force the child into comparing his suc¬
cessive judgments.

In this way, he can become aware of the contradic¬

tion between them."23

JAC completed the transition in reasoning from

the intermediate stage to the third stage of conservation which indi¬
cated his "assimilatory instrument" was developed to the point where
the observable and misleading influence of the features of the situa
tion, when in seeming conflict with his own judgments, were used to
modify his own internal structures, his level of competence.
study group,

In JAC's

children beginning the training at Level I did progress,

although "apparently the only benefit gained from the training sessions

21Ibid. , p.

243.

22Ibid., p.

244.

23Ibid. , p.

57.
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is that the child can now evaluate the two dimensions, but without
coordinating them:

'More lemonade seen from the top (large diameter),

less seen from the side (smaller diameter).'"2^
POU clearly is at an advanced enough stage so that he is able to
quickly consolidate his reasoning and attain the conservation of con¬
tinuous quantity.

"In this case, the observable features of the

situation allow the child to make predictions and some explicit
inferences based on a chain of causal implications of the "if
then

'type, which in the child's language is expressed'

to have .

.

. there must be."

.

.

.

if you want

2S

Clearly, Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet interpret the advances in
reasoning demonstrated by this learning experiment to be due to the
status of the inferential mechanisms which are in a larger sense
determined by the child's level of competence.

They conclude that for

the child reasoning at a non-conservation level:
The lack of assimilation is not due to shortcomings in the
subject's powers of observation, but to the fact that
observable features are not integrated into inferential
mechanisms.
The way in which the intermediate-level subjects integrate
the observable features into inferential mechanisms and the
increasingly rapid progress made during Sub-Stage II provide
further support for our general hypothesis that sensitivity
to environmental cues and progress during training sessions
depend on the child's initial level of development, rather
than being independent of it, as in the case of a stimulusresponse type of learning theory.

2^Ibid., p.
2^Ibid., pp.

54.
57-58.
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Clearly, the transition between the level where a child does
not use the new observable features and that where he can
integrate them within a system of inferences is not abrupt.
In fact, the transition is made very gradually by means of
an increase in the retroactive corrections and accurate
predictions, which become interdependent.
Such predictions
are possible only when they are related to prior inferences.
In this particular case, it is interesting to note that
inferences are closely dependent on the corrections which
the child is able to make, retroactively, to his earlier
solutions.26
The description of the role of inference is, of course, not new or
unique to the work of Inhelder, et al., which is cited here.
in this work,

Earlier

it was pointed out that for Piaget the first glimmerings

of intentional cause and effect reasoning are seen in the latter of
the six sub-stages of the sensori-motor period.

It

is during the fifth

sub-stage of this period that experimental trial and error behavior
begins to appear.

This is, of course, prior to the age of two.

In the

sixth period of this stage, "invention of new means through mental com¬
bination" is seen.

These behaviors are of the first level of logic

introduced earlier, the "logic of action";

i.e., they are limited to

physical actions that the child actually carries out on his environ¬
ment .
This period is followed by the beginning of the symbolic period
of representation.

With the advent of representation, pre-inferential

or pre-logical connections are made through the logic of functions;
i.e.,

the child is able to explore cause and effect relations in a

functional manner.

26 Ibid., p.

59.

As the preoperational period is limited to
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perceptual relationships, the functions are also limited.

These func¬

tions are part of what Piaget described as the spatial continuum;
perceptual attributes such as length, density, etc.
between what is logical

i.e.,

"The difference

(or pre-logical) and what is sub-logical is

simply that the former deals with the relations between discontinuous
elements while the latter relates to elements forming part of a spatial
continuum."

27

Wohlwill (1962), in discussing some of Piaget's earlier references
to perception and pre-inference on the one hand and conceptual and
inference structures on the other, states that of the earlier stage
"the child's responses appear to be governed by particular aspects of
the stimulus field. "28

Wohlwill reports that Piaget and Morf

(1958)

see a similarity of form between perceptual structures and conceptual
structures as the title of their article demonstrates, "The Partial
Isomorphisms Between Logical Structures and Perceptual Structures."
"Like Werner

(1957), Piaget and Morf draw parallels between perceptual

groupings and conceptual classes;
(the constancies)

between invariance in perception

and in conception (the conservations); between the

perception of stimulus relationships and the conceptual representation
of relationships of a symbolic level.

For these authors, however,

these analogies, or isomorphisms, are only partial; they emphasize,

27Inhelder and Piaget, The Early Growth of Logic in the Child,
p.

282.

28Joachim Wohlwill, "From Perception to Inference:
A Dimension
of Cognitive Development," Child Development Monographs, 1962, 2, 83,
p.

93.
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rather, the ways in which perceptual mechanisms differ from the cor¬
responding inferential ones.

They point out that perceptual phenomenon

generally do not meet the requirements of the fundamental operation of
logic

(reversibility, additivity,

limited and approximate sense.'

transitivity, inversion)

except in a

?Q

Evident in the similarity of structure between perception and
conception is the fact that they are not the same and they do not lead
to the same end when a child employs them in his judgments.

This can

be related to the statement of Inhelder, et al., that "the lack of
assimilation (in the non-conserving child)

is not due to shortcomings

in the subject's powers of observation, but to the fact that observable
features are not integrated into inferential mechanisms."

Studies cited

earlier, which have explored length, density and number relations, sup¬
port this thesis; namely,

that the young child depends upon perceptual

structures which lead him to incorrect solutions with respect to what
is a logical problem of the conservation of number.

Prior to the

advent of the logical coordination of perceptual differentiations,
number conservation is not possible.

Other experimental evidence will

now be presented which more or less directly involves aspects of the
inference argument.

Identity and Equivalence Conservation
Elkind

(1967),

in an essay on the nature of Piaget's explanation

of conservation problems, wrote that most researchers had overlooked

^^Ibid., p.

93.
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a distinction which was previously made regarding identity and equiva¬
lence conservations.
Conservation problems involve presenting the child with an
equivalent variable (V) and a standard

(S)

then asked to judge if they are equivalent.

stimulus.

The child is

Then the variable stimu¬

lus is transformed V -> V', "which alters the perceptual but not the
quantitative equivalence between variable and standard."30

The child

is then asked to make a quantitative judgment of equivalence.
Elkind,

in the light of Piaget's previous explanations, states

that there is recognized here two essential types of conservation:
Conservation of Identity:
The datum of the conservation
problem, the judgment regarding the equality of inequality
of S and V', can be viewed as indicative of two different
forms of conservation.
First of all, the judgment could be
viewed as dealing with the conservation of a given weight,
length, number, etc., across a reversible transformation
and with respect to itself alone.
For example, suppose that
in the weight conservation problem described earlier, one
employed only a single ball of clay which was rolled into a
sausage, and the child was asked whether the clay was now
the same weight as before (i.e., Does V = V'?).
This would
be a direct assessment of what will hereafter be called
the 'conservation of identity.'
Conservation of Equivalence:
The conservation judgments,
however, can be viewed as assessing the child's knowledge
of the invariance of a quantitative relation (of equality,
inequality, etc.) across a transformation of one of the
elements of the relation.
It can be readily seen that the
standard conservation problem outlined above provides a
direct test of this form of conservation which will here¬
after be called the 'conservation of equivalence.'

3°David Elkind, "Piaget's Conservation Problems," Child
Development,
31

1967, 38, p.

Ibid., pp.

16-17.

16.
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Elkind then explains that the conservation of identity is the
necessary condition for the conservation of equivalence, that is,
before the child can make a comparison across objects, he first has to
have the notion that when V changes to V’
remains conserved.

it's amount, or weight, etc.

In order to do this, the child must be able to

"equate the differences" or be able to "compensate" the changes which
have taken place in the dimensions (increasing length Is compensated
for by decreasing width).

This is in part accomplished through retro¬

active changes in judgment which eventually lead to the idea of
invariance or conservation.

"It is thus clear that Piaget's discussion

of conservation is primarily aimed at explaining the conservation of
identity and not the conservation of equivalence.

That is to say, the

equation of differences refers to the compensation of changes within
one and the same object and not to the relation between the standard
and the variable directly assessed by the conservation problem."

32

The initial inferences are related to identity conservation when
the child discovers "that when the dimensions of a given quantity are
altered, the dimensional differences compensate one another and under¬
lies the child's insight that transformations are reversible and that
they leave the object

(property or quantity)

invariant."

33

Now that

the child has established the notion of invariance by means of deduc¬
tive reasoning, he can establish the conservation of equivalence

32Ibid. , p.

19.

33Ibid. , p.

19.
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(S - V').
(V

"This (V) was equal to that

(S) before, and the change

V') doesn't change anything, so this (V) must still equal this

„34
(S)."

The proposed order of development of the conservations was

first identity then equivalence conservation.
A number of studies were subsequently conducted in response to
Elkind's article.
Hooper

(1969)

tested six,

seven and eight-year-old children on

the two types of conservations, and formed that 66.7 percent of the
children in the identity conservation group conserved where 43.1 per¬
cent of the equivalence group conserved.

He concluded from the analy¬

sis of his data that

identity conservation definitely precedes equiva¬

lence conservation.

The results of Papalia and Hooper (1971) were

similar with respect to quantity conservations; however, they showed
no significant difference in number conservation.
Schwartz and Scholnick (1970)

found that identity judgments were

more easily made than were equivalence judgments with a conservation
of discontinuous quantity.

The children ranged in age from four years

and five months to six years and four months.

Although they obtained

the predicted order of the conservations, they interpret their results
as not due primarily to a logical difference as Elkind

(1967)

suggests,

but rather it was due more to the stimulus setting.
It has become increasingly apparent that conservation per¬
formance is affected by two major variables.
Many analy¬
ses of conservation stress the logic which enables S to

34Ibid. , p.

20.
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make some judgment about the invariance of a particular
quality of an object (Elkind, 1967; Wallach, 1969) and the
stimulus conditions under which the judgments are made;
namely, in the face of particular irrelevant transformation
(Gelman, 1969; Uzgirls, 1964).
The present scaling study
lends support to contentions that the elements in the
stimulus situation pose a major stumbling block in the
mastery of conservation of discontinuous quantity and to
the contention that the relative difficulty of each of the
sequence of logical judgments which make up conservation
also depends on the stimulus setting in which the judgment
is made.
Teets (1968), Northam and Gruen (1970), Murray (1970), Moynahan
and Glick (1972) have all shown generally that identity conservation
did not precede equivalence conservation.

Elkind and Schoenfeld

(1972)

point out that this distinction between the conservations was meant to
apply to preoperational children only and thus this would possibly
explain the difference in the data of Teets (1968) , Northam and Gruen
(1970), and Murray (1970), as primarily older children were used in
their study.

This explanation, however, would not apply to Moynahan

and Glick (1972) , as they tested children ranging in age from five
years and four months to seven years and six months on problems of
number, length, continuous quantity and weight.

Only for length was

there a significant tendency to possess identity conservation without
equivalence conservation.
Elkind and Schoenfeld

(1972) presented a series of four hypotheses

which might explain some of the difference.

35Marilyn Miller Schwartz and Ellen Kofsky Scholnick, "Scalogram
Analysis of Logical and Perceptual Components of Conservation of
Discontinuous Quantity," Child Development, 1970, 41, p. 702.
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(1)

Six-year-old children score significantly higher on
identity and equivalence conservation tests than do
four-year-old children.

(2)

Identity judgments are easier for four and six-yearold subjects (taken as a group) than are equivalence
judgments.

(3)

Success in making identity and equivalence judgments
varies with the type of conservation test in ques¬
tion (horizontal decal age).

(4) Four-year-old subjects score significantly higher on
identity-conservation tests than on equivalenceconservation tests but that this is not true for
six-year-old subjects.36
Four different conservation tasks were used to test these hypo¬
theses:

The conservation of number, of continuous

of mass, and of length.

(liquid) quantity,

Twenty-two pre-school children with a mean

age of four years and five months and twenty-two first-grade children
with a mean age of six years and 2.8 months were tested.

Six orders

of the words "more," "less," and "same" were used in phrasing the con¬
servation questions.
results.

All four hypotheses were supported in their

The difference between identity in equivalence conservation

was most pronounced for the young children.

The number conservation

test was found to be significantly easier than the other three.

They

hypothesize the difference between identity and equivalence conserva¬
tion is accounted for because,

"identity conservation is not truly

quantitative and involves only figurative perceptual processes (i.e.,
global quantitative judgments comparable to those used when a child

36David Elkind and Eva Schoenfeld, "Identity and Equivalence
Conservation at Two Age Levels," Developmental Psychology, 1972, 6,
3, pp.

530-531.
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judges a cluster of ten pennies as more than a cluster of six—because
of the perceptual impression of numerosity).

Equivalence conservation,

in contrast, requires the deductive processes made possible by conCrete operations."

37

Although they did not state this, their distinc¬

tion could very well explain the Mehler-Bever finding of a "conserva¬
tion" or "over-conservation" in very young children as the children
may be able at a young age to judge "more" on the basis of perceptual
numerosity.
In summary, an important distinction has been made between the
levels of conservation.

Identity conservation involves a global

quantification and a perceptually based inference mechanism, whereas
equivalence conservation appears later in development and involves a
deductive concrete operational form of inference.

Compensation
"Compensation refers to the recognition that material undergoing
a perceptual transformation in one dimension is accompanied by a
specific change in another dimension."

The recognition of the per¬

ceptual transformation relates directly to anticipatory and hence
retroactive judgments which have previously been presented as central
to the development of conservation.

The compensatory relationship

between dimensions is seen as a prerequisite for conservation and

3^Ibid. , p.

532.

38F. Curcio, E. Kattef, D. Levine and 0. Robbins, "Compensation
and Susceptibility to Conservation Training," Developmental Psychology,
1972,

7,

3, p.

259.

2.!‘)

hence was hypothesized by Piaget to appear before conservation reason¬
ing.

Piaget and Inhelder (1971) reported that, "In a sample of four

to eight-year-olds,

30 percent could not conserve nor could they

anticipate the direction of change in height; 42.5 percent passed both
tests;

22.5 percent could anticipate but could not conserve; whereas

only a small portion, 5 percent, could conserve but could not antici¬
pate."^
Curcio, Kattef, Levine and Robbins (1972) hypothesized in
response to these that possessing the ability to coordinate dimensions
should increase a child's susceptibility to conservation training.
Sixty-seven children, ranging in age from five years and four months
to six years and two months, were first pre-tested on their understand¬
ing of the words "more" and "same" and the ability to compensate height
and width dimensions and discontinuous quantity conservation.
levels were thus established.

Three

Non-conservers who understood the words

"more" and "same" were assigned to either an experimental or control
group.

In these groups, one further distinction was made between com¬

pensators and non-compensators.

Four groups were in effect created in

which both compensators and non-compensators either received or did not
receive training.

They found that "children who recognize a compensa¬

tory relationship between height-width dimensions are more susceptible
to conservation than children who do not recognize this relationship.

■^Ibid., p.

260.

^Ibid ., p.

263.
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Neither the compensators nor the non-compensation control groups made
conservation progress.

They also found that children who could

verbalize the principles underlying their height predictions were more
susceptible to conservation training.
Larsen and Flavell
of Bruner

(1970) attempted to reinterpret the results

(1966) , Cohen (1967) , Halford

(1968), Silverman and Marsh

(1969) , who concluded the ability to anticipate level changes in liquid
conservation which occurred at an earlier age in all their studies to
mean that "if abstract terms are avoided, conservation appears at an
earlier age than is found using the usual conservation tasks," i.e.,
conservation can be understood in terms of "action before it can be
grasped at a verbal descriptive level.The abstract terms referred
to here is the ability to anticipate the compensation of dimensions.
Citing a reference by Piaget and Inhelder

(1963), who provided

the first objection used by Larsen and Flavell, they point out that
"the anticipation-of-levels task is a test of the ability to compen¬
sate height and width relations rather than a test of conservation,"
as conservation requires that the child realize "that the quantity

n42
of a substance does not change with changes in dimensions."
Unfortunately,

their results shed little light on whether com¬

pensation is a prerequisite for conservation of length except to say

^Gary Larsen and John Flavell, "Verbal Factors in Compensation
Performance and the Relation Between Conservation and Conservation,"
Child Development, 1970, 41, p.
42

Ibid., p.

966.

966.
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that their results gave little support to the hypothesis of Piaget
and Inhelder

(1963).

They attribute this result to a lack of clarity

on Piaget and Inhelder's part as they were able to reinterpret their
data in a manner which is in conformity with the original conceptuali¬
zation by Piaget and Inhelder.
Halford and Fullerton (1970) used a discrimination task related
to compensation to induce number conservation in children.
they stated:

First

"It is only when the compensating relation between length

and spacing is recognized that number, length, and spacing becomes
mutually consistent ones."
In order to conserve number, the children must discover
the operations which determine number.
In the context of
the classicial conservation test, this means they must dis¬
cover that number is determined by correspondence, poten¬
tial or actual, to the standard, and not by length or spac¬
ing unless these two compensate each other.
(They refer
here to Piaget's dolls and bed conservation test.)
The S
must discover that if number is constant, an increase or
decrease in length is compensated by the opposite change in
spacing.
Thus, length and spacing are not ignored as cues.
If both length and spacing are taken into account together,
and seen as compensating one another, then they are quite
consistent with number.
Then, and only then, can number be
seen as the determinant of the size of the collection.
Their theorization,
an invariant, "length,

in short,

is that unless and until number is

spacing, and counting provide antagonistic

cues,"^ and that the compensatory relation is established when the
child brings number, length and spacing into relationship.

This is, of

43G. S. Halford and T. J. Fullerton, "A Discrimination Task Which
Induces Conservation of Number," Child Development, 1970, 41, p. 206.
44

Ibid., p.

206.
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course, a different relationship than Piaget has proposed for he
establishes that the compensatory relation between perceptual dimen¬
sions,

such as length and spacing (density), occurs prior to number

becoming an invariant.
They were able to induce conservation in two-thirds of their non¬
conserving subjects by using a form of provoked one-to-one correspon¬
dence training between dolls and beds.

The children were required to

discriminate between sets which vary in extent, spacing and number
in order to select a set which matches the beds in number."45
argued that "the property of
respondence'

’reversibility' or

They

’(potential) cor¬

to a standard set has a role resembling that of a dis-

criminative stimulus."

A6

shown that the transformed

"Reversibility" was involved when it was
(lengthened) row of beds no longer in one-

to-one correspondence with the dolls, for example, could be shown to
be equal in number simply by placing the dolls on the beds, or a
return to numerical equivalence by provoked correspondence.
Their results shed little light on the role of the compensatory
relationship in number conservation for they depended heavily upon
correspondence which was presented with other potentially conflicting
ones with length and density.
conservation,

As their pre-test was one of number

they did not separate out the children as other studies

have who could anticipate the effects of transformation (compensation)

45Ibid. , p.

210.

46Ibid., p.

211.
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but still not conserve number.

They argue, of course, that until

number is invariant there can be no compensation.

Also, the mean age

of their subjects was six years and three months, which is the age at
which children naturally attain number conservation.

Provoked cor¬

respondence then could have been the determining factor and not a com¬
pensatory relationship.
In summary,

the research results on the role of compensatory and

anticipatory judgments does not seem to be conclusive, with the
exception that compensatory judgments do occur prior to the conserva¬
tions under study and from the Curcio, et al.

(1972)

study, children

acquire conservation reasoning more easily and sooner if they can
compensate.

The role that Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet

(1974) attri¬

bute to compensatory judgments in the form of anticipations and retro¬
active corrections has, in general, received little experimental
attention.

Theirs, however,

is a compelling argument, especially when

the protocols of the children cited are examined.

In addition, the

remainder of' their work, a portion of which remains to be reported on
here, gives further support to the role of the child's ability to
anticipate the effect of transformations.

Conflict and Compromise

One of the major findings of Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet s study
was that certain conceptual schemes can be manipulated and applied in
training studies such that they are brought into direct conflict with
other schemes.

The child,

in an attempt to solve the problem at hand,
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draws upon principles inherent in each scheme and due to their incom¬
patibility (until they are coordinated or integrated in a higher order
relationship)

induce conflict in the child's thinking and compromise

solutions and judgments which clearly do not solve the problem.

The

realization of the conflict on the part of the child provides part of
the impetus needed to go on and resolve the schemes.
The responses observed in the conservation of length train¬
ing study clarify the general processes underlying the
transition to a higher level of reasoning.
Both in espe¬
cially contrived situations and in normal everyday life con¬
flicts can arise between different conceptual schemes, some
of which are more developed than others.
A first effort to
combine and reconcile the conflicting schemes results in
inadequate compromises, which indicate the beginning of a
coordination between certain previously unconnected schemes.
Subsequently, the various schemes are integrated into a new
and more advanced cognitive structure.
. . . Once particu¬
lar conceptual schemes are known to be applied in certain
situations, it is possible to devise problems that activate
these schemes and to induce conflicts by comparing solutions
based on different principles

.^

The specific schemes referred to above were elementary number conserva¬
tion and the conservation of length.
Several interesting points are made.

Prior to number conserva¬

tion, which is the first of the conservations to appear as we have
seen,

the lack first of the differentiation and then the lack of the

coordination of the differentiation of number, length and density (a
dependence upon topological relations) do not disappear at the time of
elementary number conservation being attained, as these same factors
tend to operate in the various conservations studied—conservation of

A7Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of
Cognition, p.

166.
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continuous quantity, conservation of physical matter and form of con¬
tinuous quantity, and the conservation of length.

Children, even

after number conservation, tend still to be confused by the "going
beyond" judgment, as in length conservation.
To emphasize the point, number, particularly the stage of the
arithmetization of number,

is built slowly from the elementary number

conservation.
Also,

in a fascinating series of experiments, they explore the

relationship and effect that number and its use have upon various
conservations.

In essence,

structures which are at least partly

logically connected are brought into relationships with one another.
This often leads to conflict and an important dimension of a child’s
thinking in the intermediate stages when conflict is most prevalent
to compromise solutions.

The Elaboration of the ANISA Theory of Development

A complex interaction of internal structures, internal processes,
and the environment characterize the developmental theories of both
ANISA and Piaget.

The broad tenents of the two theories, although in

no way identical, are basically compatible.

ANISA has specified the

nature of man and has more broadly investigated and synthesized the
multitude of dimensions which are crucial to the development of the
human being.

Piaget, on the other hand, has to a much greater degree

investigated and theorized about the nature of the development of
knowledge as it applies to perception and cognition.

It is on the
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basis of this specificity that the elaboration of aspects of the ANISA
Theory of Development are undertaken.

Learning Competence and Equilibration

Learning competence is seen as a parallel conceptualization to
equilibration, although there are important philosophical differences.
The essential feature of learning competence is that it involves gain¬
ing conscious control over the processes of learning.

Equilibration

is seen as an "intrinsic and constitutive property of organic and
mental life."^8

In the same sense, consciousness and conscious con¬

trol are seen by ANISA as intrinsic and constitutive properties of the
human being.

Equilibration is, however, described as an auto-

regulatory mechanism, whereas conscious control represents an act of
intention, of will.

Auto-regulation is not interpreted by Piaget,

however, as meaning that it happens automatically; rather, the type of
equilibration which can occur is fundamentally dependent upon the level
of competence or the stage of development which reflects the functional
status of the internal structures.

As a consequence, equilibration is

not a static form but changes as development occurs.

Equilibration

functions as a regulatory mechanism whose function it is to preserve
the integrity of the mental structures, yet at the same time extend
them to the next level of development.

ed.
p.

^8Jean Piaget, Six Psychological Studies, trans. Anita Tenser,
David Elkind (New York:
Vintage Book Edition, Random House, 1967),
102.
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The organism has special organs of equilibrium.
The same
is true of mental life, whose organs of equilibrium are
special regulatory mechanisms.
This is so at all levels
of development, from the elementary regulations of motiva¬
tion (needs and interests) up to will for affectivity, and
from perceptual and sensori-motor regulations up to opera¬
tions for cognition.
We shall see that the role of opera¬
tions is to anticipate the intrusions which modify all of
the representative systems and to compensate for them.
This
is accomplished by the complete reversibility which charac¬
terizes operational mechanisms, as opposed to the semi¬
reversibility of the regulatory mechanisms of preoperational thought.^
The twin functions of preservation and extension were introduced
in Chapter Two as describing two levels of equilibration.
homeorhesis and homeostasis.

They were

The former is an elementary form of

equilibration which characterizes the early stages of developmental
formation of the structures, whereas,
in the mature system.

the second, homeostasis, functions

Further, each structure develops its own rules

of transformation through which equilibration functions.

This was par¬

ticularly evident in the research on the various forms of conservation
among which there is a basic structural similarity, yet they develop
at different times and can even be manipulated to create internal cogni¬
tive conflict between them.
pensation,

Through anticipation, compromise and com¬

the conflicts are resolved and a new and higher level of

synthesis is present.
Learning competence for ANISA functions in a similar manner.
Learning to learn is dependent upon the state of competence of the
internal structures,

49 Ibid. , p.

102.

i.e., conscious control over the fundamental

238

processes of learning is gradually structured.

The conscious control

over the processes of learning would involve similar mechanisms of
anticipation, compromise, compensation reasoning.

These mechanisms

describe the type of integrations and generalizations the child is able
to make at this stage of development.
The role of reversibility was discussed in the introductory sec¬
tions of this chapter.

During preoperative thought, there is a gradual

dissociation of form and content until in operative thought a logical
deductive frame of reference prevails.

This logical frame of reference

relates to the child's own internal actions.

The gradual refinement

of reversibility reasoning first in the form of approximate judgments
or integrations and last in the form of logical reversibility would
also be true for ANISA as a description of the fundamental changes in
the conscious ability to control differentiations, integrations and
generalizations.
The equilibration model is important to education for it is the
basis upon which Piaget distinguishes between two levels of activity
which contribute to development.
situations,

Piaget limits learning to specific

to provoked interactions which are, for example, under the

control of the teacher.

The process of equilibration underlies the

second and major contribution to development;

i.e., Piaget argues that

there is an aspect to development which is not subject to manipulation,
rather it is the child's own internal mental functioning or activity
which is responsible for the major transitions in reasoning which
occurs through the stages.

In a sense, Piaget argues for recognition
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of the child's ovm activity in the process of development.

Efforts to

overcome conflict, through trial and error, through retroactive cor¬
rections, through compromise, and through compensation, functions to
coordinate the structures of knowledge and bring on a new stage of
thinking.

These kinds of activity cannot be accounted for if develop¬

ment is conceived to be due to either maturational factors solely or
due to the summation of a set of discrete learning expriences defined
in the narrow sense.

Neither requires a level of internal functioning.

Equilibratory mechanisms then are seen to develop gradually and
are limited by each stage of development.

Much of the research on num¬

ber has substantiated this aspect of stage, each of which is charac¬
terized by a definable type of reasoning.

This was particularly evi¬

dent in the research by Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet

(1974) where they

showed over and over again that the effect of various training proce¬
dures depended primarily upon the state of competence or the state of
development of the assimilatory scheme.
example,

At earlier levels, for

they were not even able to induce conflict in the child when

presented with clearly (to the adult) contradictory responses; while
for children at a more advanced level, the differential aspects of the
situation were grasped and conflict was created, although the resolu¬
tion of the conflict in many children had to await further development,
i.e., had to await equilibration activity by the child.
The fact that many subjects progressed as a result of the
training procedures and that in most cases this progress
resulted in stable acquisitions is in itself sufficient to
show that progress cannot stem from maturation alone; if
it is possible, through adequate exercises, to shorten the
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intervals which 'normally1 (according to the standards
established through statistical studies) separate the suc¬
cessive cognitive stages, then development cannot be
explained in terms of a genetically pre-established pro¬
gram with no modification resulting from the environment.
Quite to the contrary, insofar as it is possible to compare
learning achieved as a result of training procedures with
that occurring over a greater time span in everyday life,
the results demonstrate the importance of the interactions
between a subject's tendency to assimilate reality and the
reality with which he is brought into contact, and the
importance of general stimulation of his mental processes
when opportunities for action and reflection are numerous.^
Stimulation of the child's mental processes, of his own conception
of reality,

is clearly accomplished through training procedures which

utilized uncoordinated members of what eventually will be a major
structure of knowledge.

Bringing these into relationship in an educa¬

tional setting would constitute for ANISA a description of the educa¬
tional process through which an optimum rate of development is achieved.
The technique used by Inhelder, et al., is summarized in the following
statement,

the general principles of which will later be used to sug¬

gest ways to support number development.
Conflict is introduced into procedures by confronting the
subjects with the discrepancy between their predictions and
the experimental outcome, or, as in logical or logicomathematical problems, between sub-systems of the child's
own reasoning.
A typical example is that of the child who,
in the number and length experiment, thinks he can make his
road the same length as the model simply by using the same
number of matchsticks, ignoring the fact that his matches are
not of the same length.
In the particularly clear situation
where parallel roads are laid out one directly above the
other, he realizes that his solution is wrong, and why, but
this does not help him solve the problem in the other

50Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, Learning and the Development of
Cognition, p.

266.

I
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situations, unless a certain competence in the coordination
of schemes (comparing different ideas and their respective
results) is already present.
They go on to state that this type of experience for the child
(the experience of discrepancies between one's predictions and ideas)
is clearly an important dimension in the acquisition of knowledge.
Again,

it is important to recognize, however, that this technique was

successful at a particular level of development.

This type of pre¬

diction and the inferential mechanisms evoked are typical of the child
who is passing from a preoperational form of reasoning to an opera¬
tional form.

The state of competency,

the state of the pre-logical

to logical or pre-inferential to inferential forms of reasoning,
determines the potential use of regulations or mechanisms which are
present.
Before proceeding further with the analysis of learning principles
important to ANISA, the integration of learning competence with the
general notion of equilibration can be undertaken.

Implications

It,

indeed,

seems reasonable at this point to state that the

gradual control which the child is able to exercise over his environ¬
ment and his own internal actions of thought as described by the
mechanism of equilibration must,
ing how to learn.

51 Ibid., p.

in part, be what is inherent in learn¬

The gradual transition from recognitive abstraction

267.
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to reflective abstraction; from object permanence to the logic of
action (early form of causal reasoning—trial and error), to the logic
of functions, to the mature forms of logic; from retroactive correc¬
tions, to predictions (anticipation and implication), to compensatory
reasoning; must all be examples of the growing process of control over
one’s thinking processes.

In this sense they constitute the learning

how to learn of logico-mathematical thought in general and number in
specific.

As Piaget intended them, these functions are not learned in

the strict sense, for one cannot teach a child, for example, to make
a compensation between the topological dimensions of length, density
and height.

They are not taught or learned in the strict sense because

they occur as properties of a particular stage of development of a
specific level of competence, and because they are the result of the
child's own mental activity.
The ANISA Theory of Development is, as stated previously, not
based upon a Piagetian definition in the narrow sense but rather cor¬
responds to the broad definition of development.

Therefore, these

same learning processes and conscious control over them would suggest
that they can be taught in an ANISA sense; i.e., after accurately
diagnosing the level of competence of the child, a specific learning
experience would be introduced by the teacher in order to induce a
new level of differentiation, integration and generalization.
Earlier, Piaget was quoted as having rejected the idea that a
child can learn to equilibrate.

To reiterate, "a new scheme is the

product of learning in the strict sense, insofar as it results from the

243

differentiation of a previous scheme and insofar as this differentia¬
tion involves an accommodation that depends on experience.

But for

this learning to take place, there must exist previous schemes that
can be differentiated during the assimilation of new objects.

More¬

over, the structure of these schemes and the assimilation, considered
strictly as the prerequisite of the structure, are pre-conditions and
not the products of learning.

In a word, learning relates to the

content of the schematism while the generalizable character of its
form does not result from learning but is a necessary condition for
the functioning of the schemes.
It would appear paradoxical to be describing the characteristics
of learning to learn on the one hand and at the same time stating that
it cannot be learned.

This is true only in the sense that Piaget

limits learning to apply to some didactic point or to be manipulated
by the teacher.

In the larger sense, the development of regulatory

mechanisms which apply universally across an entire set of structures
or stage are developed as a result of the child's efforts.

It is also

reasonable in the sense that for ANISA learning is not limited to the
empiricist conception of learning, which holds that development is the
sum of discrete learning episodes, as learning is defined in a broad
(equilibration—learning to learn)

sense.

Therefore, for ANISA the

effect of manipulation and intervention on the part of the teacher is
not limited to a didactic or content oriented experience, but is rather.

52Furth, Piaget and Knowledge, p.

236.

i
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defined in a manner which involves the regulatory mechanisms of a par¬
ticular structure or stage of reasoning.

This is so because the

Developmental Theory of ANISA recognizes, as does Piaget, that the
actualization of potentiality is due to a complex interaction of
internal structures,

internal processes and the environment.

Now that the basic compatibility of the equilibration mechanisms
with that of the learning to learn mechanisms has been established, a
specific analysis of the learning to learn of number can be undertaken.

What Is the Learning to Learn of Number?

The problem of "What is the learning to learn of number?" is simi¬
lar to the basic problem posed by Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet

(1974),

that being "the major concern of the present work is to discover the
processes of integration that result in novel types of behavior; these
will be studied by means of a method based on learning."
question was asked in another way,

The same

"What are the regulatory mechanisms

which govern the transition from one stage of development to the next?"
The fundamental starting point for these studies included several
assumptions:

(1)

"The basic hypothesis of developmental constructivism

(Piaget, 1960) postulates that no human knowledge, with the obvious
exception of very elementary hereditary forms,
structures of the subject or the object";54

is preformed in the

(2) There is a continuity

53Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet, "Learning and the Development of
Cognition," p.

8.

54Ibid., p.

8.
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between functions at a lower level and those of a more advanced level;
(3)

Piaget proposes a single explanatory principle to account for the

transformations that lead to novel types of behavior that characterize
each successively more complex stage of development.

This principle is

based on regulatory or auto-regulatory mechanisms which account for the
structure of the different cognitive stages of various levels of
complexity and their mode of construction";

(4)

"All regulations

that take place during biological growth and psychological development
are constructive processes and not just a means of preserving an already
attained equilibrium; and all constructive processes imply compensating
activities that counteract disturbances in equilibrium";56 (5)

"Con¬

cepts do not develop in closed systems but are in constant interaction
with each other—even though for methodological reasons they are
studied separately—and it is this interaction that accounts for the
child's progress during learning experiences."

They do not see the

problem of interaction as one of transfer but is better thought of in
terms of "extension of fields of operativity."57
Posing the same question for ANISA, i.e., "What are the regulatory
mechanisms which govern the transition from one level to another?"
or "What are the processes of integration that result in novel types
of behavior?" would produce the following set of assumptions on which

55Ibid., pp.

8-

56Ibid. , P-

10

57Ibid. , P-

15

to base an answer.
(1) Learning is the key to the release of human potentiality.

Potentiality does not imply preformed

structures, nor preformed knowledge.

Potentiality

does imply, however, that there is a latent capacity
of each individual to express certain unique charac¬
teristics in addition to common characteristics.
ANISA then would depart with a hypothesis of develop¬
ment constructivism to the extent that an interaction
also occurs with respect to a latent but undeveloped
capacity.
(2) The development of conscious control over the
processes of learning constitutes learning compe¬
tence or learning how to learn.

Conscious control

changes as development proceeds but is nonetheless
an inherent characteristic or prime causal factor
behind all human activity.

It is not auto-regulated

or system governed in the sense that the degree of
conscious control relates to a person's general
state of well-being, to his state of "effectance,"
and because of that relationship, development can
be accelerated or retarded as the state of well¬
being is changed or effected.
(3) The processes of learning competence are differen¬
tiation,

integration and generalization.

Conscious

control is exercised over the capacity to abstract
(differentiate) or select from what is either
stored in one’s memory about the process of learn¬
ing experienced earlier that is relevant to the
present learning task and apply it appropriately
to the task.

To do this appropriately will involve

some kind of association (integration) of the dif¬
ferentiated or abstracted aspects of previous
learning processes with the requirements of the
present task.

This would essentially constitute a

learning of the regulatory mechanisms or a learning
of equilibratory mechanisms.

As noted previously,

this type of learning is not like Piaget's learning
in the narrow sense but is more like his learning
in the broad sense which is equivalent to develop¬
ment .
(4) A continuity between functions at a lower level and
those at a more advanced level, as for Piaget, are
necessarily implied by learning competence.
(5) Also, as for Piaget,

concepts develop in a constant

interaction with each other.

In the sense that

every object of the environment is assimilated into
an already existent scheme, and therefore knowledge
is an action,

then for ANISA interaction with the

environment also accounts for the child's progress
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during development.

58

Learning competence defined as conscious control over basic pro¬
cesses of development is fundamentally an expression of selfactualization—an expression of creativity guided by purposive activity.
Creativity is then the fundamental dynamic which expresses itself as
purposive activity.
is being gained
activity.

Subjective confirmation that learning competence

(effectance)

serves to reinforce and direct conscious

This view does not exclude equilibration as a means of

explaining the construction of development but transcends and incorpo¬
rates it.

The central problem then of distinguishing learning compe¬

tence or the learning to learn of number from equilibratory mechanisms
is to account for development as an activity expressive of purposive
and conscious activity.

What Is the Role of Differentiation, Integration
and Generalization?

In pursuit of the general goal of determining "What is the learn¬
ing to learn of number?" the role of differentiation, integration and
generalization must be accounted for, as they are the central processes
hypothesized in the ANISA Theory of Development through which conscious
control or learning competence is gained.

It has already been suggested

that the mechanisms of equilibration describe generally the means by
which the child

is able to exercise control over his interaction with

^Daniel C. Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human
Potential," p.

56.
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the environment and his own internal actions of thought.

They

generally involve the transition from recognitive abstraction to
reflective abstraction, the transition from the logic of action to the
logic of functions to the mature forms of logic; retroactive correcbions to predictions (anticipation and implication), to compensatory
reasoning.

To relate these forms of transition to the processes of

differentiation,
explained.

integration and generalization now remains to be

First, the definition of learning competence is stated

again as it describes the framework for the manner in which differen¬
tiation,

integration and generalization function.

Learning competence then refers to a capacity to abstract
(differentiate) or select from what is stored in one’s
memory about the process of learning experienced earlier
that is relevant to a present learning task and apply it
appropriately to the task.
To do this 'appropriately' will
involve some kind of association (integration) of the dif¬
ferentiated or abstracted aspects of previous learning
processes with the requirements of a present task.59
Generalization would involve the application of the integration
processes of learning to wider fields of application.

It is interest¬

ing to note that in subsequent ANISA publications after this initial
definition was advanced, the definition of learning competence has
been changed.

Careful reading of the first definition reveals that it

clearly refers to the differentiation and integration of the process
of learning, whereas the later definition refers to the differentiation,
integration and generalization of experience.

5Daniel C. Jordan, "Learning Competence and the Release of Human
Potential," Unpublished Manuscript, Xerox, December 1971, p. 56.
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We thus detine learning eonpcM eneo as t hr :iM l i t v i .> .Ml
ferentiate experience, whether internal or external, into
separate elements, to integrate them in a new way, thereby
providing new information, new feelings, new skills and new
perceptions which may or may not become expressed immedi¬
ately in some form of overt behavior, and to generalize the
integration. 0
Later definitions clarify that learning competence rests on the
conscious ability to differentiate,
ing processes or experience.

integrate and generalize the learn¬

For ANISA, then, the meaning of a learning

process and that which constitutes internal or external experience are
equivalent concepts,

i.e.,

that which is intended by an internal

experience or an internal structure for ANISA conditions the type of
learning process which the child employs.

As was the problem with a

narrow and broad definition of learning and development for Piaget,
so also a similar problem arises when the Piagetian definitions of
experience and memory are considered.

Piaget defines both of these

concepts in a broad and narrow sense, and as was the case for learning,
ANISA recognizes and uses them in the broad sense.

Therefore, it is

not a matter of a conceptual difference between the two theories but
is a matter of the definition of terms.
Experience, no matter tiow presented or managed, is for Piaget an
insufficient mechanism for the construction of an operative structure
such as the conservation of physical substance.
of Development and Learning,

states:

60Jordan and Streets, "The ANISA Model:
Education Planning," p.

297.

Piaget, in his essay

A New Basis for
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Experience of objects, of physical reality, is obviously
a basic factor in the development of cognitive structures.
But once again this factor does not explain everything.
I
can give two reasons for this.
The first reason is that
some of the concepts which appears at the beginning of the
stage of concrete operations are such that I cannot see how
they could be drawn from experience.
... My second objec¬
tive to the sufficiency of experience as an explanatory
factor is that this notion of experience is a very equivocal
one.
There are, in fact, two kinds of experience which are
psychologically very different and this difference is very
important from a pedagogical point of view.
It is because
of the pedagogical importance that I emphasize this distinc¬
tion.
First of all, there is what I shall call physical
experience, and secondly, what I shall call logicomathematical experience. 1
The first objection Piaget discusses, an example involving the
conservation of substance,
of plasticene.

is the case of changing the shape of a ball

This is the same example which has been discussed

previously, where the ball shape is changed to a sausage shape and the
child is asked, "Is it the same amount?"

To ascertain other aspects of

the conservation of substances, he added two more questions:
it have the same weight?" and "Does it have the same volume?"

"Does
Piaget

points out that weight conservation can simply be shown to the child
by weighing it before and after the transformation.
of weight, it would seem,
experience.

The conservation

can then be gained as a direct result of

He uses a similar explanation of volume conservation by

stating that the volume which the plasticene displaces submerged in
water before and after the transformation can be shown to be the same;
hence, volume conservation could result directly from experience.
then states,

He

"Through perception you can get at the weight of the ball

blpiaget, "Development and Learning," p. 188.
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or the volume of the ball but perception cannot give an idea of the
amount of substance.

No experiment, no experience, can show the child

that there is the same amount of substance.
The reason that the conservation of substance cannot be simply
shown is that it must become a logical necessity which involves
coordination of the three rules,
bility.

identity, compensation and reversi¬

The child must realize that it is the same substance, that

nothing has been added or subtracted

(identity), and that the changes

in one dimension are compensated for by the change in another dimen¬
sion.

Finally,

reversed;

the child must know that the transformation can be

i.e., the substance can be returned to its original state.

This reasoning is clearly linked to the notion of operative knowing
where the child’s own internal schema act upon the "experience" trans¬
forming it with respect to the rules of the schema.
Piaget’s second objection to the sufficiency of experience explana¬
tion relates to the distinction between physical experience and logicomathematical experience.
above.

In fact, it is the same argument clarified

"Physical experience consists of acting upon subjects and

drawing some knowledge about the objects by abstraction from the
objects.
watch,

For example, to discover that this pipe is heavier than this

the child will weigh them both and find the difference in the

objects themselves.

This experience in the usual sense of the term—

in the sense used by empiricists but not ANISA people."

^Ibid. } p. 188.
63Ibid. , p.

188.
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is a second type of experience which I shall call logico-mathematical
experience where the knowledge is not drawn from the objects, but is
drawn by the actions effected upon the objects.
thing.

This is not the same

When one acts upon objects, the objects are indeed there, but

there is also the set of objects which modify the objects.

He

illustrates this second kind of experience which modifies the object
by using an example involving the conservation of number.

He reports

that a mathematician friend of his, when a boy of four or five, dis¬
covered that the number of objects in a set remained the same no
matter how he arranged or counted them.

First, the boy arranged ten

pebbles in a row and counted them left to right (one, two, three .
ten).

Then he counted them right to left

They were the same.
first clockwise,
same.

(ten .

.

Then he arranged them in a circle and counted

then counter-clockwise and the total remained the

"Now what did he discover?

pebbles had no order.

He did not discover a property of

that the sum was independent of the order.

He discovered

... He discovered a

property of actions and not a property of pebbles."
point out that what,

The

It was his action which introduced a linear

order or a cyclical order, or any kind of an order.

He goes on to

in fact, was discovered was a mathematical deduc¬

"The subsequent deduction will consist of interiorizing these

6^Ibid., p.

.

. three, two, one).

pebbles; he discovered a property of the action of ordering.

tion.

.

188.
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actions and then of combining them without needing any pebbles."65
This is a classic example and distinction for Piaget when dif¬
ferentiating what can be gained from learning in the narrow sense and
what involves operative knowing in the equilibration or broad sense.
It is an important example also,
the nature of the operation.

in fact, it is a clear example, of

The pedagogical significance of this is

that physical experience or action on objects does not lead to a logicomathematical deduction.

This type of deduction must await the develop¬

ment or construction of more advanced and internalized structures
which possess their own rules of transformation.

In an ANISA sense,

it offers a clear distinction of the inception of a truly internalized
conscious control over processes which regulated the child’s interaction
with the environment.

The type of conscious control over the processes

which regulate interaction are clearly cast within the framework of the
stages of development, the characteristics of which have been exhaus¬
tively illustrated previously.
Piaget concludes his discussion in this article by delineating
the role of learning when considered from a pedagogical and didactic
perspective.

He states:

"My first conclusion is that learning of

structures seems to obey the same laws of the natural development of
these structures.

In other words, learning is subordinated to develop¬

ment and not vice-versa."66

65Ibid., pp.

He goes on to establish within the

188-189.

66Ibid. , p. 194.

I
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framework three criteria for those educators interested in teaching
operational structures:

(1) "Is the learning lasting?";

generalization is possible?";

(3)

(2)

"How much

"In the case of each learning experi¬

ence, what was the operational level of the subject before the experi¬
ence and what more complex structures has the learning succeeded in
achieving?"^7
My second conclusion is that the fundamental relation
involved in all development and all learning is not the
relation of association.
In the stimulus-response schema,
the relation between the response and the stimulus is under¬
stood to be one of association.
In contrast to this, I
think that the fundamental relation is one of assimilation.
Assimilation is not integration of any sort of reality into
a structure, and it is this assimilation which seems to me
fundamental in learning, and which seems to me the funda¬
mental relation from the point of view of pedagogical or
didactic applications.
All of my remarks today represent
the child and the learning subject as active.
An operation
is an activity.
Learning is possible only when there is
active assimilation.
It is this activity on the part of
the subject which seems to me underplayed in the stimulusresponse schema.
The presentation which I propose puts
the emphasis on the idea of self-regulation, on assimila¬
tion.
All the emphasis is placed on the activity of the
subject himself, and I think that without this activity
there is no possible didactic or pedagogy which signifi¬
cantly transforms the subject.
Before relating this discussion to a definition of learning compe¬
tence, one last distinction remains to be made.

The first definition

of learning competence used the word memory, and it was implied in the
second.

In an effort to further clarify assimilation, and association

in a stimulus-response sense, Piaget states that the issue of

67Ibid. , p.
6®Ibid., pp.

194.
194-195.
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conservation schemata and the manner of their function is not a matter
of calling or evoking from the memory a figurative aspect but is more
strictly speaking a problem of assimilation into the schemata.
The problem of the conservation of the schemata is not,
properly speaking, a problem of memory, unless the mean¬
ing of the term is extended in an unwarranted way, for the
schema of an action, being the transferable or generalizable quality in the action, is self-conserving; the memory
of a schema is thus nothing more or less than the schema
itself, and so there is no need to talk of 'memory1 in con¬
nection with it except insofar as to show the schema to be
an instrument of memory.
On the other hand, memory in the
strict sense of the term, which is to say recognition or
evocation ... is simply the figurative aspect of this
conservation of schemata-figurative in the sense of some¬
thing perceived (recognized) or imagined (evocation by a
memory-image).69
Memory in the strict sense then for Piaget refers to calling forth
the perceptual or figurative sense of something.

The association or

integration of this aspect of experience from memory is closely associ¬
ated with stimulus-response strategies.

The role of the conservation

schemata or operation is clearly for Piaget not functional in a
stimulus-response framework.
The distinctions between broad and narrow definitions of experience
and memory were developed by Piaget in an effort to distinguish con¬
structivist notions of development from empiricist conceptions.

The

ANISA Theory of Development is conceived in a manner parallel with that
of Piaget's constructivist notions of development, therefore, the
second definition of learning competence, as it is presented stated,

69 Piaget, Biology and Knowledge, p.

187.
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cannot be misread as a stimulus-response statement;

i.e., it cannot be

read in the narrow sense of the definition of experience and memory.
This is so for the simple reason that both experience and memory are
defined for ANISA in the broad sense of the terms.

In this framework,

ANISA for Piaget would stretch or extend the meaning of the term
memory in an "unwarranted way."
of competence,

Memory for ANISA refers to the level

to the specific structures which the child has con¬

structed through his external and internal experience.

For ANISA,

therefore, experience can be a logico-mathematica1 activity, as it can
also relate to simple figurative, perceptual, or qualitative differen¬
tiations.

The definition of experience then for ANISA involves the

role of cognitive structures or assimilatory schemata, as it does for
Piaget.

The major cause of developmental progress for both ANISA and

Piaget is attributed to the actions of the child's own internal struc¬
tures.

Learning competence then would refer to the child's growing

ability to employ or "appropriately" utilize the structures in new
situations.

The conscious use of these structures is gradually

attained and becomes fully conscious in the formal operational stage
where thinking is propositional or hypothetico-deductive.

Within the

framework of all of these considerations, a definition of learning
competence is advanced.
Learning competence refers to the child's growing capacity
to select or differentiate the appropriate assimilatory
schema and to integrate that structure with other struc¬
tures thereby transforming the present state of develop¬
ment into a new and higher ordered structure and thereby
generalizing the integration.

258

Within the context of this definition, the child's ability to resolve
conflicts between structures through compromise (retroactive corrections
and predictions) and compensation judgments would characterize elements
which come under the conscious control of the child at the age under
study in the period of the development of logico-mathematical thought.
Also within the context of this definition, the assimilatory schema
would govern what the child differentiates and integrates from, for
example, the perceptual field.

An example of the application of this

definition follows.

Differentiation, Integration and Generalization of the
Conservation of Number

First, it is important to state that the differentiations, inte¬
grations and generalizations are conditioned by the state of compe¬
tence, by the stage of the development of the assimilatory schema.
Second, conscious control is contingent upon the stage of development
of logic and inference mechanisms.
In the stage of gross quantification (Stage I of the conserva¬
tion of number) , the assimilatory schema is characterized by the
general conditions of a sense of numerosity, by the general topological
aspect of the objects dealt with as being "smaller" or "larger" or
"more" or "less."

The child's figurative differentiations are topo¬

logically oriented and are restricted to the perceptual field as
opposed to a logical field.

Differences are perceived as relative

to one another and are not specific.

Hence, when asked about the
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equality of two rows of discrete elements, one row of which is longer
than the other, as for example

.

, the child applies a

schema of relative size, hence he claims the longer row has more.

At

this stage, length, density and number have not been incorporated into
a logical structure, hence, there is nothing wrong from the child’s
judgmental perspective with the assertion that the longer row has
more.

The child simply applies his sense of gross quantification to

all problems or situations which require it, and to him his conclusions
make sense even if they are wrong.
The child then enters the intuitive stage of qualitative cor¬
respondence where he realizes that it is no longer a simple matter of
the application of a general gross and undifferentiated sense of
quantity, but as in the case of quotity reasoning, the child sees that
he can count the elements in each set and they equal each other.
Because number still does not exist as a conserved unit, however, the
child in the face of an overwhelming topological difference will fall
back to the judgments used in the previous stage; i.e., that of the
quality of gross quantity or bigness being determined by perception
of length.

However, the conflict produced by this use of perceptual

criteria in light of what should be an equal number established on the
basis of counting is clearly unsettling for the child.

Because number

is not yet conceived to be a logical necessity, the child has no means
available to resolve the conflict.

During this stage, however, the

child begins to dissociate (differentiate) length, density and number
from each other and from the prior dominance of gross quantity and
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begins to apply compensation judgments; i.e., an increase in length
is compensated for by a decrease in density.
fore,

Conscious control, there¬

is suggested by the manner in which the child adopts schemes

which act to resolve the conflict.
In the last stage, number invariances becomes a logical necessity
and identity, compensation and reversibility arguments are employed to
justify answers.
The conservation of number then provides a good example of the
appropriate application of the developing assimilatory schema, of the
rules of the developing structures to wider fields of application
(integration).

The following diagram illustrates the general nature

of the coordinations from one stage to the next.

Stage I

Stage II

Perceptually-Based Gross Discrimination

tolt

Intuitive-Transition Stage of
Qualitative Correspondence
to

Stage III

Operational Number Conservation

During the intuitive or transitional stage, the child vacillates
between the perceptual
schema.

(figurative, topological)

schema and a logical

During this stage, qualitative discriminations (length,

density) have begun to be dissociated

(differentiated); however, they

are as yet not fully coordinated.
Within this frame of reference then, the child's judgment, hence,
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use of the assimilatory schema,
competence.

is conditioned by the general state of

Further, it would seem that the child's conscious and

logical control over these schema becomes evident after the transition
into the third stage which, in general, corresponds to the end of the
preoperational stage and the beginning of the concrete operational
stage.
It is interesting to note, however, that the results of Inhelder,
et al.

(1974)

showed clearly that even though a child had attained the

stage of elementary number conservation and could justify his reasoning
by using identity,

compensation and reversibility, arguments that he

could not use these arguments with respect to a length conservation
problem.

Eventually, of course, these same three arguments will be

employed with respect to length conservation but as they stand, the
conservation of length depends upon the development of the concept of
measurement in combination with the unit; hence, the child is unable to
appropriately use the same rules of logic

(identity, compensation and

reversibility) when applied to as yet a separate structure and not yet
developed.
A general definition of the learning to learn of number can now
be advanced.
The learning to learn of number is the conscious ability
to make all of the necessary differentiations, integra¬
tions and generalizations that create the basic structure
which enables the child to comprehend and deal with num¬
ber and its basic meaning.
The assimilatory structure previously identified which governs
the first stage of the development of number is that of gross
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quantification.

It's rules are not specific but are approximate, and

it is closely tied to the perceptual field or topological relations.
Therefore, the differentiation which the child makes at this stage is
as general and non-specific as is required by the assimilatory schema.
Further, the differentiations are related to the figurative aspects of
the problem,

for example, length and perceptual one-one correspondence

of small sets of objects.

The integration that the child is able to

make meets the requirements of the characteristic of this stage (gross
quantification).

The relative size of a set of objects may be deter¬

mined for the child by the length of the row alone as it can be the
predominating perceptual characteristic of an approximate sense of
bigness or gross quantity.
an invariant,

Number, because it is not as yet necessarily

is not able to be used by the child to establish equiva¬

lence between two sets of objects.

Even though the child is able at

first in a one-to-one correspondence situation to count the elements
•

in each set

•

•

•

....

and say each has four elements, once the perceptual

correspondence is destroyed the matter of which set has "more" or
"less" now becomes a problem of cardinal evaluation which is beyond
the child’s reasoning at this point.

Therefore, the integration of

the perceived dimensions is established within the child’s frame of
reference to mean which looks bigger;

i.e., the cognitive structure of

the child at this stage deals with notions of "more" and "less" as
"looks bigger" and "looks smaller."
bigger,

therefore,

it has more.

In this case, the longer set looks

"For the adult, cardinal evaluation

always presupposes that units have been added or merged in order to
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form the whole obtained by the correspondence with the set to be
evaluated.

For the child of this stage, on the contrary, the evalua¬

tion is based merely on the global quantities of the sets in question,
these quantities being quantified by comparison as 'more' or
without coordination of the comparisons."^0
stage is,

'less,'

The integration at this

therefore, limited because the child is only able to concen¬

trate on the sets one at a time and does not understand that there is
a compensatory relationship or need to coordinate them.

For these

reasons, the aspect of generalization is limited to the specific
application of one criterion at a time; i.e., length, if it is the
predominating topological factor,
case of "more" and "less."
in the number of elements

is used to establish size in the

In the case where two sets differ greatly
^ ! 1 .* . . .

, a relative and non-specific

numerosity judgment is made.
To sura up, the most general characteristic of this stage
is the irreversibility of the reactions.
The evaluations
of children at this level are purely perceptual, with the
result that qualities that are not comparable are related,
and the synthesis can only be global.
This means, in
other words, that the child’s intuitive judgment is not
combined with operations through which the elements iso¬
lated by his analysis can be put together again.
It is
precisely because the judgments of the child at this stage
lack mobility, that his thought is essentially irrevers¬
ible.71
Learning competence or the conscious control of learning processes
at this stage is also characterized by the lack of mobility and the

70Piaget, The Child’s Conception of Number, p.
71 Ibid., p.

70.

69.
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irreversibility of thought.

During the second and third stages, how¬

ever, dramatic changes take place as operational logic begins to be
structured.

Thought becomes more precise, more mobile and elementary

reversibility (renversibilite') becomes evident limited as it is to
the perceptual field.
During the second stage, qualitative or intuitive correspondence
is established.

Qualitative correspondence becomes operational when

the child is presented with small collections of objects which can be
intuitively grasped and manipulated.

Differentiated topological

features begin to be coordinated in an intensive sense, that is, they
still cannot be fully added together as there still is no concept of
the invariance of number except when dealing with very small numbers,
and reversibility is as yet limited to actual physical return to the
original state.

At this stage, the differentiation of perceptual

features remains similar to the previous stage.

However, their inte¬

gration and coordination is partially established, although it is not
operational yet.

As a consequence, judgment remains essentially

qualitative and intuitive.

For example, the equivalence of two sets

remains limited to a perceptual correspondence and is, therefore, not
a lasting equivalence based on number.

Cardinal evaluation in this

stage becomes more structured as the child determines number value of
a set or sets by counting.

This determination provides the impetus

for the dramatic development in conscious control in the form of con¬
flict which occurs at this stage, for the conflict is between cardinal
evaluation (equivalence of the two sets of objects on the basis of
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number) and perceptual evaluation of one row being longer than the
other, therefore it "looks" as though it has more.

The child then

abandons cardinal equivalence in favor of the perceptual value of more
because

'it looks bigger."

This is quotity reasoning.

The child's

intuitive understanding that quantitative judgments of "more" or
"less" objects should determine the relative size of the sets being
compared is in direct conflict with prior use of the perceptual attri¬
butes which in the previous stage establishes gross quantity.
Conscious control then begins to intervene precisely at the time
that perceptual and logical solutions come into conflict.

The child

attempts to overcome the conflict by trial and error manipulation,
compromise solutions, and retroactive corrections.

These are clear

examples of the increasing mobility and partial reversibility of
thought.

However, until number becomes an invariant, i.e., a logical

necessity, the conflict between percepts and concepts at this stage
remains unsolvable.
During the third and final stage, topological features are no
longer simple features of the situation but because they are assimi¬
lated into an operational scheme, i.e., they are acted upon by the
child’s thought structures, they can be coordinated and logically
utilized.

At this stage, a child’s thought with respect to number

exhibits a truly transformational character.

Number is assumed as a

logical necessity to be invariant and there is extensive multiplica¬
tion of the qualities dealt with.

Differentiation then must be

expressed in terms of an operational assimilatory schema.

Integrations
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are logically governed, and schemes such as counting are appropriately
applied

(generalized)

to any new situation which requires number Judg¬

ment.
In terms of conscious control, thought with respect to number is
now fully reversible, hence judgments are accurately made and are no
longer approximations.

To this degree, thought is mobile, although

this is only the beginning of the stage of concrete operations.

Con¬

crete operations are limited in the sense that the physical environ¬
ment is still at least initially required, whereas full mobility of
thought is established in formal operations where it becomes proposi¬
tional in form, and the presence of the physical environment is no
longer necessary.

Number Development Chart

The following chart diagrams a general sequence of number opera¬
tions and relates that sequence to general stage characteristics;
to descriptions of differentiation,

integration and generalization

in each stage; to an approximate chronological age scale; and to the
general transition from percept bound to logical reasoning.

As

classification and seriation are the major contributing structures,
whose eventual operational synthesis results in number, then they are
displayed separately one on each side of number.

The chart is intended

as a general description of the sequence of the attainment of various
operations.

Age dimensions represent approximations and should not

be interpreted explicitly as the individual child may vary greatly
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from the norms suggested here.

Some developmental connections between

various aspects of the operations are depicted by arrows.

Proximity

also suggests that the schemes are related but do not necessarily
derive from one another.
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STAGE

DIFFERENTIATION
INTEGRATION
GENERALIZATION

CLASSIFICATION
(SIMILARITY)

PERCEPTION
TO LOGIC

SERIAT ION
(ORDERED
Dirrac»ce)

NUMBER

5A

Operational
Number

Length
Conservation

/

Dif ferentiation
Number is conserved
and conditioned by
logical assimilatory
schema.

Arithmetical Number
Addition and Subtraction

\

Integration
Coordinated by rules;
e.g., compensation,
identity, reversi¬
bility.
Generalization
Between schema begin
to be made through
conflict although
rules of transforma¬
tion (i.e., identity,
compensation, etc.)
are not generalizable to other con¬
servations.

Measuring Based
on Division
Into Units of
Constant Size

\

Cardinal
Properties

Ordinal
Properties

(Identity,

Compensation, Reversibility)
Asymmet rical
Relation

Class Inclu¬
sion Logical

3M
Transitivity
Hierarchical
Classifica¬
tion
Intuitive
Qualification

■V V 0) «i
' ' o B

Differentiation
Number is intuitively
and perceptually

C 0)
<U OS

Counting

Direct cor¬
respondence
two seriatlon sets

based.
Integration
Child begins to apply
schema to correct
situations; i.e.,
"this is a question
of number, there¬
fore, I can count

Nurn aer
Words
Matched
With
Absolute
Quantity

to solve the prob¬
lem."
Generalization
Begins to make trial
and error judgments,
retroactive correc¬
tions, few real
coordinations, how¬

Insertion
of a
second set
of elements
in an
estab¬
lished
seriatIon

Multiple
Class
Membership

Relational
Terms Used
(More-Less,
LongerShorter)

Simple
seriation
of two
series in
perceptual
correspon¬
dence

/

Perceptual Recognition
Sets of Equivalence

Seriation
of a large
collection
by trial
and error

ever.
O uv /
U CO V

eu o.

Clobal
Quant iflcatlon

Differentiation
Static perceptual
schema of bigness.

Exhaustive
Sorting

Generalizations
Few,

if any.

One-to-One Correspondence

Magnitude Discriminations
Recite
Number

Integration
Pew coordinations
except to bigness.
Topological
Relations

Match
Similar
Visual
Arrays
of
Number

Words in
Sequence
Consistency
Sorting

Object Permanence

Seriation
of small
number
sticks
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CHAPTER

V

IMPLICATIONS FOR A PARENT-TEACHER TRAINING PROGRAM

This chapter is devoted to the formulation of a training program
on pre-numerical thinking in the young child.

The training program's

philosophy and structure must logically flow from the ANISA Theory of
Development and The Theory of Curriculum.

Further, because pre-

numerical thinking develops in the child prior to the formal school¬
ing of the child

(two through five or six years of age), this aspect

of ANISA training must apply to both parents and pre-school teachers
who are the trainers of children at this age.

The majority of children

in the world, however, will not attend a formalized pre-school program;
therefore,

the program should ideally be developed for use by parents.

Parent-teacher training in ANISA will eventually involve all
aspects of the five areas of human potentiality, only one of which is
cognitive development.

This program will, however, present only the

portion of the cognitive domain as it relates to number.

Integration

of this into the comprehensive program that an ANISA trainee will
receive, which will include not only the entire cognitive domain but
the sensori-motor, perceptual, effective or emotional, moral and voli¬
tional domains, will be an aspect of the development of the entire
model.

It is my intent, therefore, to attempt implications for a

parent and pre-school teacher training program which will be charac¬
terized by an effort to present the content knowledge or theoretical
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framework of development of number in a manner which will facilitate
putting it into practice with the child.
It is important at the outset to distinguish between the adult's
experience in this training program and the child's subsequent develop¬
ment of knowledge under the guidance of the adult.
already reasoning at a logical level;

The adult is

i.e., the adult has long since

progressed through the developmental stages which he or she will be
studying as a parent.

Therefore,

it follows that in this training pro¬

gram the adult cannot reconstruct his knowledge of how he attained the
concepts with respect to number and think mathematically in the same
manner that a child does.
between,

for example,

The conflicts which develop for the child

spatial and logical aspects of the operations

under discussion would not be experienced by the adult who is already
reasoning on a logical level.
The task of the adult is,

therefore, three-fold.

First, the adult

must understand the acquisition process or developmental processes
which occur in the developing child.

Second, the adult needs to under¬

stand the specific operations which are central to the formation of
number in the developing child, e.g., the forms of conservation,
classification, correspondence, etc.

Third, the adult must be able to

extend his general understanding to practical everyday situations with
the child.

The adult must be able to provide specific experiences

which enable the child to make the proper differentiations, integra¬
tions and generalizations.
The rather extensive and complex nature of this two-fold task as
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it relates to number development necessitates an efficient and effec¬
tive manner of presentation.

Further, to the extent possible, the

training program for the adult should reflect as many aspects of the
ANISA Theory of Development as possible, for even though the learning
task for the adult and the child are different because of differing
levels of attainment, recognized in the Theory of Development are
learning principles which apply to all levels of development.

A pro¬

gram developed by Dr. S. N. Postlethwaite, a botanist at Purdue
University,

can be adapted to facilitate an understanding of the

first two objectives in an ANISA training program for adults.
program has become known as the "Audio-Tutorial" approach.

His

The

second part would involve the parent and teacher in a controlled and
guided implementation stage with children.

During this second phase,

the third aspect of extending one’s knowledge of theory to the practi¬
cal world of the child would take place.

Part One:

An Adaptation of Postlethwaite's Program

The basic format is very flexible and is built upon many princi¬
ples of learning which are basic to the philosophy and practice of
the ANISA model.

Most basic of principles is the recognition that

knowledge is structured by the individual as a result of the actions he
or she performs on the material.
of audio-visual supports,
lated or seen,

The use of behavioral objectives, use

the presence of all materials to be manipu¬

the creation of many supportive guides for successful

student interaction with the material, the isolation of the learner
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from distractions and others are important aspects of this method.
Important also is the idea of breaking the major area of study into
discrete conceptual modules or mini-courses.
an aspect of development.

They,

Each module will cover

therefore, are central to all other

supportive materials used by the trainee in this aspect of the pro¬
gram.

Following is an outline of the adapted Postlethwaite program

as it applies to Number in an ANISA training program.
Postlethwaite has adapted the use of pre-recorded audio-tapes
as the main guide for the student's interaction with the content to
be mastered.

Their use in this ANISA training is consistent with the

philosophy of the model mainly because of the incorporated recognition
of the individual nature of the learning experience.
(parent or teacher)

Each student

is ideally provided with a tape, a play back

machine and earphones.

In this circumstance, each student is under

the complete control of how he proceeds with the guided interaction
with the content and supportive materials.

The rate, the extent of

exposure to, and the amount of repetition desired by the student are
all factors able to be controlled.
turning the tape-machine off.

The rate is controlled simply by

Repetition is accomplished by repeating

a section of the tape.
Isolation of the individual allows for minimal distractions and
maximum concentration;

i.e., the learner can be relatively isolated

from any extraneous distractions through the use of an isolated
contained space supplemented by the use of headphones.
Another important recognition by Postlethwaite is the necessity
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of the use of multiple sources of information.

In addition to the

central guiding audio-tape, the content to be mastered can be pre¬
sented, outlined and illustrated in written form.

Also, as is the

case with number development, examples of the supportive physical
material

(toys, objects, games, etc.) which will be used by the child

can be included and manipulated by the adult.

These materials can be

further supplemented for the adult's training through the use of
slides, video-tapes, Super-8 film and any other audio-visual support
felt necessary.
The inclusion of physical objects manipulated by the adult in the
training of their use recognizes an important learning principle; i.e.,
simultaneous psycho-motor, perceptual and cognitive involvement maxi¬
mizes learning.

In addition, the adult trainee will actually use a

wide variety of possible materials to be used with the child.

This

will also serve to fix in the adult frame of reference how various
materials can be used to support the development of various cognitive
schemes.
The format also allows for the modularization or division of the
main topic of number development into smaller discrete units.

For

example, a module presenting an overview of ANISA's Theory of
Development which would contain a discussion of the function of dif¬
ferentiation,

integration and generalization and learning competence

could be developed.

Other modules should be developed on the three

stages of the development of seriation, and another on classification,
and another on conservation.
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Each module Is designed as a discrete unit of sufficient length
to be engaging and challenging but brief enough to be completed
within a few hours.

Each module characteristically constitutes a

guided interaction with the topic.

The developmental sequence which

characterizes the manner in which a child's development proceeds
should be followed in the module.
This approach is not expected to provide a training procedure
which can wholly be depended upon to train adults in number develop¬
ment.

Indeed, from the extensive theoretical analysis of the preceding

chapters,

this approach has certain limitations.

It does not provide

for direct supervision and immediate feedback as would be the case in
the second part of the training procedure to be discussed where the
adult works with another adult trainer and a child.

Another limita¬

tion of this approach is that it cannot provide for practice and
generalization of the concepts covered necessary to have an adult be
a fully competent teacher.
and, most importantly,

It does, however, provide some practice

it does provide a setting whereby a complex

topic can be studied in some detail.
strength,

In this recognition lies its

for the management of the environment for the child in a way

that will provide for appropriate differentiations, integration and
generalizations and will provide aspects such as conflict, requires
the teacher to be well-grounded in the theory.
Again, number development is closely associated with the skills
of logic and as such is only a part of the total development that must
occur in the psycho-motor, perceptual, cognitive, affective and
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volitional domains of human potential.

Therefore, the utility of

this adaptation of Postlethwaite's approach is seen mainly in trans¬
mitting the content of number theory and in transmitting the content
of the Theory of Development as it applies to developmental processes.
It is expected also that the manner in which the teacher can function
as an ANISA trained interventionist can also be demonstrated in the
training program.

This approach may also be of use as an aspect of

a training program which can be used on a more extensive basis than
in the training centers alone; e.g., as in a situation where the
time and money to centralize training operations may not be available.
Trainers who lack specific expertise in early math development may also
use this package of materials as it will be by and large self-contained.
Lastly, it is hoped that the A-T approach as a vehicle will reflect
learning theory as recognized by the ANISA model;

i.e., the parent or

teacher being trained will be engaged in the processes of differentia¬
tion,

integration and generalization.

This singular aspect of cogni¬

tive development in the larger context of the entire model must be
recognized as but a small part of the release of human potential.
Therefore, this particular aspect of training must, when fully
developed, be incorporated as part of the total training that an "ANISA
teacher" would receive.

Part Two:

Implementation for the Adult Trainee

ANISA training of parents and teachers cannot solely rely upon
the program just outlined for it can only serve as a framework of
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information and experience for the adult.

A second half of training

must be an implementation stage which would make practical the use of
knowledge and materials in the home or classroom.

This aspect of the

program could be conducted in a more traditional lab-school setting
where the trainee functioned as a teacher under the guidance of
experienced ANISA personnel.

The basic task would consist of becoming

familiar with the use of various diagnostic tools and procedures for
assessing the level of the children's development to be "taught."
Second, the adult parent or teacher would then function as an ANISA
teacher interacting and guiding the children through various appro¬
priate experiences.
As this second aspect of training is much more traditional and
is already widely in use, it need not be developed further here.

It

is felt important, however, that the two aspects of this program are
complementary and even indispensable aspects of a thorough program.
The knowledge and experience gained in the first part establishes in
an easily implemented fashion a level of competence in the trained
adult.

The second aspect consolidates that competence in that it is

practical and relates to the everyday life.

The second half also

serves to provide the means for dealing with the whole child in all
of his developmental aspects.

Philosophical Considerations

Math Readiness
An important reason for considering a program designed to train
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parents and teachers of young children is directly related to its
potential for effecting the child’s growth of concepts related to
establishing a foundation of "math readiness" prior to entry into the
formal kindergarten and elementary school program.
larly that of arithmetical number,

Number, particu¬

is slowly built up from elementary

number conservation and the concepts which precede this.

The use of

number in the elementary school levels requires a firm foundation
established developmentally through years of experience.

In the

introduction to this work, mention was made of some of the research
which substantiates this math readiness perspective.
Conservation of number has been shown by several researchers
to be related to work with counting and with addition and
subtraction.
Almy, Chittenden, and Miller (1966) noted that
children who conserve at an early age do better in beginning
arithmetic than those who are late in acquiring conserva¬
tion.
Robinson (1968) also found significant relationships
between a child’s ability to conserve, seriate, and classify
and his level of achievement in Grade One.
He concluded that
conservation may be necessary but not sufficient for mathe¬
matics achievement.
Others have found that first graders
who are conservers tend to do better at certain mathematical
problem-solving tasks.
Steffe (1967) reported that the tests
of conservation of numerousness used in his study provided
an excellent prediction of success in solving addition prob¬
lems and learning addition facts for children entering first
grade.
Using the same test in a companion study or sub¬
traction, LeBlanc (1968) reported a similar conclusion.
Dodwell (1961) and Wheatley (1968) have also indicated that
the tests of number conservation that they used may be
meaningful measures of arithmetic readiness.^
Although the available research on math readiness is not as exhaus¬
tive of the topic as has been the research of development, the results

1Suydam and Weaver, "Research of Learning Mathematics," in
Mathematics Learning in Early Childhood, Thirty-Seventh Yearbook NCMT,
1975, p.

48.
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of the research reported are indeed what one would expect to find.
Many of the training studies cited earlier are of direct relevance
here.
Suydam and Weaver (1975)

summarize the studies which they reviewed

in listing what a normal five-year-old can do prior to formal training.
(1) Many children can count and find the number of objects
to ten, and some are able to count to at least twenty;
(2) Some can say the number names for tens in order (that
is, ten, twenty, thirty . . .), but far fewer can say
the names when counting by twos and fives;
(3) Most know the meaning of "first," and many can identify
ordinal positions through "fifth";
(A) Many can recognize the numerals from one to ten, and
some can write them;
(5) Most can give correct answers to simple addition and
subtraction combinations presented verbally either
with or without manipulative materials;
(6) Most have some knowledge about coins, time, and other
measures; about simple fractional concepts; and about
geometric shapes.2
This list must, of course, be interpreted in light of the fact
that elementary number conservation is not attained as an average
beginning in the latter months of the fifth year and going on into the
sixth year.

Some of what they report children can do, therefore, must

be primarily verbal and not logical.
Normative summaries may or may not correspond to what an individual
child may do, however.

For this reason, procedures need to be developed

for assessing the level of competence of each individual child in order
that training experiences be appropriate to his or her level of develop¬
ment.

2Ibid., p.

49.
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Affective Aspects
Another important consideration which effects both children and
adults lies in the affective domain of attitudes toward number and
mathematics.

It can be safely assumed that most of Piagetian

theory and the related research is beyond the concern of all but the
most avid devotee.

The selection and manner of presentation of topics

related to number development must be judicious chosen and presented
in a manner that is relatively easy to understand.

The attitude of

the adult toward the level of possible difficulty in understanding
number is specific, and the growth of logic,

in general, will undoubt-

ably affect any potential relationship with a child.
the adult to relate to the child,

The ability of

to give emotional support, to capi¬

talize on the interests of each child, to act as an arranger of environ¬
ments for the child, etc., will to a large degree be determined by an
attitude toward the subjects.

For this reason, it may be important

at some later date to distinguish between the level of involvement
that a parent would have and would,

therefore, need to be aware of and

the teacher of the young child who Is or must be a specialist and,
therefore, have a greater depth of knowledge of the subject.
The affective aspect also relates to the child in a narrow sense
in their attitude toward mathematics and in the broader sense,
entire sense of well-being.

The ANISA program will, in this broad

sense, be concerned with the development of the whole child.
ANISA,

their

For

the dynamic force behind development is effectance, that is,

effectance is the most powerful form of intrinsic motivation which
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occurs as a result of the subjective confirmation that competence is
being gained,

that development is happening and new powers and feelings

are being expressed.

Effectance,

so conceived, can only narrowly be

attributed to a specific aspect of cognitive development represented
by number.

The Whole Child
Constance Kamii, who has long distinguished herself as a teacher
and interpreter of Piaget in the classroom setting, has written many
articles on translating the Piagetian operations of classification,
seriation and number into educational terms.

Recently, Kamii and

3
DeVries

(in press) have written a book which in a sense reports an

important evolution in her thinking with respect to the education of
the whole child.

Prior to this latest work, her writings, in essence,

compartmentalized various aspects of child development into the major
categories of socio-emotional objectives and cognitive objectives.
"The previous conceptualizations no longer make sense to us for two
reasons.

First, as discussed above,

they confused the development

seen on Piagetian tasks with the development of the child in the
everyday world.
classification,

Second, they compartmentalized the objectives into
seriation, numerical reasoning, spatial reasoning, etc.

This juxtaposition of cognitive abilities as if they were separate
mechanisms

.

.

. was an assimilation of Piaget's theory into a

3Constance Kamii and Rheta DeVries, Piaget For Early Education
(In Press) .
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mechanistic notion of intelligence.

One of the most central ideas in

Piaget's theory is that intelligence develops as a whole."4 5
In light cf this realization,

she reconceptualizes the role that

education has to play in the development of the child.

First and

foremost is the development of the socio-emotional factors.

Incorpo¬

rated within this general area come what are the cognitive objectives.
Instead of emphasizing the cognitive aspects as they had been pre¬
viously,

they state that early childhood education should first "come

up with interesting ideas, problems and questions."
(1972)

Eleanor Duckworth's

article which is titled "The Having of Wonderful Ideas" is a

major source of what is meant by this.

The second cognitive objective

is to have the young child "put things into relationships and notice
similarities and differences."^

The major thrust of this curriculum

would depend upon the child coming up with new things and creating
new relationships in the learning environment which is basic to the
development of the whole child.
The ANISA model,

as is evident at this point, provides an uplift¬

ing framework through the integration of a definition of man, a philoso¬
phy, a theory of development and a theory of curriculum, in which the
total child is dealt with.

As has been stated earlier, the particular

aspect of number must, of course, be integrated into a total program
and then, and only then, will number be placed in its proper perspective.

4Ibid., p.

43 of the manuscript.

5Ibid., p. 43 of the manuscript.
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"The Having of Wonderful Ideas"

The article by Eleanor Duckworth (1972) on "The Having of Wonder¬
ful Ideas

provides an insight of important dimensions to the type of

integration which must occur on the part of the teacher attempting to
apply a program such as ANISA.

In this article, she, as has Kamii,

has spent a great deal of time and effort thinking and working with
Piagetian ideas in the classroom.

The evolution in her depth of under¬

standing is one which must be paralleled by parents and teachers who
might use this Piagetian derived number training program presented at
the end of this chapter.
Her's is essentially a struggle to bring Piaget’s Theory of
Development and the attendant Piagetian tasks
seriation,
classroom.

etc.)

(number conservation,

into the real world of a child and the world of the

She begins this struggle as one who is well-versed in the

theory and as one who has attempted to lead children through a pro¬
gressive accomplishment of Piagetian tasks.

She begins:

The other day I was going over some classic Piagetian inter¬
views with a few children to show a friend what they were
like.
One involved seriation of lengths.
I had cut ten
cellophane drinking straws at different lengths, and was
asking the children to put them in order, from smallest to
biggest.
The first two seven-year-olds did it with no dif¬
ficulty and little interest.
And then came Kevin.
Before
I said a word about the straws, he picked them up and said
to me, 'I know what I’m going to do,’ and proceeded, on his
own, to seriate them by length.
He didn’t mean, 'I know
what you’re going to ask me to do.’
He meant, 'I have a
wonderful idea about what to do with these straws.
You’ll
be surprised by my wonderful idea.'
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It wasn't easy for him.
He needed a good deal of trial
and error as he set about developing his system.
But he
was so pleased with himself when he accomplished his self¬
set task that when I decided to offer them to him to keep
(ten whole drinking straws!) he glowed with joy, showed
them to one or two select friends, and stored them away
with other treasures in a shoe box.
The having of wonderful ideas is what I consider to be the
essence of intellectual development.
And I consider it
the essence of pedagogy to give Kevin the occasion to have
his wonderful ideas, and to let him feel good about him¬
self for having them.6
She cites two other examples similar to this one in which the
child succeeded in having their own wonderful ideas about the logical
nature of the Piagetian task.

One involved a six-year-old girl named

Stephanie who discovered and wrote an essay on the compensation of
height versus volume while working with capillary tubes.

The second

example involved an example cited by Piaget of the boy who discovered
that he could arrange ten items in a row and count them and then put
them in a circle and count them and he still came up with ten items.
The wonderful idea in this case involved the conservation of number.
Each of these instances involved a high level of interest and a
sense of accomplishment and pride on the part of the child who made the
important discovery.
I think it must be that the whole enterprise was his own
wonderful idea (referring to the boy who discovered number
conservation).
He raised the question for himself, and
figured out, for himself, how to try to answer it.
In
essence, I am saying that he was in a transitional moment,

^Eleanor Duckworth, "The Having of Wonderful Ideas," Harvard
Education Review,

1972, 42,

2, p.

218.
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and Stephanie and Kevin were, too.
He was at a point where
a certain experience fit into certain thoughts, and he took
then a step forward.
I think a powerful pedagogical point can be made from this.
These three instances dramatize it, because they deal with
children moving ahead with Piaget notions, which are usually
difficult to advance with any one experience.
The point
has two aspects:
First, the right question at the right
time can move children to peaks in their thinking which
result in significant steps forward and real intellectual
excitement; and second, although it is almost impossible
for the adult to know exactly the right time for a given
question for a given child—especially for a teacher who
is concerned with thirty or more children—children can
raise the right question for themselves when the setting
is right.
And once the right question is raised, they are
moved to tax themselves to the fullest to find an answer.
The answers did not come easily in any of these three cases,
but the children were prepared to work them through.
Having
confidence in one's ideas doesn't mean, 'I know my ideas
are right'; it means, 'I am willing to try out my ideas.'7
The essence of her ideas concerning the having of wonderful ideas
on the part of the child is then in finding ways to interest children
in order that their own zest for learning be supported and allowed to
flourish.

She asserts that there is a wide gulf between a theory of

development and a theory of curriculum and then application in a class¬
room setting.
A theory of intellectual development might have been the
basis of a theoretical framework for a curriculum.
But in
making things work in a classroom, it was but a small part
when compared with finding ways to interest children, to
take into account different children's interests and
abilities, to help teachers with no special training in the
subject, and so forth.8

7Ibid. , p.

222.

8Ibid., p.

220.
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She goes on to state that her knowledge of Piaget's theory of
intellectual development and prior attempts to apply it directly to
educational settings by leading the child through Piagetian tasks, lead
her to directly confront the crux of the problem; namely,
taining the child's interest.

that of main¬

Direct application of skills in a situa¬

tion tightly controlled by the teacher did little to spark the child's
interest.

Whereas skillful arrangement of the environment and asking

the right question at the right time proved to lead the child to make
his own discoveries.

She explains that "there are essentially two

aspects to providing occasions for wonderful ideas,
prepared to accept children's ideas.

then.

One is being

The other is providing a setting

which suggests wonderful ideas to children—different ideas to dif¬
ferent children—as they get caught up in intellectual problems that
are real to them."

q

The second aspect of her criteria is directly derived from a tho¬
rough and intimate familiarity with the Theory of Development and the
Theory of Curriculum.

This level of competence is relatively easily

attained by the adult through training programs, such as this one on
the development of number.

The first criterion lies at the heart of

what may distinguish an effective "ANISA" teacher or parent from an
ineffective one, precisely for the reason that it allows a child to
develop his own creative potentials for purposive activity and hence
allows the child the all important feeling of "effectance."

9Ibid., p,

224.

All of
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this leads to the formulation of the most fundamental objective;

i.e.,

the task for the parent or teacher is not to teach Piagetian tasks
from an instructive or didactic perspective, but is rather to provide
a setting in which the child's interest, initiative and sense of
curiosity and feeling of accomplishment are supported.
Kamii and DeVries provide many examples of situations both in the
everyday life situations of the child and others arranged by the
teacher whereby this objective is met.

For this reason, their work

should be required reading for any ANISA trained program.
Earlier in this work, research on the child's understanding of the
words "more" and "less" was presented.
from this research.

Two points can be summarized

First, relational terminology; i.e., the child's

understanding of the words "more" and "less" as specific examples and
in general the child's developing facility with language in general,
are integrally linked to the child's developing logical capacities,
not in a causal relationship but in a simultaneous and intertwined
manner.

Second, most young children do not understand and therefore

do not use the words "more" and "less" in a correct manner until the
age of four and five.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that an

understanding of these words should be part of what a teacher is con¬
cerned with.

Kamii and DeVries include an example using these words

which supports the perspective of involving the child s interest and
at the same time the words are used meaningfully.

The device used is

an elastic toy which is fastened to the edge of a table.

The child is

presented with the problem of finding something heavy enough to make
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the elastic stretch to the floor and possibly even "break."

The situa¬

tion is naturally enough an exciting situation for the child.
situation,
long,

In this

the teacher uses the words "heavy" and "light," "short" and

and

more" and "less."

The level of involvement of the child

is high for obvious reasons, whereas, other situations which could
emphasize the correct use of the relational terms might not be.

For

example, "Does this set contain more candies than this one?" or "Which
row has more?"
research,

These two questions are of the model used in most

including Piaget's.

Employed directly, these questions seem

dull and uninteresting, but in the right circumstance, they are alive
and interesting.

Kamii and DeVries record many such ideas.

Duckworth cites similar examples using, for example, biological
phenomena which if presented in one way can be exciting, but if taught
to the young child, loses all potential for involving the child’s
interest.

She states:

knowledge,

such familiarity, seem interesting and accessible to the

child.

"So the best one can do is to make such

That is, one can familiarize children with a few phenomena in

such a way as to catch their interest,
their own questions,

to let them raise and answer

to let them realize that what they can do is

significant—so that they have the interest, the ability, and the selfconfidence to go on by themselves.
The point being made need not be belabored any further.

In sum¬

mary, however, it is clear that it is a consideration which initiates

10 Ibid., p. 225.
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from the very heart of ANISA's
development.

For this reason,

conceptualization about the nature of
it necessitates careful planning and.

most importantly, an orientation and attitude toward teaching.
orientation presented above becomes even more challenging
when the learning studies work of Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet
are considered.

(1974)

It has been reported earlier that their studies

involved a careful and scientific manipulation of the structures of
knowledge to induce learning with a consequent change in the organiza¬
tional structures.

None of their studies assessed the level of

interest of the children, yet dramatic operative development occurred,
especially among those children who were in a transitional stage.
The application of such scientifically-based training is not only con¬
cerned with ANISA theory but clearly characterizes ANISA's approach to
child development.
Jordan and Streets,
cited earlier,

in the opening paragraphs of an article

1 discuss the deleterious effects of poorly planned and

executed programs and state:

"Perpetuation of the tendency to imple¬

ment new programs without regard for careful thinking,
planning and painstaking evaluation is disturbing.

long-range

Logically, such

thinking and planning would draw upon the vast body of research find¬
ings concerning the development of children and provision would then
be made to apply those findings systematically and to assess their
practical utility.

.

.

. Either we must find a way of translating

^Jordan and Streets, "The ANISA Model:
Educational Planning," 1973.

A New Basis for
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what we know into a powerful and comprehensive system of educational
practice or face the continuation of insignificant results that
inevitably comes from piecemeal, short-term and, therefore, necessarily
superficial program planning.
The incorporation of the carefully designed and implementive
methods of Inhelder, et al.

(1974)

into an educational effort such as

ANISA’s will require the careful and painstaking analysis referred
to above.

Educational experiences which are designed to evoke inferen¬

tial mechanisms in response to cognitive conflict are matters of suffi¬
cient complexity such that they can only be handled by a well-trained
teacher.

The potential of such careful and scientific manipulation to

effect not only the rate of development but also to maximize the effec¬
tiveness of educational planning appears to be exactly what is intended
by the commentary of Jordan and Streets.

The Development of a Parent-Teacher Training Program

This,

the concluding section of this chapter,

is devoted to the

specifications for the units of the first part of the training program.
First,

a general outline of the units to be considered in this program

will be discussed.

Second, an example of a finished unit with objec¬

tives, materials, student booklet and a transcript of a narrative which
is to be taped is presented.

■^■^Ibid. , pp.

289-290.
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Suggested Units for Development
Part of the philosophy of this approach is to divide a topic of
reasonable complexity, such as number development, for example, into
a series of easily understood units.

Therefore, each of these units

should be deliberately kept short and have a limited number of major
objectives.

The first unit to be suggested is an overview of the most

fundamental factors in the development of number.
The Fundamental Properties of Number.

This unit should emphasize

the development of the relations of similarity and ordered difference
as they relate to number.
number.

The unit is introduced as the fundamental

Logic is suggested as that property of thinking which allows

the child to synthesize similarity and ordered difference relations
into number.
The Conservation of Number.

The role of conservation and its

importance to the development of logical thinking should be considered
the central theme of this unit.
number thinking,

Early stages in the development of

for instance gross quantification, should be con¬

trasted with the use of the logical-mathematical arguments of identity,
reversibility, and compensation.

Conflict in the intuitive stage may

provide the focus of the contrast suggested above.

Two further addi¬

tions might be considered within this context, namely,

the intuitive

visual number sense and the importance of using small collections of
objects in initial training sequences.

Second, relational terminology

can also be discussed in this context.

The development of an accurate

understanding of "more," "less" and "same," are examples of relational
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words.
Classification.

This unit would explore the various forms of

classifactory skills, such as simple sorting, hierarchical, classifi¬
cation and the class inclusion relation, within a developmental con¬
text.

These should then be integrated with number in general and the

cardinal property in specific.
Seriation.

This unit would explore in detail the various forms

of ordered difference relations.

Simple seriations, seriation with

correspondence and other more complex forms of seriation would be
explored within a developmental context.
Diagnosis of Developmental Level or Level of Competence.
unit is most appropriate for teachers rather than parents.

This

Prior to

formal training, accurate diagnosis of the level of competence is not
thought to be crucial.

Accurate diagnosis may also require the use of

specific and complex tests and is,
cern for the layman.

therefore, beyond the level of con¬

Accurate diagnosis followed by training of

specific skills and the manipulation of structures after the model
established by Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet (1974) requires a
specialist such as a teacher.

Prototypical Experiences

Appendix B has been developed to provide a definition of each of
the skills of structures important to the development of number and
logical thinking.

Each definition is followed by suggested materials

which should be considered prototypical; i.e., materials used by the
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teacher can be modeled after the suggested materials.

Therefore,

this

list of materials should in no way function to limit what a teacher
uses but should instead be suggestive of things in the real world of
the child which can be used.
The following unit is an example of what is intended as an adapta¬
tion of Postlethwaite’s program.

It indicates a statement of objec¬

tives, materials, booklet and transcript.

The Meaning of Yan:

A Unit on the Fundamental

Properties of Number

Objectives
Upon completion of this unit,

the student should be able

to:
(1) Describe what a quality is.
(2) Describe how qualities are structured into rela¬
tions based on similarity.
(3) Describe what a difference is.
(4) Describe how differences are structured into
relations of ordered difference.
(5)

Relate the similarity relation and ordered dif¬
ference relation to number.

Materials
Box A:
and yellow,

Contains a set of attribute plastic shapes of red, blue
small and large, circles, squares and triangles.
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Box B:

Contains a set of cubical solids, rectangular solids and

triangular solids which should be stacked into a tower.

However, the

difference in dimensions should not be regular.
Box C:

Contains a set of ten rods of the same design as

Cuisenaire rods.

The difference in this case has the property of being

a unit difference.
Booklet, for the students'

use.

Page 1 should contain a list of the objectives.
Page 2 should, at the top, have
I.

yan
tyan
tethera
sethra
methra

II.

Page 3.

Box A groups.

Explain the meaning of yan in terms of
similarity and ordered difference rela¬
tions .
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Music.

Hello.

a yan, you ask?
find the word

This is a unit on the meaning of yan.

What'9

In the booklet you have been provided with you will
yan" at the top of a list of words.

I'll give you a

little problem to see if you can figure out what a yan is.

You will

need your pencil or pen and should use the space in the booklet to
down the problem.

Ready!

If a yan plus a tyan equal a

tethera — Music — and three tyans equals a sethra — Music — and
two tethras also equal a sethra, what does a tethra minus a tyan
equal?

Music

Have you got it?

A tethra plus a yan equals a sethra.
it?

If not, I shall give you a hint:
What then is a yan?

If you did, you know that six yans also equals a sethra.

it or not,
number.

Most children do not attain an understanding of the concept

for this,

loop.

Believe

the concept of yan is basic to a child's understanding of

of yan until they are five or six years old.

"A".

Did you get

There are several reasons

the first of which we will explore by using the box labelled

In the box, you will find a number of objects and one string
Take these out and set them on the table before you.

loop and lay it out.

Take the

Now see how many different ways you can group

or sort the plastic objects in the loop.

Stop the tape and write as

many of the ways that you can think of in the space under the Roman
numeral II. — Music — How many ways did you find?

It so happens

that there are nearly fifty ways to group these objects.

If you did

not devise nearly that number, stop the tape and try again.
are,

There

as you have discovered, many ways to group these objects, all of

which depended upon the recognition and use of the qualities of the
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objects,

such as color or shape or size of the objects.

You could have

used any one of the qualities alone to define your group, or you could
have used two together, such as color and shape.

All three could have

been used also,

such as large red triangles or large blue straight-

edged objects.

Our world is filled with such qualities,

the grouping

of which depends upon establishing a relationship of similarity.
Similarity relations as it turns out have a great deal to do with the
child’s understanding of number.

As you might expect,

it takes the

child a long time to develop to the point where he or she can do what
you have just done.

This difference between the way in which you

approached the problem and the way in which a child might do it is that
you have the rules of logic to use where the child does not.

Logical

thinking slowly develops in the child and part of it happens through
the child's use of the similarity relation.
similarity relation has to do with number.
ask you a question.

Now you ask what the
To answer this, I shall

When can apples equal elephants?

Never, but a

given number of apples, say three, can equal the same number of
elephants.

A group of three apples and a group of three elephants

have the same number property, but this property of three is not
apparent to the very young child.

A group of three apples equals a

group of three elephants when the child is able to understand a property
of the groups which is not present when qualities are considered alone,
for elephants and apples have little in common.

Number then necessi¬

tates the use of the similarity relation in a logical way.
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In order to illustrate a second property of number, I would like
you to take the box labelled "B" and build a tower.
do this.

What does your tower look like?

Stop the tape and

Chances are you put the

largest object on the bottom and built from there to the smallest on
the top.

You recognized immediately that there was a difference in

the size of the objects.
largest to smallest.

Further, you arranged those differences from

In the box labelled "C", you will find a series

of ten rods which can be arranged again from largest to smallest or
smallest to largest. — Music — This group is different from the
one you used to build the tower in that the difference between each
is the same,

that is,

the differences equal one another.

the second important characteristic of number.

This then is

Essentially,

it is not

a relationship of similarity but it is a relationship of difference.
The ability to order the differences is again something that you are
able to do easily as an adult possessed of logical thinking.

However,

for the child this ability is slowly built, as it first depends upon
noticing the differences and, most importantly, being able to put those
differences into an ordered relationship.
Now we can return to the first question,
the word yan?"

"What is the meaning of

Stop the tape and see if you can write a statement

explaining the meaning of yan using the concepts of similarity and
ordered difference, which we have just explored; that is, how can you
use these relationships to figure out what you mean? — Music —
Yan is, of course,
one.

One plus two

equal to the basic unit or to the concept

(a yan plus tyan)

equals three or tethra.

Three
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twos equal six or sethra as would two threes equal six.
tethra, or three, minus two, or tyan, equals a yan.

Therefore,

The problem

clearly required a relationship of ordered difference between these
words equal to the unit one which never changes.

Also, as we see,

there are several different ways to arrive at six.
ones or three twos or two threes.

You can add six

All of these groups depend upon

the group or six elements being similar to another group of six ele¬
ments.

These relationships are technically described as the cardinal

property of number which depends on the similarity relation and the
ordinal property which depends upon the ordered difference property
of number.
In closing,

it is important to emphasize again that these proper¬

ties of number for the child are slowly built up from first being able
to notice similarity and differences among objects,

then to place

similarity and difference into more complex relationships and finally
possess both of these characteristics.

The words "yan," "tethra" and

so forth are actually a system of numbers found in Yorkshire, England
and are Celtic in origin.

After the Unit

Upon completion of this aspect of the program, the adult must
now be guided in a situation which will require generalization of these
concepts of similarity and ordered difference.

This generalization is

with respect to the real world of the child, where aspects of everyday
experience are placed within the conceptual framework.

The adult would

then be able to interact with the child in a manner that would
encourage differentiations, integrations and generalizations.
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FURTH'S KNOWING CIRCLE

The following diagram (the knowing circle)
Furth’s work titled Piaget and Knowledge.

is directly taken from

It is an attempt by Furth to

specify in a schematic way the relationship of the various functional
elements of Piaget’s theory.

Real Event

Functional
Intei;iorizatiofr

Motor
Output

\

\

c

o

<TJ

Sensory
Input

Assimilation

Coordinating 'g
At straction
o
o
o

X

5

<

The solid lines schematize
sensori-motor knowing.
At
that stage, the circle is
only closed when it is part
of an external motor reac¬
tion.
The sensori-motor
scheme.
Operational thinking (repre¬
sented by the broken line)
is characterized by a grow¬
ing dissociation between
the knowing act and its
particular external mani¬
festation.
By means of
functional internalization
the knowing circle is closed
without external action.

Inner Structure
(1) The circle assimilates or incorporates the real event into the
structure and at the same time accommodates the structure to the
particular features of the real event.
(2) Only through the closing of the circle is the real event turned
into an object of knowing,

i.e. , an event that is known, and
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the structure into an active knowing structure.
(3) The growth and development of the internal structure is pri¬
marily due to the coordinating abstraction which feeds back
from the knowing activity itself to the enrichment of the
structure.
(A) The internal structure is not something that at any time was
external and gradually became internalized, rather,

it is

developmentally and phylogenetically related to the living
organization itself which at no level can be considered as
being outside the organism.
(5)

Functional interiorization is thus the specific condition of
a knowing in which external motor reaction is no longer an
essential prerequisite, although it may well remain accompany¬
ing the phenomena.

(6)

In the case of a sensori-motor scheme, there issues an external
act,

in the case of an operational scheme, an internal knowing.

(7) Piaget refers to internal knowing by different terms:
a) Operations — When emphasizing their being part of a
structure;
b) Judgment

— When he considers assimilatory activity
that assigns an event as belong to a
structure;

c)

Concept

— When he focuses on the operational
scheme as the common source of
assimilations.
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For Piaget's theory at all developmental levels, knowledge is
basically linked to the biological internal organization.

Knowledge

does not merely derive from the taking in of external data; the
organism is interacting with the environment, transforms or constructs
external reality into an object of knowledge.

Hans Furth, Piaget and Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 75-76.
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PROTOTYPICAL EXPERIENCES

Each prototypical experience is designed to provide a setting in
which the child encounters an environment with specific limitations
designed to strengthen a specific cognitive operation.
arranged environments,

i.e.,

Many of the

learning situations, can be used in a

variety of ways to strengthen various cognitive abilities,

simply by

altering the manner in which the interaction takes place.

In addition,

it must be recognized that cognitive structures occur developmentally,
that is, some are designed for the child who as yet has not become
competent in that operation.

It must also be borne in mind that the

theoretical developmental sequence presented on number suggest that
experience must proceed simultaneously in the operation's prerequisite
to number, mainly classification and seriation.
Most of the experiences suggested here are direct applications of
tests Piaget used to explore epistomic questions.

They can be adapted

to be used either as diagnostic tools to explore the state of the
child's development or they can be applied as educational experiences.
In general,

the educational sequencing of experiences should

follow the sequence of the successive planes of the structuration of
knowledge.

First comes discrimination of perceptual attributes, then
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their coordination in conservation, classification and seriation
problems which are then extended into numeration problems involving
cardination, ordination, addition and multiplication of relations.

Set No. I:

Discrimination, Differentiation
(Qualitative Analysis)

Discrimination, differentiation of perceptual attributes
such as:
length, height, width, squareness, roundness,
color, shape, smallest, largest, etc.
Part of these
exercises is involved with labelling, as in knowing or
attaching a word to a color or shape.
This is a very
basic form of qualitative analysis.
A simple form of
quantitative analysis can be introduced also in a global
recognition and comparison of relative size, as in the
largest or smallest circle.
A.

Each of the perceptual dimensions, such as color,
shape, size,

should be explored.

(1) From a set of red, yellow and blue circles,
squares and triangles of various sizes,
the child is asked to pick out a single
dimension
a) Circle, square or triangle.
b) A red, yellow or blue object.
c) A large or small object.
(2)

Coordination of two dimensions
a) A red circle or yellow triangle.
b) A large red object.

(3)

Coordination of three dimensions
a) A small red circle or large blue square.

321

B.

Another aspect of the use of crlterial attributes is
in the recognition and use of different critical
attributes of the same object or objects.

This might

be titled "changing criterial attributes."
(1) Using the red, yellow and blue squares, circles
and triangles, the child can be asked to spon¬
taneously classify the set of all objects by
being asked to divide them into two piles.
After a division has taken place have a dis¬
cussion of the criteria used.
Then ask the
child to divide the entire set in another way,
asking then "How did you separate them this
time?"

Set No. II:

Class Inclusion

(Simple Qualitative Analysis)

Differentiated or discriminated criterial attributes can be
explored from a perspective of their sameness; i.e., among a field or
set of objects similarities can be used to form elementary sets.

The

previous prototypical set which emphasized differentiation can be
modified to emphasize a discussion of sameness, or evaluation of simi¬
larity across many objects.

Shapes, both solid and figural, as in

closed, open, curved line and straight lined, could be used.
forming solid shapes could be the circles,
tioned before.
of this form.

Material

squares and triangles men¬

Buttons of various shapes, sizes, and colors also are
Figures can also be drawn on separate pieces of paper as

S , ^ A I
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The child is asked with materials of this type to separate or
divide them into two or three groups.

Generally,

it is important for

the young child to have the materials in a form that can be manipu¬
lated physically instead of conceptually as would be the case if they
were drawn on a board or piece of paper.

It is also important that

the materials be able to be separated in a number of different ways.
For instance,

the geometric figures could be divided into two sets,

one containing curved lines and the other straight lines.

The same

materials could be divided into two sets of open and closed figures.

Set No. Ill:

Seriation

(Simple Quantitative Analysis)

Seriation conceptually deals with ordered difference.

Simple

seriation is the ordering of materials along one dimension of dif¬
ference, such as:
can simply be,

length, height, or color.

Materials, therefore,

for example, a set of six sticks each differing in

length from shortest to longest

jj

|

I

I

I

Ij

•

ManV other examples

which may conceptually be more complicated can be drawn from an order
of events perspective.

These might be in the form of picture cards of

a glass being filled with liquid

—| Ld fel

•

An? event

which can be simply illustrated and that takes place in a logical
sequence can be used as material.
The child In each of these examples Is asked to place the objects
or pictures In order.

The reasons for the order can then be discussed
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Set No.

IV:

Conservation

(Quantitative Analysis)

Conservation conceptually deals with the ability to preserve the
invariance of a characteristic despite a transformation of some sort.
Most transformations used by Piaget are simple perceptual or position
changes of the materials involved.
A.

Continuous quantity
Liquid is a good example of a continuous
quantity that is easily transformed in shape.
Piaget used either a drink that was familiar to
the child, such as orangeade or lemonade, or he
used colored water as the basic material.

Glasses

or beakers of various sizes are also needed.
(1) A friend has orangeade, the child has
lemonade.
Each glass is filled to exactly
the same height.
(2) The child is asked "who has more?"
The
child is able to adjust the amounts by add¬
ing more to either glass until he agrees
that they are the same.
(3) The friend's is then taken and poured into
a taller and thinner glass.
"Now who has
more?"
(4) The friend's is then poured back into the
original glass.
"Who has more now?"
(5) The friend's may then be divided among
several smaller glasses.
"Who has more
now?"
These are then returned to the
original glass.

324

B.

Discontinuous Quantity
Materials for this type of conservation exer¬
cise might be a set of any of a variety of separate
objects, such as beans or seeds, or beads.
(1) Both teacher and child have a pile of beans.
As the teacher takes one bean, the child is
instructed also to take one out of the pile
and place it into a glass.
The teacher
might have a short, wide glass and the child
a tall, thin glass.
The child is asked each
time, "Are they the same?"
After placing
ten beans one by one into their glasses, the
child is asked, "Who has more?" The Stage I
child will eventually concede that he has
more, indicating a conflict between percep¬
tion and one-one correspondence.
(2) Another variation with these materials is to
pour them into various containers, asking
each time if they are the same.
The ques¬
tion of their sameness might be also
approached by asking the child if we made a
necklace with the beads, "Whose would be the
longest?"
C.

Conservation of Number
Conservation of number tests typically involve
the comparison of two sets of objects.
would lay out in a row,

The teacher

for example, six counters.

The child is then asked to select from a pile of
counters exactly the same number of counters, no
more, no less.

The teacher, if necessary, arranges

both sets so that there is a perceptual correspondence.

The question is asked again, "Do we each

have the same number?"

Then one of the rows is
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shortened or lengthened, and the child is asked
again if they both have the same number.

Set No. V:

Class Inclusion and

Quantitative Analysis

This basic exercise is intended to develop quantitative judgment
of more or less through the construction of sets.

The materials are

basically a number of round and square pieces roughly the same size.
There are two colors,
same color

three squares and three round pieces of the

(white) and two squares and two round of another color

(red) .
The child is asked to identify the various dimensions present
such as roundness or squareness or the two colors that are present.
Then the child is asked to place all of the white ones in a pile.

The

remaining pile consists of round and square shapes of the same color.
Questions after this might be "Are there more red ones than white
ones?" or "Are there more red ones than round ones?" or "Are there
more white ones than square ones?

Set No. VI:

Conservation and

One-One Correspondence

One-to-one correspondence is the first stage of establishing what
is later conserved as a lasting equivalence between objects or sets of

objects.

Quantitative correspondence is established between two
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conceptually connected objects,

such as a flower and Its vase or an

egg and an egg cup or in the form of a penny exchanged for an object
"purchased" as a piece of candy.
A.

Provoked Correspondence
Flowers and vases or eggs and egg cups.
The child is asked, "What do we put in vases?"
"Flowers" is the response.

Instructions can

then be given that we will have one flower in
each of seven vases.
presented.

A pile of flowers is then

The child is then told to pick a

flower out of the pile and place one near each
vase.

"Do we have the same number?"

The child’s

answer can be confirmed by placing each flower
in its vase.

The flowers can then be taken out

and bunched together in front of the vases.

"Now

do we still have the same number of both?"
A similar sequence could be followed for
eggs and egg cups or through the exchange of
one penny for each object purchased.

The

Stage I child will no longer see the two sets as
equivalent after a transformation takes place.
B.

Spontaneous Correspondence and the Cardinal Value of Sets
In this type of encounter, the child has to
find the correspondence between a model and a set
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he is to construct.

Here the objects need not be

of a homogeneous nature such as all buttons, or pen¬
nies, but may be a set of irregular objects.

The

child is simply asked to construct an equivalent
set by any method of his own demise.

The models

should be of differing perceptual or configural
arrangements,

i.e.,
•® o

000000%

7

o

a

%

O

0*0
0
00

1

o o
o*o

•

•

After an equivalent set has been constructed
according to the child,

the constructed set can

be rearranged and their equivalence questioned.
Equivalence in this example can be of a
numerical nature if correspondence is established
on the basis of equal number in each set.
here is,

therefore,

Explored

the cardinal value of a set.

A Stage I child may use number to begin with but
after rearrangement will not be able to preserve
equivalence because of the overwhelming perceptual
transformation that has taken place.

Set No. VII:

Serial and

Ordinal Correspondence

Ordinal correspondence fundamentally depends upon position in the
order.

This order can either be one of actual position or it can be
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completely conceptual.

To illustrate the example of Piaget's dolls

and sticks model is discussed.
Materials for this consist of a set of dolls of increasing height
and a set of walking sticks of various heights.
ated by the child.

Each set can be seri¬

The child is after the construction of the serial

order of the dolls asked to choose a walking stick for each doll.
Research has indicated that it is conceptually no more difficult to
arrange in order each set separately and then match the sets by bring¬
ing them together

(double seriation) than to construct one seriation

and find the corresponding element from the second set
tion with correspondence).

(simple seria¬

One of the major factors contributing to

this is found in the fact that the correspondence is determined by
physical position in the order.

Much more difficult is finding the

correspondence between doll and stick without having previously
arranged or order the set.
this.

Only the third stage child is capable of

Ordination at this stage is truly numerical in character.

Set No. VIII:

Ordination and Cardination

Experiences of this type are intended for either the Stage II or
III child as they involve what must be numerical reasoning.

Generally,

the child is required to evaluate from a perspective of simultaneously
considering the cardinal value of a set and position within the set or
ordinal values.

Success in working at this level indicates that the

unit is understood, or is close to being understood.
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A.

Cards and Ordination-Cardination
Materials for this experience are con¬
structed equivalent to unit lengths;

i.e.,

the

first card A - 1 unit of height, card B « 2
units of height, card C ■ 3 units of height,
etc.

If A ■> 1 and C ■ 3, then C - 3A or

C ■ A + A + A.

The child is asked to construct

the series or a staircase A-F.

The child is

then asked how many cards like A could we make
with B or C or F.

Cards can then be picked at

random to further test this form of cardination.
In this series,

the ordinal position also cor¬

responds to its cardinal value; i.e., the
fourth card D*=A + A + A + A.

This can be

utilized if we ask the child how many steps has
the doll climbed if it is on step F.

Finally,

the staircase can be destroyed; i.e., the visual
seriation is destroyed and the same cardinal and
ordinal questions can be asked.

Only the third

stage child can answer these questions.
B.

Insertion of Extra Sticks in an Already Existent or
Just Constructed Series by the Child
The materials are one set of sticks (A, B, C,
D, E, F) and a second set

(a, b, c, d, e, f)

such

that "a" is a length longer than "A" but shorter
than "B".

First the series

constructed.

(A, B, C, D, E, F)

is

Then the child is asked to insert

the remaining stairs such that we have
(AaBbCcDdEeFf).

The doll can then be introduced

and questions asked concerning how many stairs
have been climbed.
Mats and Hurdles
This 1h a slightly more complex example
because it involves a lag between the cardinal
and ordinal values.

Basically, we have a set of

hurdles from shortest to tallest and a set of
nine mats to place between the hurdles.

The

teacher might begin by placing two mats around
the first hurdle and ask the child to place the
remaining in the set.

The lag comes because after

the doll has Jumped two hurdles, three mats have
been touched.

Questioning then proceeds utiliz¬

ing this asking how many hurdles have been Jumped
and mats touched if the doll is here, for example.
The relationship may be explored also by removing
the mats and some of the hurdles and asking, "How
many mats are needed for the remaining hurdles?"
Lastly,

the arrangement can be destroyed and the

same questions asked.
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Set No.

IX:

Additive and Multiplicative Composition

Compositions of a complex type require manipulation of several
relationships simultaneously.
provide an interesting example.

Classes in a hierarchical relationship
We define a whole as the wider class

with various sub-classes as parts.

Manipulation of the part-whole,

whole-part relationship requires the presence of conservation, class
inclusion rules and an understanding of ordered differences of seriation.

For instance,

the sub-classes of A = basset hounds and A' =

all other dogs add to make the class B of all dogs.

This type of

relationship specifies and A + A + A ^ 3A rather A + A + A = A.
states and A + A’

= B, or B - A' = A.

Numerically,

It

this is related

to the whole being defined, for example as 7 and A + A' add to equal
the whole such that 1+6, 2+5,

3+4 all equal 7.

Continuing with the dog example, we can further make the relation¬
ships more complex by adding wider classes.

For example, B = all

dogs and B^ equals all other mammals such that B + B1 = C where C =
all mammals; C^ = all other vertebrates such that C + C^ = D, where
D = all vertebrates.

Finally, we have A + A^ + B + B^ + C + C^ = D.

Composition of relations as was mentioned in the elaborate descrip¬
tion is dependent upon two systems of quantification.
logical transitivity of relations.

The first is the

Herein is the ability to understand

part-whole relations such that from the example being discussed,
class C contains sub-classes B and B1 and B contains sub-classes A and
A"*-,

therefore, A< C;

i.e., sub-class A is a part of the larger class C.
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Secondly, composition of relations depends upon the ability to parti¬
tion the whole into equal units,

the concept of proportions.

Addition and multiplication of relations are hierarchical stages
of composition or quantification.
relationships along one dimension.

The former is the ability to compose
This is related to what Piaget

identifies as intensive quantification.

Multiplication of relations

is the ability to compose relationships on more than one dimension
simultaneously.

This is related to extensive quantification, as in the

idea of true proportions where what is lost in the dimension of height
is gained in the dimension of width in a volume problem.
A.

Additive Composition of Classes
Generally, materials for this in a simple
example would consist of a set of objects B
definable in purely qualitative terms.

A and A^

are subsets of set B also definable in purely quali¬
tative terms.

For example, B is a set of wooden

beads most of which are brown (subset A) and two of
them are white (subset A^).

The problem for the

child is to discover if there are more elements In
B than in A.

Specifically,

the question would be,

"Are there more wooden beads than brown beads?"
B.

Additive Composition Involving Numbers
Two sets of sweets, both totalling eight
(A + A) and

(7+1), are used in a setting where

the child is told he will get four sweets today
and four tomorrow or he will get seven ones the
first day and one on the second.
basically,

The question is

"Will there be the same to eat in the

two days?"
Multiplication of Relations
One example used by Piaget is where the child
is given three differently shaped containers, all
filled with an equal quantity of liquid, and
several empty vessels.

Perceptually, it looks as

though there is more liquid in the taller and thin¬
ner container.

The child is asked simply whether

the quantities are the same, greater than or less
than one particular container of the set.

Then the

child is asked what can be done to be sure that
there is more in one of them.

